When were atomic weapons created? Who invented the atomic bomb? History of the atomic bomb

One of the first practical steps of the Special Committee and the PSU was the decision to create a production base for the nuclear weapons complex. In 1946, a number of important decisions were made in connection with these plans. One of them concerned the creation of a specialized design bureau for the development of nuclear weapons at Laboratory No. 2.

On April 9, 1946, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted closed resolution No. 806-327 on the creation of KB-11. This was the name of the organization designed to create a “product,” that is, an atomic bomb. P.M. was appointed head of KB-11. Zernov, chief designer - Yu.B. Khariton.

By the time the resolution was adopted, the issue of creating KB-11 had been worked out in detail. Its location has already been determined, taking into account the specifics of future work. On the one hand, the particularly high degree of secrecy of the planned work and the need to conduct explosive experiments predetermined the choice of a sparsely populated area hidden from visual observations. On the other hand, one should not move too far away from enterprises and organizations co-executing the nuclear project, a significant part of which were located in the central regions of the country. An important factor was the presence of a production base and transport arteries on the territory of the future design bureau.

KB-11 was tasked with creating two versions of atomic bombs - a plutonium bomb using spherical compression and a uranium bomb with cannon rapprochement. Upon completion of development, it was planned to conduct state tests of the charges at a special testing ground. The ground explosion of the plutonium bomb charge was supposed to be carried out before January 1, 1948, and the uranium bomb – before June 1, 1948.

The official starting point for the beginning of the development of RDS-1 should be the date of issuance of the “Tactical and Technical Specifications for an Atomic Bomb” (TTZ), signed by Chief Designer Yu.B. Khariton on July 1, 1946 and sent to the head of the First Main Directorate under the USSR Council of Ministers B.L. Vannikov. The terms of reference consisted of 9 points and stipulated the type of nuclear fuel, the method of transferring it through a critical state, the overall mass characteristics of the atomic bomb, the timing of the operation of electric detonators, the requirements for a high-altitude fuse and the self-destruction of the product in the event of failure of the equipment that ensures the operation of this fuse.

In accordance with the TTZ, the development of two versions of atomic bombs was envisaged - an implosion type with plutonium and a uranium type with cannon approach. The length of the bomb should not exceed 5 meters, diameter - 1.5 meters, and weight - 5 tons.

At the same time, it was planned to build a test site, an airfield, a pilot plant, as well as organize a medical service, create a library, etc.

The creation of an atomic bomb required the solution of an exceptionally wide range of physical and technical issues related to an extensive program of computational and theoretical research, design and experimental work. First of all, it was necessary to conduct research on the physicochemical properties of fissile materials, develop and test methods for their casting and mechanical processing. It was necessary to create radiochemical methods for extracting various fission products, organize the production of polonium, and develop technology for the manufacture of neutron sources. Methods for determining the critical mass, the development of a theory of efficiency or efficiency, as well as the theory of a nuclear explosion in general, and much more were required.

The given brief enumeration of the directions in which the work unfolded does not exhaust the entire content of the activities that required implementation for the successful completion of the atomic project.

By the February 1948 resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which adjusted the deadlines for completing the main task of the atomic project, Yu.B. Khariton and P.M. Zernov was instructed to ensure the production and presentation of one set of the RDS-1 atomic bomb with full equipment by March 1, 1949 for state testing.

In order to complete the task in a timely manner, the resolution stipulated the scope and timing of the completion of research work and the production of material for flight design tests, as well as the resolution of certain organizational and personnel issues.

The following research works stood out:

• completion of testing of a spherical explosive charge by May 1948;
• study until July of the same year of the problem of metal compression during the explosion of an explosive charge;
• development of a neutron fuse design by January 1949;
• determination of critical mass and assembly of plutonium and uranium charges for RDS-1 and RDS-2. Ensuring the assembly of the plutonium charge for RDS-1 before February 1, 1949.

The development of the design of the atomic charge itself - “RD-1” - (later, in the second half of 1946, called “RDS-1”) was started at NII-6 at the end of 1945. Development began with a charge model on a scale of 1/5 full-scale. The work was carried out without technical specifications, but solely according to the oral instructions of Yu.B. Khariton. The first drawings were made by N.A. Terletsky, who worked at NII-6 in a separate room, where only Yu.B. was allowed entry. Khariton and E.M. Adaskin - deputy. director of NII-6, who carried out general coordination of work with other groups that began developing high-speed detonators to ensure synchronous detonation of a group of electric detonators and work on the electrical actuation system. A separate group began to select explosives and technologies for manufacturing unusual shapes of parts from aircraft.

At the beginning of 1946, the model was developed, and by the summer it was produced in 2 copies. The model was tested at the NII-6 test site in Sofrino.

By the end of 1946, the development of documentation for a full-scale charge began, the development of which began to be carried out already in KB-11, where at the beginning of 1947, in Sarov, initially minimal conditions were created for the manufacture of blocks and carrying out blasting operations (parts from explosives, before launching into operation of plant No. 2 in KB-11, supplied from NII-6).

If at the beginning of the development of atomic charges, domestic physicists were to some extent ready for the topic of creating an atomic bomb (based on their previous work), then for the designers this topic was completely new. They did not know the physical principles of the charge, the new materials used in the design, their physical and mechanical properties, the admissibility of joint storage, etc.

The large dimensions of explosive parts and their complex geometric shapes, tight tolerances required the solution of many technological problems. Thus, specialized enterprises in the country did not undertake the production of large-sized charge housings, and pilot plant No. 1 (KB-11) had to produce a sample housing, after which these housings began to be manufactured at the Kirov plant in Leningrad. Large-sized parts from explosives were also initially manufactured in KB-11.

During the initial organization of the development of charge components, when institutes and enterprises of various ministries were involved in the work, a problem arose due to the fact that the documentation was developed according to various departmental guidelines (instructions, technical specifications, standards, construction of drawing symbols, etc. .). This situation greatly hampered production due to large differences in the requirements for the manufactured charge elements. The situation was corrected in 1948-1949. with the appointment of N.L. as deputy chief designer and head of the research and development sector of KB-11. Dukhova. He brought with him from OKB-700 (from Chelyabinsk) the “Drawing Management System” adopted there and organized the processing of previously developed documentation, bringing it to a unified system. The new system best suited the conditions of our specific development, which provides for multivariate design development (due to the novelty of the designs).

As for the radio and electrical charge elements (“RDS-1”), they are entirely domestically developed. Moreover, they were developed with duplication of the most critical elements (to ensure the necessary reliability) and possible miniaturization.

Strict requirements for the reliability of charge operation, the safety of working with the charge, and the preservation of the quality of the charge during the warranty period of its shelf life determined the thorough development of the design.

Information supplied by intelligence about the contours of the bombs and their sizes was sparse and often contradictory. So, about the caliber of a uranium bomb, i.e. “Baby”, it was reported that it was either 3" (inches) or 51/2" (in fact, the caliber turned out to be noticeably larger). About the plutonium bomb, i.e. “Fat man” - that it looks “like a pear-shaped body”, and about the diameter - it is either 1.27 m or 1.5 m. So the bomb developers had to start everything almost from scratch.

TsAGI was involved in developing the body contours of the KB-11 aerial bomb. Blowing through his wind tunnels an unprecedented number of contour options (more than 100, under the leadership of Academician S.A. Khristianovich) began to bring success.

The need to use a complex automation system is another fundamental difference from the development of conventional aerial bombs. The automation system consisted of safety stages and long-range cocking sensors; starting, “critical” and contact sensors; energy sources (batteries) and an initiation system (including a set of detonator capsules), ensuring synchronous operation of the latter, with different timings in the microsecond range.

Thus, at the first stage of the project:

• the carrier aircraft was determined: TU-4 (by order of I.V. Stalin, the American “flying fortress” B-29 was reproduced);
• Several design options for aerial bombs have been developed; their flight tests were carried out and contours and structures that meet the requirements of atomic weapons were selected;
• an automatic system for the bomb and the aircraft instrument panel was developed, which guaranteed the safety of the suspension, flight and battery release, the implementation of an air explosion at a given altitude and, at the same time, the safety of the aircraft after an atomic explosion.

Structurally, the first atomic bomb consisted of the following fundamental components:

• nuclear charge;
• explosive device and automatic charge detonation system with safety systems;
• the ballistic body of the aerial bomb, which housed the nuclear charge and automatic detonation.

The atomic charge of the RDS-1 bomb was a multilayer structure in which the active substance, plutonium, was transferred to a supercritical state by compressing it through a converging spherical detonation wave in the explosive.

Great successes have been achieved not only by technologists, but also by metallurgists and radiochemists. Thanks to their efforts, already the first plutonium parts contained small amounts of impurities and highly active isotopes. The last point was especially significant, since short-lived isotopes, being the main source of neutrons, could have a negative impact on the likelihood of a premature explosion.

A neutron fuse (NF) was installed in the cavity of the plutonium core in a composite shell of natural uranium. During 1947-1948, about 20 different proposals were considered regarding the principles of operation, design and improvement of the NZ.

One of the most complex components of the first atomic bomb RDS-1 was an explosive charge made from an alloy of TNT and hexogen.

The choice of the outer radius of the explosive was determined, on the one hand, by the need to obtain satisfactory energy release, and, on the other, by the permissible external dimensions of the product and technological production capabilities.

The first atomic bomb was developed in relation to its suspension in the TU-4 aircraft, the bomb bay of which provided the ability to accommodate a product with a diameter of up to 1500 mm. Based on this dimension, the midsection of the ballistic body of the RDS-1 bomb was determined. The explosive charge was structurally a hollow ball and consisted of two layers.

The inner layer was formed from two hemispherical bases made from a domestic alloy of TNT and hexogen.

The outer layer of the RDS-1 explosive charge was assembled from individual elements. This layer, intended to form a spherical converging detonation wave at the base of the explosive and called the focusing system, was one of the main functional units of the charge, which largely determined its tactical and technical performance.

Already at the very initial stage of the development of nuclear weapons, it became obvious that the study of the processes occurring in the charge should follow the computational and experimental path, which made it possible to correct the theoretical analysis based on the results of experiments and experimental data on the gas-dynamic characteristics of nuclear charges.

It is worth especially noting that the chief designer of RDS-1, Yu.B. Khariton and the main developers, theoretical physicists, knew about the high probability of a 2.5% incomplete explosion (a reduction in explosion power of ~ 10%) and about the consequences that awaited them if it were realized. They knew and... worked.

The location for the test site was chosen near the city of Semipalatinsk, Kazakh SSR, in a waterless steppe with rare abandoned and dry wells, salt lakes, and partially covered with low mountains. The site intended for the construction of the test complex was a plain with a diameter of approximately 20 km, surrounded on the south, west and north by low mountains.

Construction of the test site began in 1947 and was completed by July 1949. In just two years, a colossal volume of work was completed, with excellent quality and at a high technical level. All materials were delivered to construction sites by road along dirt roads 100-200 km away. Traffic was around the clock both in winter and summer.

The experimental field contained numerous structures with measuring equipment, military, civil and industrial facilities to study the effects of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. In the center of the experimental field there was a metal tower 37.5 m high for the installation of RDS-1.

The experimental field was divided into 14 test sectors: two fortification sectors; civil engineering sector; physical sector; military sectors for the placement of samples of military equipment; biological sector. Instrument buildings were built along radii in the north-eastern and south-eastern directions at various distances from the center to accommodate photochronographic, film and oscillographic equipment recording the processes of a nuclear explosion.

At a distance of 1000 m from the center, an underground building was built for equipment that recorded light, neutron and gamma fluxes of a nuclear explosion. Optical and oscillographic equipment was controlled via cables from a software machine.

To study the impact of a nuclear explosion, sections of metro tunnels, fragments of airfield runways were built on the experimental field, and samples of aircraft, tanks, artillery rocket launchers, and ship superstructures of various types were placed. To transport this military equipment, 90 railway cars were needed.

The government commission for testing RDS-1, chaired by M.G. Pervukhina began work on July 27, 1949. On August 5, the commission concluded that the test site was completely ready and proposed to carry out a detailed testing of the assembly and detonation operations within 15 days. The test time was determined - the last days of August.

I.V. was appointed scientific supervisor of the trial. Kurchatov, from the Ministry of Defense, the preparation of the test site for testing was led by Major General V.A. Bolyatko, the scientific management of the test site was carried out by M.A. Sadovsky.

In the period from August 10 to August 26, 10 rehearsals were held to control the test field and the charge detonation equipment, as well as three training exercises with the launch of all equipment and 4 detonations of full-scale explosives with an aluminum ball from automatic detonation.

On August 21, a plutonium charge and four neutron fuses were delivered to the test site by a special train, one of which was to be used to detonate a warhead.

Scientific supervisor of the experiment I.V. Kurchatov, in accordance with the instructions of L.P. Beria, gave the order to test the RDS-1 on August 29 at 8 a.m. local time.

On the night of August 29, 1949, the final charge assembly was carried out. The assembly of the central part with the installation of parts made of plutonium and a neutron fuse was carried out by a group consisting of N.L. Dukhova, N.A. Terletsky, D.A. Fishman and V.A. Davidenko (installation “NZ”). The final installation of the charge was completed by 3 a.m. on August 29 under the leadership of A.Ya. Malsky and V.I. Alferova. Members of the special committee L.P. Beria, M.G. Pervukhin and V.A. The Makhnev controlled the progress of the final operations.

On the day of the test, the majority of the top test management gathered at the test site command post, located 10 km from the center of the test field: L.P. Beria, M.G. Pervukhin, I.V. Kurchatov, Yu.B. Khariton, K.I. Shchelkin, KB-11 employees who participated in the final installation of the charge on the tower.

By 6 o'clock in the morning the charge was lifted onto the test tower, it was equipped with fuses and connected to the blasting circuit.

Due to worsening weather, all work required by the approved regulations began to be carried out with a one-hour shift earlier (from 7.00 instead of 8.00 as planned).

At 6:35 a.m., the operators turned on the power to the automation system, and at 6:48 a.m. the test field machine was turned on.

At exactly 7 a.m. on August 29, 1949, the entire area was illuminated with a dazzling light, which signaled that the USSR had successfully completed the development and testing of the first atomic bomb.

According to the recollections of test participant D.A. Fishman, the events in the control room unfolded as follows:

In the last seconds before the explosion, the doors located on the back side of the command post building (from the center of the field) were slightly opened so that the moment of the explosion could be observed by a burst of lighting in the area. At the zero moments, everyone saw a very bright illumination of the earth and clouds. The brightness was several times higher than that of the sun. It was clear that the explosion was successful!

Everyone ran out of the room and ran up onto the parapet protecting the command post from the direct impact of the explosion. Before them opened a picture, enchanting in its scale, of the formation of a huge cloud of dust and smoke, in the center of which a flame was blazing!

But Malsky’s words were heard from the loudspeaker: “Everyone immediately enter the command post building! A shock wave is approaching” (according to calculations, it should have arrived at the command post in 30 seconds).

Upon entering the room, L.P. Beria warmly congratulated everyone on the successful test, and I.V. Kurchatova and Yu.B. He kissed Khariton. But inside, apparently, he still had some doubts about the completeness of the explosion, since he did not immediately call and report to I.V. Stalin about the successful test, and went to the second observation point, where nuclear physicist M.G. Meshcheryakov, who in 1946 attended demonstration tests of US atomic charges on Bikini Atoll.

At the second observation point, Beria also warmly congratulated M.G. Meshcheryakova, Ya.B. Zeldovich, N.L. Dukhov and other comrades. After this, he meticulously questioned Meshcheryakov about the external effect of the American explosions. Meshcheryakov assured that our explosion was superior in appearance to the American one.

Having received confirmation from an eyewitness, Beria went to the test site headquarters in order to inform Stalin about the successful test.

Stalin, having learned about the successful test, immediately called B.L. Vannikova (who was at home and could not attend the test due to illness) and congratulated him on the successful test.

According to the memoirs of Boris Lvovich, in response to congratulations, he began to say that this was the merit of the party and the government... Then Stalin interrupted him, saying: “Come on, Comrade Vannikov, these formalities. You better think about how we can start producing these products in the shortest possible time.”

20 minutes after the explosion, two tanks equipped with lead protection were sent to the center of the field to conduct radiation reconnaissance and inspect the center of the field.

Reconnaissance determined that all structures in the center of the field had been demolished. A crater formed at the site of the tower, the soil in the center of the field melted and a continuous crust of slag formed. Civil buildings and industrial structures were completely or partially destroyed. Eyewitnesses were presented with a terrible picture of the great massacre.

The energy release of the first Soviet atomic bomb was 22 kilotons of TNT equivalent.

The “father” of the Soviet atomic bomb, Academician Igor Kurchatov, was born on January 12, 1903 in the Simsky Plant in the Ufa province (today it is the city of Sim in the Chelyabinsk region). He is called one of the founders of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Having graduated with honors from the Simferopol men's gymnasium and evening vocational school, in September 1920 Kurchatov entered the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of Tauride University. Three years later, he successfully graduated from the university ahead of schedule. In 1930, Kurchatov headed the physics department of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology.

"RG" talks about the stages of creating the first Soviet atomic bomb, which was successfully tested in August 1949.

Pre-Kurchatov era

Work on the atomic nucleus in the USSR began back in the 1930s. Physicists and chemists not only from Soviet scientific centers, but also foreign specialists took part in the all-Union conferences of the USSR Academy of Sciences of that time.

In 1932, radium samples were obtained, and in 1939, the chain reaction of fission of heavy atoms was calculated. The year 1940 was a landmark year in the development of the nuclear program: employees of the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology submitted an application for a breakthrough invention at that time: the design of an atomic bomb and methods for producing uranium-235. For the first time, conventional explosives were proposed to be used as a fuse to create a critical mass and initiate a chain reaction. In the future, nuclear bombs were detonated in this way, and the centrifugal method proposed by UPTI scientists is still the basis for the industrial separation of uranium isotopes.

There were also significant flaws in the Kharkov residents’ proposals. As Alexander Medved, Candidate of Technical Sciences, noted in his article for the scientific and technical magazine “Engine”, “the uranium charge scheme proposed by the authors was, in principle, not workable.... However, the value of the authors’ proposal was great, since this particular scheme can be considered the first discussed in our country at the official level, a proposal for the design of the nuclear bomb itself."

The application circulated through the authorities for a long time, but was never accepted, and eventually ended up on a shelf labeled “top secret.”

By the way, in the same fortieth year, at the all-Union conference, Kurchatov presented a report on the fission of heavy nuclei, which was a breakthrough in solving the practical issue of implementing a nuclear chain reaction in uranium.

What is more important - tanks or bombs?

After Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, nuclear research was suspended. The main Moscow and Leningrad institutes dealing with problems of nuclear physics were evacuated.

Beria, as the head of strategic intelligence, knew that major physicists in the West considered atomic weapons an achievable reality. According to historians, back in September 1939, the future scientific director of the work on the creation of the American atomic bomb, Robert Oppenheimer, came to the USSR incognito. From him, the Soviet leadership could hear for the first time about the possibility of obtaining superweapons. Everyone - both politicians and scientists - understood that the creation of a nuclear bomb was possible, and its appearance by the enemy would bring irreparable troubles.

In 1941, the USSR began to receive intelligence information from the USA and Great Britain about the deployment of intensive work on the creation of nuclear weapons.

Academician Pyotr Kapitsa, speaking on October 12, 1941 at an anti-fascist meeting of scientists, said: “... an atomic bomb of even a small size, if feasible, could easily destroy a large capital city with several million people...”.

On September 28, 1942, the resolution “On the organization of work on uranium” was adopted - this date is considered the start of the Soviet nuclear project. In the spring of the following year, Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was created specifically for the production of the first Soviet bomb. The question arose: who should be entrusted with the leadership of the newly created structure.

“We need to find a talented and relatively young physicist so that solving the atomic problem becomes the only work of his life. And we will give him power, make him an academician and, of course, we will vigilantly control him,” Stalin ordered.

Initially, the list of candidates consisted of about fifty names. Beria suggested choosing Kurchatov, and in October 1943 he was summoned to Moscow for a viewing. Now the scientific center, into which the laboratory has been transformed over the years, bears the name of its first director - “Kurchatov Institute”.

"Stalin's Jet Engine"

On April 9, 1946, a resolution was adopted to create a design bureau at Laboratory No. 2. The first production buildings in the Mordovian Nature Reserve were ready only at the beginning of 1947. Some of the laboratories were located in monastery buildings.

The Soviet prototype was named RDS-1, which, according to one version, meant “special jet engine.” Later, the abbreviation began to be deciphered as “Stalin’s jet engine” or “Russia does it itself.” The bomb was also known as “product 501” and atomic charge “1-200”. By the way, to ensure secrecy, the bomb was referred to in documents as a “rocket engine.”

RDS-1 was a 22 kiloton device. Yes, the USSR carried out its own development of atomic weapons, but the need to catch up with the States, which had gone ahead during the war, pushed domestic science to actively use intelligence data. So, the American “Fat Man” was taken as a basis. The US dropped a bomb under this code name on August 9, 1945 on Nagasaki, Japan. “Fat Man” worked on the basis of the decay of plutonium-239 and had an implosive detonation scheme: charges of conventional explosives explode along the perimeter of the fissile substance, which create a blast wave that “compresses” the substance in the center and initiates a chain reaction. By the way, this scheme was later found to be ineffective.

RDS-1 was designed as a free-falling bomb of large diameter and mass. The charge of an atomic explosive device is made of plutonium. The bomb's ballistic body and electrical equipment were of domestic design. Structurally, the RDS-1 included a nuclear charge, a ballistic body of a large-diameter aerial bomb, an explosive device and equipment for automatic charge detonation systems with safety systems.

Uranium deficiency

Taking the American plutonium bomb as a basis, Soviet physics was faced with a problem that had to be solved in a short time: at the time of development, plutonium production had not yet begun in the USSR.

At the initial stage, captured uranium was used. But a large industrial reactor required at least 150 tons of the substance. At the end of 1945, mines in Czechoslovakia and East Germany resumed operations. In 1946, uranium deposits were found in Kolyma, the Chita region, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the North Caucasus, near Pyatigorsk.

The first industrial reactor and radiochemical plant "Mayak" began to be built in the Urals, near the city of Kyshtym, 100 km north of Chelyabinsk. Kurchatov personally supervised the loading of uranium into the reactor. In 1947, the construction of three more nuclear cities began: two in the Middle Urals (Sverdlovsk-44 and Sverdlovsk-45) and one in the Gorky region (Arzamas-16).

Construction work proceeded at a rapid pace, but there was not enough uranium. Even at the beginning of 1948, the first industrial reactor could not be launched. The uranium was loaded by June 7, 1948.

Kurchatov took over the functions of the chief operator of the reactor control panel. Between eleven and twelve o'clock at night he began an experiment on the physical start-up of the reactor. At zero hours thirty minutes on June 8, 1948, the reactor reached a power of one hundred kilowatts, after which Kurchatov suppressed the chain reaction. The next stage of reactor preparation lasted two days. After supplying cooling water, it became clear that the uranium available in the reactor was not enough to carry out a chain reaction. Only after loading the fifth portion did the reactor reach a critical state, and a chain reaction became possible again. This happened on the tenth of June at eight o'clock in the morning.

On June 17, Kurchatov made an entry in the operational journal of the shift supervisors: “I am warning that if the water supply is stopped there will be an explosion, so under no circumstances should the water supply be stopped... It is necessary to monitor the water level in emergency tanks and the operation of pumping stations ".

On June 19, 1948, at 12:45 p.m., the commercial launch of the first nuclear reactor in Eurasia took place.

Successful tests

The quantities contained in the American bomb were accumulated in the USSR in June 1949.

The head of the experiment, Kurchatov, in accordance with Beria’s instructions, gave the order to test the RDS-1 on August 29.

A section of the waterless Irtysh steppe in Kazakhstan, 170 kilometers west of Semipalatinsk, was allocated for the test site. A metal lattice tower 37.5 meters high was mounted in the center of the experimental field, approximately 20 kilometers in diameter. RDS-1 was installed on it.

The charge was a multilayer structure in which the active substance was transferred to a critical state by compressing it through a converging spherical detonation wave in the explosive.

After the explosion, the tower was completely destroyed, leaving a crater in its place. But the main damage was from the shock wave. Eyewitnesses described that when the next day - August 30 - a trip to the experimental field took place, the test participants saw a terrible picture: the railway and highway bridges were twisted and thrown back 20-30 meters, wagons and cars were scattered across the steppe at a distance of 50-80 meters from the installation site, residential buildings were completely destroyed. The tanks on which the impact force was tested lay on their sides with their turrets knocked down, the guns turned into a pile of twisted metal, and ten “test” Pobeda vehicles were burned out.

A total of 5 RDS-1 bombs were manufactured. They were not transferred to the Air Force, but were stored in Arzamas-16. Currently, a mock-up of the bomb is on display at the Nuclear Weapons Museum in Sarov (formerly Arzamas-16).

There are two key areas in the area of ​​a nuclear explosion: the center and the epicenter. At the center of the explosion, the process of energy release directly occurs. The epicenter is the projection of this process onto the earth or water surface. The energy of a nuclear explosion, projected onto the ground, can lead to seismic tremors that spread over a considerable distance. These tremors cause harm to the environment only within a radius of several hundred meters from the point of explosion.

Damaging factors

Atomic weapons have the following destruction factors:

1. Radioactive contamination.
2. Light radiation.
3. Shock wave.
4. Electromagnetic pulse.
5. Penetrating radiation.

The consequences of an atomic bomb explosion are disastrous for all living things. Due to the release of a huge amount of light and heat energy, the explosion of a nuclear projectile is accompanied by a bright flash. The power of this flash is several times stronger than the sun's rays, so there is a danger of damage from light and thermal radiation within a radius of several kilometers from the point of the explosion.

Another dangerous damaging factor of atomic weapons is the radiation generated during the explosion. It lasts only a minute after the explosion, but has maximum penetrating power.

The shock wave has a very strong destructive effect. She literally wipes out everything that stands in her way. Penetrating radiation poses a danger to all living beings. In humans, it causes the development of radiation sickness. Well, an electromagnetic pulse only harms technology. Taken together, the damaging factors of an atomic explosion pose a huge danger.

First tests

Throughout the history of the atomic bomb, America showed the greatest interest in its creation. At the end of 1941, the country's leadership allocated a huge amount of money and resources to this area. Robert Oppenheimer, who is considered by many to be the creator of the atomic bomb, was appointed project manager. In fact, he was the first who was able to bring the scientists' idea to life. As a result, on July 16, 1945, the first atomic bomb test took place in the desert of New Mexico. Then America decided that in order to completely end the war it needed to defeat Japan, an ally of Nazi Germany. The Pentagon quickly selected targets for the first nuclear attacks, which were supposed to become a vivid illustration of the power of American weapons.

On August 6, 1945, the US atomic bomb, cynically called "Little Boy", was dropped on the city of Hiroshima. The shot turned out to be simply perfect - the bomb exploded at an altitude of 200 meters from the ground, due to which its blast wave caused horrific damage to the city. In areas far from the center, coal stoves were overturned, leading to severe fires.

The bright flash was followed by a heat wave, which in 4 seconds managed to melt the tiles on the roofs of houses and incinerate telegraph poles. The heat wave was followed by a shock wave. The wind, which swept through the city at a speed of about 800 km/h, demolished everything in its path. Of the 76,000 buildings located in the city before the explosion, about 70,000 were completely destroyed. A few minutes after the explosion, rain began to fall from the sky, large drops of which were black. The rain fell due to the formation of a huge amount of condensation, consisting of steam and ash, in the cold layers of the atmosphere.

People who were affected by the fireball within a radius of 800 meters from the point of the explosion turned to dust. Those who were a little further from the explosion had burned skin, the remains of which were torn off by the shock wave. Black radioactive rain left incurable burns on the skin of survivors. Those who miraculously managed to escape soon began to show signs of radiation sickness: nausea, fever and attacks of weakness.

Three days after the bombing of Hiroshima, America attacked another Japanese city - Nagasaki. The second explosion had the same disastrous consequences as the first.

In a matter of seconds, two atomic bombs destroyed hundreds of thousands of people. The shock wave practically wiped Hiroshima off the face of the earth. More than half of the local residents (about 240 thousand people) died immediately from their injuries. In the city of Nagasaki, about 73 thousand people died from the explosion. Many of those who survived were subjected to severe radiation, which caused infertility, radiation sickness and cancer. As a result, some of the survivors died in terrible agony. The use of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki illustrated the terrible power of these weapons.

You and I already know who invented the atomic bomb, how it works and what consequences it can lead to. Now we will find out how things were with nuclear weapons in the USSR.

After the bombing of Japanese cities, J.V. Stalin realized that the creation of a Soviet atomic bomb was a matter of national security. On August 20, 1945, a committee on nuclear energy was created in the USSR, and L. Beria was appointed head of it.

It is worth noting that work in this direction has been carried out in the Soviet Union since 1918, and in 1938, a special commission on the atomic nucleus was created at the Academy of Sciences. With the outbreak of World War II, all work in this direction was frozen.

In 1943, USSR intelligence officers transferred from England materials from closed scientific works in the field of nuclear energy. These materials illustrated that the work of foreign scientists on the creation of an atomic bomb had made serious progress. At the same time, American residents contributed to the introduction of reliable Soviet agents into the main US nuclear research centers. The agents passed on information about new developments to Soviet scientists and engineers.

Technical task

When in 1945 the issue of creating a Soviet nuclear bomb became almost a priority, one of the project leaders, Yu. Khariton, drew up a plan for the development of two versions of the projectile. On June 1, 1946, the plan was signed by senior management.

According to the assignment, the designers needed to build an RDS (special jet engine) of two models:

1. RDS-1. A bomb with a plutonium charge that is detonated by spherical compression. The device was borrowed from the Americans.
2. RDS-2. A cannon bomb with two uranium charges converging in the gun barrel before reaching a critical mass.

In the history of the notorious RDS, the most common, albeit humorous, formulation was the phrase “Russia does it itself.” It was invented by Yu. Khariton’s deputy, K. Shchelkin. This phrase very accurately conveys the essence of the work, at least for RDS-2.

When America learned that the Soviet Union possessed the secrets of creating nuclear weapons, it began to desire a rapid escalation of preventive war. In the summer of 1949, the “Troyan” plan appeared, according to which on January 1, 1950 it was planned to begin military operations against the USSR. Then the date of the attack was moved to the beginning of 1957, but with the condition that all NATO countries join it.

Tests

When information about America's plans arrived through intelligence channels in the USSR, the work of Soviet scientists accelerated significantly. Western experts believed that atomic weapons would be created in the USSR no earlier than 1954-1955. In fact, the tests of the first atomic bomb in the USSR took place already in August 1949. On August 29, an RDS-1 device was blown up at a test site in Semipalatinsk. A large team of scientists took part in its creation, headed by Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov. The design of the charge belonged to the Americans, and the electronic equipment was created from scratch. The first atomic bomb in the USSR exploded with a power of 22 kt.

Due to the likelihood of a retaliatory strike, the Trojan plan, which involved a nuclear attack on 70 Soviet cities, was thwarted. The tests at Semipalatinsk marked the end of the American monopoly on the possession of atomic weapons. The invention of Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov completely destroyed the military plans of America and NATO and prevented the development of another world war. Thus began an era of peace on Earth, which exists under the threat of absolute destruction.

"Nuclear Club" of the world

Today, not only America and Russia have nuclear weapons, but also a number of other states. The collection of countries that own such weapons is conventionally called the “nuclear club.”

It includes:

1. America (since 1945).
2. USSR, and now Russia (since 1949).
3. England (since 1952).
4. France (since 1960).
5. China (since 1964).
6. India (since 1974).
7. Pakistan (since 1998).
8. Korea (since 2006).

Israel also has nuclear weapons, although the country's leadership refuses to comment on their presence. In addition, there are American nuclear weapons on the territory of NATO countries (Italy, Germany, Turkey, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada) and allies (Japan, South Korea, despite the official refusal).

Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which owned part of the USSR's nuclear weapons, transferred their bombs to Russia after the collapse of the Union. She became the sole heir to the USSR's nuclear arsenal.

Conclusion

Today we learned who invented the atomic bomb and what it is. Summarizing the above, we can conclude that nuclear weapons today are the most powerful instrument of global politics, firmly entrenched in relations between countries. On the one hand, it is an effective means of deterrence, and on the other, a convincing argument for preventing military confrontation and strengthening peaceful relations between states. Atomic weapons are a symbol of an entire era that require especially careful handling.

The creation of the Soviet nuclear bomb, in terms of the complexity of scientific, technical and engineering problems, is a significant, truly unique event that influenced the balance of political forces in the world after World War II. The solution to this problem in our country, which has not yet recovered from the terrible destruction and upheaval of four war years, became possible as a result of the heroic efforts of scientists, production organizers, engineers, workers and the entire people. The implementation of the Soviet nuclear project required a real scientific, technological and industrial revolution, which led to the emergence of the domestic nuclear industry. This labor feat paid off. Having mastered the secrets of nuclear weapons production, our Motherland for many years ensured military and defense parity between the two leading states of the world - the USSR and the USA. The nuclear shield, the first link of which was the legendary RDS-1 product, still protects Russia today.
I. Kurchatov was appointed head of the Atomic Project. From the end of 1942, he began to gather the scientists and specialists needed to solve the problem. Initially, the general management of the atomic problem was carried out by V. Molotov. But on August 20, 1945 (a few days after the atomic bombing of Japanese cities), the State Defense Committee decided to create a Special Committee, headed by L. Beria. It was he who began to lead the Soviet atomic project.
The first domestic atomic bomb had the official designation RDS-1. It was deciphered in different ways: “Russia does it itself,” “The Motherland gives it to Stalin,” etc. But in the official resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of June 21, 1946, the RDS received the wording “Jet engine “C”.”
The tactical and technical specifications (TTZ) indicated that the atomic bomb was being developed in two versions: using “heavy fuel” (plutonium) and using “light fuel” (uranium-235). The writing of the technical specifications for the RDS-1 and the subsequent development of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 were carried out taking into account the available materials according to the scheme of the US plutonium bomb tested in 1945. These materials were provided by Soviet foreign intelligence. An important source of information was K. Fuchs, a German physicist who participated in work on the nuclear programs of the USA and England.
Intelligence materials on the US plutonium bomb made it possible to avoid a number of mistakes when creating the RDS-1, significantly shorten its development time, and reduce costs. At the same time, it was clear from the very beginning that many of the technical solutions of the American prototype were not the best. Even at the initial stages, Soviet specialists could offer the best solutions for both the charge as a whole and its individual components. But the unconditional requirement of the country's leadership was to guarantee and with the least risk to obtain a working bomb by its first test.
The nuclear bomb had to be manufactured in the form of an aerial bomb weighing no more than 5 tons, with a diameter of no more than 1.5 meters and a length of no more than 5 meters. These restrictions were due to the fact that the bomb was developed in relation to the TU-4 aircraft, the bomb bay of which allowed the placement of a “product” with a diameter of no more than 1.5 meters.
As the work progressed, the need for a special research organization to design and develop the “product” itself became obvious. A number of studies conducted by Laboratory N2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences required their deployment in a “remote and isolated place.” This meant: it was necessary to create a special research and production center for the development of an atomic bomb.

Creation of KB-11

April 9, 1946 a closed resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on the creation of a Design Bureau (KB-11) at Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences. P. Zernov was appointed head of KB-11, and Yu. Khariton was appointed chief designer.

The resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 21, 1946 determined strict deadlines for the creation of the facility: the first stage was to go into operation on October 1, 1946, the second - on May 1, 1947. The construction of KB-11 (“facility”) was entrusted to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. The “object” was supposed to occupy up to 100 square meters. kilometers of forests in the Mordovian Nature Reserve and up to 10 sq. kilometers in the Gorky region.
Construction was carried out without projects and preliminary estimates, the cost of work was taken at actual costs. The construction team was formed with the involvement of a “special contingent” - this is how prisoners were designated in official documents. The government created special conditions to ensure construction. However, construction was difficult; the first production buildings were ready only at the beginning of 1947. Some of the laboratories were located in monastery buildings.

The volume of construction work was great. There was a need to reconstruct plant No. 550 for the construction of a pilot plant on the existing premises. The power plant needed updating. It was necessary to build a foundry and press shop for working with explosives, as well as a number of buildings for experimental laboratories, testing towers, casemates, and warehouses. To carry out blasting operations, it was necessary to clear and equip large areas in the forest.
At the initial stage, there were no special premises for research laboratories - scientists had to occupy twenty rooms in the main design building. The designers, as well as the administrative services of KB-11, were to be housed in the reconstructed premises of the former monastery. The need to create conditions for arriving specialists and workers forced us to pay more and more attention to the residential village, which gradually acquired the features of a small town. Simultaneously with the construction of housing, a medical town was erected, a library, a cinema club, a stadium, a park and a theater were built.

On February 17, 1947, by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR signed by Stalin, KB-11 was classified as a special security enterprise with the transformation of its territory into a closed security zone. Sarov was removed from the administrative subordination of the Mordovian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and excluded from all accounting materials. In the summer of 1947, the perimeter of the zone was taken under military protection.

Work in KB-11

The mobilization of specialists to the nuclear center was carried out regardless of their departmental affiliation. The leaders of KB-11 searched for young and promising scientists, engineers, and workers in literally all institutions and organizations of the country. All candidates for work in KB-11 underwent a special check by the state security services.
The creation of atomic weapons was the result of the work of a large team. But it did not consist of faceless “staff members”, but of bright personalities, many of whom left a noticeable mark in the history of domestic and world science. Significant potential was concentrated here, both scientific, design, and performing, working.

In 1947, 36 researchers arrived to work at KB-11. They were seconded from various institutes, mainly from the USSR Academy of Sciences: Institute of Chemical Physics, Laboratory N2, NII-6 and the Institute of Mechanical Engineering. In 1947, KB-11 employed 86 engineering and technical workers.
Taking into account the problems that had to be solved in KB-11, the order of formation of its main structural divisions was outlined. The first research laboratories began working in the spring of 1947 in the following areas:
laboratory N1 (headed by M. Ya. Vasiliev) – development of structural elements of an explosive charge that provide a spherically converging detonation wave;
laboratory N2 (A.F. Belyaev) – research on explosive detonation;
laboratory N3 (V.A. Tsukerman) – radiographic studies of explosive processes;
laboratory N4 (L.V. Altshuler) – determination of equations of state;
laboratory N5 (K.I. Shchelkin) - full-scale tests;
laboratory N6 (E.K. Zavoisky) - measurements of central frequency compression;
laboratory N7 (A. Ya. Apin) – development of a neutron fuse;
laboratory N8 (N.V. Ageev) - study of the properties and characteristics of plutonium and uranium for use in bomb construction.
The start of full-scale work on the first domestic atomic charge can be dated back to July 1946. During this period, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 21, 1946, Yu. B. Khariton prepared the “Tactical and technical specifications for the atomic bomb.”

The TTZ indicated that the atomic bomb was being developed in two versions. In the first of them, the working substance should be plutonium (RDS-1), in the second - uranium-235 (RDS-2). In a plutonium bomb, the transition through the critical state must be achieved by symmetrically compressing spherical plutonium with a conventional explosive (implosive version). In the second option, the transition through the critical state is ensured by combining masses of uranium-235 with the help of an explosive (“gun version”).
At the beginning of 1947, the formation of design units began. Initially, all design work was concentrated in a single research and development sector (RDS) KB-11, which was headed by V. A. Turbiner.
The intensity of work in KB-11 was very great from the very beginning and was constantly increasing, since the initial plans, very extensive from the very beginning, increased in volume and depth of elaboration every day.
Conducting explosive experiments with large explosive charges began in the spring of 1947 at the KB-11 experimental sites still under construction. The largest volume of research had to be carried out in the gas-dynamic sector. In connection with this, a large number of specialists were sent there in 1947: K. I. Shchelkin, L. V. Altshuler, V. K. Bobolev, S. N. Matveev, V. M. Nekrutkin, P. I. Roy, N. D. Kazachenko, V. I. Zhuchikhin, A. T. Zavgorodniy, K. K. Krupnikov, B. N. Ledenev, V. M. Malygin, V. M. Bezotosny, D. M. Tarasov, K. I. Panevkin, B. A. Terletskaya and others.
Experimental studies of charge gas dynamics were carried out under the leadership of K. I. Shchelkin, and theoretical questions were developed by a group located in Moscow, headed by Ya. B. Zeldovich. The work was carried out in close cooperation with designers and technologists.

The development of “NZ” (neutron fuse) was undertaken by A.Ya. Apin, V.A. Alexandrovich and designer A.I. Abramov. To achieve the desired result, it was necessary to master a new technology for using polonium, which has a fairly high radioactivity. At the same time, it was necessary to develop a complex system for protecting materials in contact with polonium from its alpha radiation.
In KB-11, research and design work on the most precise element of the charge-capsule-detonator was carried out for a long time. This important direction was led by A.Ya. Apin, I.P. Sukhov, M.I. Puzyrev, I.P. Kolesov and others. The development of research required the territorial approach of theoretical physicists to the research, design and production base of KB-11. Since March 1948, a theoretical department began to be formed in KB-11 under the leadership of Ya.B. Zeldovich.
Due to the great urgency and high complexity of work in KB-11, new laboratories and production sites began to be created, and the best specialists of the Soviet Union seconded to them mastered new high standards and strict production conditions.

The plans drawn up in 1946 could not take into account many of the difficulties that opened up to the participants in the atomic project as they moved forward. By Decree CM N 234-98 ss/op dated 02/08/1948, the production time for the RDS-1 charge was extended to a later date - until the plutonium charge parts were ready at Plant No. 817.
With regard to the RDS-2 option, by this time it became clear that it was not practical to bring it to the testing stage due to the relatively low efficiency of this option compared to the cost of nuclear materials. Work on RDS-2 was stopped in mid-1948.

By resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 10, 1948, the following were appointed: first deputy chief designer of the “object” - Kirill Ivanovich Shchelkin; deputy chief designer of the facility - Alferov Vladimir Ivanovich, Dukhov Nikolay Leonidovich.
In February 1948, 11 scientific laboratories were hard at work in KB-11, including theorists under the leadership of Ya.B. Zeldovich, who moved to the site from Moscow. His group included D. D. Frank-Kamenetsky, N. D. Dmitriev, V. Yu. Gavrilov. The experimenters did not lag behind the theorists. The most important work was carried out in the departments of KB-11, which were responsible for detonating the nuclear charge. Its design was clear, and so was the detonation mechanism. In theory. In practice, it was necessary to carry out checks and carry out complex experiments again and again.
Production workers also worked very actively - those who had to translate the plans of scientists and designers into reality. A.K. Bessarabenko was appointed head of the plant in July 1947, N.A. Petrov became the chief engineer, P.D. Panasyuk, V.D. Shcheglov, A.I. Novitsky, G.A. Savosin, A.Ya. Ignatiev, V. S. Lyubertsev.

In 1947, a second pilot plant appeared within the structure of KB-11 - for the production of parts from explosives, the assembly of experimental product units and the solution of many other important tasks. The results of calculations and design studies were quickly translated into specific parts, assemblies, and blocks. This, by the highest standards, responsible work was carried out by two factories under KB-11. Plant No. 1 manufactured many parts and assemblies of the RDS-1 and then assembled them. Plant No. 2 (its director was A. Ya. Malsky) was engaged in the practical solution of various problems associated with the production and processing of parts from explosives. The assembly of the explosive charge was carried out in a workshop led by M. A. Kvasov.

Each stage passed posed new tasks for researchers, designers, engineers, and workers. People worked 14-16 hours a day, completely dedicating themselves to their work. On August 5, 1949, a plutonium charge manufactured at Combine No. 817 was accepted by a commission headed by Khariton and then sent by letter train to KB-11. Here, on the night of August 10-11, a control assembly of a nuclear charge was carried out. She showed: RDS-1 meets the technical requirements, the product is suitable for testing at the test site.

Confidence that an atomic bomb would soon appear in the Soviet Union was complete in the fall of 1946. This is evidenced by many documents from those years.

Writer, journalist, USSR State Prize laureate Vladimir Gubarev.

"Top secret"

The Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2493-1045ss/op dated November 14, 1946 stated “the need to build a special testing ground for RDS,” which will henceforth be called the “Mining Station of the First Main Directorate.” The main objective of the research is “the practical use of the RDS mine forge.”

If you lift the veil of secrecy, then everything becomes clear.

"Mountain Station" is a testing ground.

"RDS" - atomic bomb.

"Mine horn" - a nuclear charge.

The Kazakh steppes were ideal both for testing weapons and for preserving all kinds of secrets. Control over the work of designers and physicists was extremely strict. They had to constantly report to the country's top leadership about their every step, about conducting certain experiments, about successes and failures.

RDS-1. Photo: http://www.biblioatom.ru

The secrecy of the “Atomic Project” was special for each person, and therefore is described by the participants in the events differently. So, Professor L.V. Altshuler- one of the pioneers of the “Atomic Project”. In his memoirs about the “lost world of Khariton” (as he calls the design bureau where the first samples of nuclear weapons were created) he writes: “ The secrecy regime was also depressing. It was not just a regime, but a way of life that determined the behavior, way of thinking of people, their state of mind. I was haunted by the same dream, from which I woke up in a cold sweat. I dreamed that I was in Moscow, walking down the street and carrying SS documents in my briefcase (top secret). And I understand that I died, because I cannot explain how and for what purpose they got there. But it's just a dream. And once almost the same thing happened to me in reality. Coming home from work in the evening (fortunately, not in Moscow, but at the site) and unwrapping the newspapers that were carefully delivered to us at work, I was horrified to discover among them secret documents that I was obliged to hand over at the end of the working day to the first department. However, instead, I absent-mindedly put them in my briefcase along with the newspapers. My first impulse was to report a violation of the secrecy regime. My good genius, my wife, saved me Maria Parfenyevna Speranskaya, who, by the way, was the first bomber of the facility. She categorically opposed this, realizing that honesty in this case was punishable, and very seriously. At night I kept the documents under my pillow, and in the morning, when I arrived at work first, I put them in the safe, after which I went to the regime department and “confessed” that yesterday I did not have time to hand over these documents and left them in the safe. I was forgiven for the violation».

Particular attention was paid to the fight against spies. The Ministry of State Security was instructed to “organize enhanced operational security work at facility No. 859 and in areas of the Chelyabinsk region adjacent to the security zone.” All correspondence that came here or went out “to the big world” was censored. Flights of aircraft not only of civil aviation, but also of military aviation were prohibited. The first person to try to fly over the Plutonium plant will be an American intelligence officer. Powers. But this will happen after 15 years. The U-2 will be shot down by a missile near Sverdlovsk. By the way, the American intelligence officer will film not only the Plutonium Plant, but also Chelyabinsk-70, a nuclear weapons center. However, for another good 30 years the Americans will not know what they are doing in the city of Snezhinsk.

Parcel from America

A very popular story among physicists is how one of the intelligence officers, naturally risking his life, delivered a piece of pure plutonium from America, and this is what helped the academician Khariton create an atomic bomb.

Yuliy Khariton and RDS-1. Photo: http://www.biblioatom.ru

Is this true or fiction?

I asked this once Yulia Borisovich Khariton. He answered evasively:

- I don’t remember anything like that...

I didn’t expect to hear something like this from an academician whose memory was always impeccable, and therefore decided that due to secrecy, he could not tell the truth.

So, the intelligence officers in America finally got a piece of plutonium?!

I found unexpected confirmation in the documents of the USSR Atomic Project.

January 21, 1949 L. P. Beria gives the order: “ Urgently instruct Comrade Khariton (personally) to comprehensively study the attached detail in KB-11 and oblige him to present his conclusion. Ensure proper secrecy».

It took Yu. B. Khariton six days to carefully examine the sample.

« The sample was examined,” he wrote later in the report. “An X-ray photograph was taken, which showed that the sample consisted of A-9. The amount of impurities is apparently small, since the spectrum exactly matches the spectrum of pure A-9.

Conclusion: The sample consists of A-9 of fairly high (and possibly very high) purity. High quality casting».

Beria was disappointed. The intelligence officers convinced him that the part delivered from America was made of plutonium. In fact, it was a very pure piece of uranium that was used in reactors. We had quite enough of this uranium (its code is A-9).

However, it was extremely difficult for intelligence officers to obtain this uranium in secret US laboratories, and their feat was recognized with government awards.

M. G. Pervukhin (Chairman of the State Commission for Testing), Yu. B. Khariton, I. V. Kurchatov and P. M. Zernov (Director of Design Bureau No. 11) at the collective farm market, 1949. Photo: http://www.biblioatom .ru

June 9, 1949 B. Vannikov, I. Kurchatov, Yu. Khariton, A. Alexandrov, P. Zernov, K. Shchelkin, N. Dukhov And V. Alferov sign the “Protocol for the consideration of the basic starting data for drawing up the technical characteristics of the RDS-1 object.” It reflected all the parameters of the first Soviet atomic bomb. In particular, a bomb can be dropped from a Tu-4 aircraft from a height of 5 to 10 thousand m. The maximum wing span of the bomb is 2 m, length is 3 m 34 cm, diameter is 1.5 m, weight is 4600 kg.

On June 15, 1949, Vannikov and Kurchatov prepared a special “Note” for Beria, in which they informed that the creation of the atomic bomb had been completed. And on August 18, a draft Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On conducting an atomic bomb test” was prepared. The first copy of the document has been sent Stalin. But he did not sign it; he told Beria that “the issue was discussed in the Central Committee and no decision would be made.” Beria realized that his fate now depended on the test results.

Test Ram

These are not legends, but reality. During a nuclear explosion, animals - and there were a lot of them at the test site near Semipalatinsk! — more than once surprised testers with their behavior. So, one mongrel has already survived a low-power nuclear explosion, and they decided to use it again - how will it behave in the second explosion? The dog was tied with a chain to an anchor fixed in the ground at the edge of the Experimental Field. There the animal was exposed only to irradiation. The mongrel tried to gnaw the chain, but she failed. Then she started digging a hole. Literally a few seconds before the explosion, she lay down in the hole, turned her muzzle towards the explosion and covered her nose with her paw.

Determination of the impact of nuclear explosion parameters. Photo: From the archives of RFNC-VNIIEF

The shock wave swept over the animal, the light radiation only scorched its fur, but it was not protected from the radiation...

Doctors told this story to all the newcomers who began serving at the nuclear test site: they say, even a dog understands how to protect himself from a nuclear explosion...

Another story is about a stubborn ram who showed truly “human wisdom.” At first he tried his best to stay in the truck when he was brought to the dugout where he was supposed to be during the explosion. They finally put him in the dugout and closed the doors tightly.

Immediately after the explosion, the testers had to remove the experimental animals, which were located throughout the Experimental Field. One of them quickly raked the ground - the dugout had collapsed after the explosion, and made a hole to the door. The tester tried to crawl into the dugout backwards - it was more convenient. I opened the door slightly and felt a strong blow to the “soft spot”. The scientist flew out of the trench, and behind him appeared a ram, distraught with fear. The animal quickly flew into the back of the truck and pressed itself against the cab, saying, now you will never get me out of here...

In the evenings, the testers often could not sleep. In the vivarium that was located in the town, dogs were howling - both those who had returned from the Experimental Field, and those who had yet to get there. This evening howl of dogs is remembered by everyone who served and visited the Semipalatinsk training ground in those years.

From the report of Dr. med. Sciences I. Vasilenko

« During the first nuclear explosion, since there was not even approximate data on possible radiation doses, bio-points were equipped every 250 m so as to obtain all degrees of damage (death on the spot, severe, moderate, light and no damage). During the first test of a nuclear device, 1,535 animals were exhibited on the Experimental Field, including 129 dogs, 417 rabbits, 375 guinea pigs, 380 white mice and rats, 170 sheep and goats, and 64 piglets.

During the second test (1951), 237 animals were placed on the Experimental Field of the Semipalatinsk test site, including 33 large ones (cows, horses, camels)... The research materials carried out at the test site are unique. They have found wide practical application...»

"Killed on takeoff"

"I did everything I had to do." After Columbus can repeat these words Viktor Ivanovich Zhuchikhin. He was a participant in almost all the experiments that determined the fate of nuclear weapons in our country. He was also at the origins of the peaceful use of nuclear explosions. However, due to direct pressure from the Americans, this successfully developing program was first suspended and then closed altogether.

“They killed him on takeoff,” a nuclear scientist I knew once told me about Zhuchikhin, and he’s probably partly right.

We met with Viktor Ivanovich several times in Chelyabinsk-70, in his small apartment, I received great pleasure from conversations with him. One day we were talking about testing the first atomic bomb.

-Where to start? — he thinks, and then says with a smile: “Perhaps from “Kozla”!”

- What goat? - I’m perplexed.

— Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov. Because of his long beautiful beard and his eyes, everyone called him “Beard.” And only one person, the head of the PSU Boris Lvovich Vannikov, who was famous for his inexhaustibility of jokes and witticisms, invariably called Kurchatov “The Goat.” Everyone took this joke correctly, including Igor Vasilyevich - they laughed... Of course, it was great happiness that it was Kurchatov who stood at the head of the project - he was its soul, its driving force.

- You can’t say that...

- In that case, who? Americans?

— Let’s leave reconnaissance and everything else aside... You can get some information, but the main thing is to do it... The technical specifications for the first atomic bomb were submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval in June 1946. Yu. B. Khariton. But it was the fruit of the mind and work of the team, one of whose leaders was Professor Khariton.

— How did you get into KB-11?

— I studied at the ammunition department of the Moscow Higher Technical University. The topic of my graduation project was an unguided anti-aircraft missile, and I expected to do this in the future. However, the four of us were invited to talk by the state security captain. We talked with him, and at the distribution committee we were told that “comrade captain is hiring you”... And then I was invited to a conversation. In the finale, Shchelkin said: “Everyone present will be engaged in the development of an atomic bomb”... A few days later, in April 1947, I was already at the “Object”.

— I understand that there was a lot of new and unusual things there. But what do you remember most clearly to this day?

- Image Kirill Ivanovich Shchelkin. The main merit that the first atomic bomb was developed in a short time and at a high technical level, perhaps, belongs to him. At that time he was only 36 years old, but he already had a wealth of experience in experimental studies of detonation processes in gases. And the country’s leadership was not mistaken in appointing him deputy scientific director for solving the atomic problem. He knew how to create a friendly atmosphere, give timely good advice, and relieve emotional stress, which was especially valuable at that time.

The work was incredibly difficult, and by the beginning of 1949 it became quite obvious that the time had come to prepare for field tests. In particular, it was necessary to test the detonation systems. We turned it on a million times to make sure it was absolutely reliable...

- Do you remember anything funny?

— There was enough humor and jokes... I remember how the construction colonels armed themselves with shovels and, by the sweat of their brow, hammered concrete at the base of the tower.

Explosion control panel. Photo: http://www.biblioatom.ru

- Were the soldiers not allowed there?

- At this time, they were no longer supposed to be at the tower - only officers... And the pit provided for by the project at the base of the tower was cemented. The head of the builders thought that the bosses might fall into this hole after looking at the top of the tower. But in this case, the cart with the bomb cannot be rolled into the elevator; it will have to be lifted. So the colonels were hammering the concrete - after all, the tower had already been accepted by the State Commission and taken under special protection. By the way, one day Zavenyagin still fell into this hole. Fortunately, he was not injured, but a barrier was immediately placed in front of the pit.

Command post. Photo: http://www.biblioatom.ru

— At 4.30 in the morning the charge began to rise to the top platform of the tower. At 5.30 G. P. Lominsky And S. N. Matveev They began to equip the charge with detonator caps. The head of the operation is K. I. Shchelkin. The first pole box with detonator caps is inserted by Kirill Ivanovich himself. At 5.40 the charge was completed. The feeder block is connected to the initiation block. Everyone leaves. Shchelkin is the last to leave the tower. At 6.20 the performers and security leave the site. Kurchatov receives information that everything is ready for an explosion.

The tower on which the charge of the first domestic atomic bomb RDS-1 was placed. Photo: http://www.biblioatom.ru

— Was he already in the shelter?

- Certainly. The armored entrance doors were closed and locked with safe locks. Everyone moved away from the walls and, standing in the middle of the room, froze in anticipation. The voice sounded loud A. Ya. Malsky: “10 seconds left... 5 seconds... 4... 3... 2... 1... 0!” For a moment it was quiet, and then the ground shook under our feet - and everything became silent... We were silent, the pause lasted forever... How long? I don’t know, no one looked at the clock, but I clearly remember how it slowly ticked off the seconds... And suddenly - a deafening blow, a thunderous roar. And again silence. Everyone stood speechless... Someone rushed to the door first, and everyone immediately rushed after him. We saw a terrible picture... In the place where the tower was, a huge column of dust and gas rose into the clouds. The blinding rays of the sun fell on the ground through a huge hole - the explosion threw a dense layer of clouds far to the sides. The monstrous force continued to disperse the rain clouds, and the gas column above the explosion site went into the sky...

— How did the management react?

— They left the command post. Were Beria with his bodyguard - a colonel armed to the teeth. Everyone hugged and congratulated each other. Then Beria suggested giving the charge, which worked so well, a name. Kurchatov said that Shchelkin had already done this. The charge is called “RDS-1”, that is, “Russia makes it itself.” Beria smiled and said that the “Boss” would like it...

Before and after the bomb explosion. Photo: http://www.biblioatom.ru

Secrecy... forever!

It’s even difficult to imagine what would have happened in the country if a nuclear mushroom had not risen into the sky on August 29 over the Kazakh steppe!

« On August 29, 1949, at 4 a.m. Moscow time and at 7 a.m. local time, in a remote steppe region of the Kazakh SSR, 170 km west of the city of Semipalatinsk, at a specially built and equipped experimental site, the explosion of an atomic bomb, exceptional in its destructive and damaging power.

The atomic explosion was recorded using special instruments, as well as observations of a large group of scientists, military and other specialists and observations of members of the Special Committee TT who were directly involved in the test. Beria, Kurchatova, Pervukhina, Zavenyagina and Makhneva.

Among the expert participants in the test was the physicist Meshcheryakov, who was our observer of the atomic bomb tests in Bikini...»

The minutes of the meeting on the bomb test were signed personally by Beria. Photo: http://www.biblioatom.ru

Stalin ordered to reward those on whom the fate of the “Atomic Project” depended. These included stars of heroes, orders, and titles of Stalin Prize laureates, cars and dachas, and even free travel by all means of transport for Project participants and their families. Such a generous reward, perhaps, did not exist even during the war.

But another document appeared: “ Signatures on non-disclosure of information about the test were selected from 2883 people, including 713 employees of KB-11, the test site, research organizations and governing bodies who were directly involved in the test, including all authorized representatives of the Council of Ministers and scientists. For the remaining 3,013 landfill workers, the collection of subscriptions will be completed within three days...»

Now the mention of a nuclear test and participation in it was equated with treason, and for many decades the heroes of the great atomic epic did not have the right to even tell their children about what they had done. It seems to me that this is the biggest crime of those who were in power...