May creation of the central headquarters of the partisan movement. Central headquarters of the partisan movement

During the Great Patriotic War.

Central headquarters of the partisan movement at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command TSSHPD at SVGK
Armed Forces emblem
Years of existence	1942 - 1944
A country	USSR USSR
Subordination	chief of staff
Included in	at Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SVGK)
Type	headquarters
Function	central body of military command
Participation in	The Second World War
Commanders
Notable commanders	P. K. Ponomarenko, V. T. Sergienko

On January 13, 1944, taking into account that the majority of partisan detachments operate on the territory of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSR, which have their own headquarters of the partisan movement, the State Defense Committee of the USSR, by decision No. 4945ss, disbanded the TsShPD.

By the same decision, the GKO transferred leadership of the partisan movement in the still occupied territory to the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the republics: Ukrainian SSR, BSSR, ESSR, Lat SSR, Lit SSR, MSSR, Karelo-Finnish SSR and Crimean ASSR and the regional committees of the Leningrad and Kalinin regions.

Tasks of the CSBA

Leadership of the partisan movement, the main task of which is to disorganize the enemy’s rear, namely:

destruction of enemy communication lines (blowing up bridges, damaging railway tracks, causing train wrecks, attacking enemy vehicles and horse-drawn vehicles);
destruction of communication lines (telephone, telegraph, radio stations);
destruction of warehouses - ammunition, equipment, fuel and food;
attack on headquarters and other military institutions behind enemy lines;
destruction of materiel at enemy airfields;
informing units of the Red Army about the location, number and movements of enemy troops.

Composition of the TSSHPD

Structure of the CSBA

Intelligence Department of the TsShPD - was responsible for the work on establishing new military formations arriving at the front, groupings and regroupings of troops, the state and operation of the enemy’s communications, monitoring his measures to prepare defensive lines, the deployment and relocation of airfields and warehouses, the Nazis’ readiness for chemical warfare, the number and the combat effectiveness of the enemy’s field and security units, as well as the political and economic situation in the occupied territory of the USSR.
The Operations Department of the TsShPD - directed the combat activities of partisan formations, both through the corresponding headquarters of the partisan movement and directly. The Operations Department was involved in the creation of raid partisan formations and detachments, the dispatch of organizational and sabotage groups and the reorganization of partisan formations, identified new areas of activity for them and assigned them combat missions, and also monitored the implementation of orders from the head of the Central Shpd.

Chief - Colonel I.I. Naumov.

The deputy chiefs are Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Shestakov and Major Ivolgin.

The operational department included three areas:

1st direction - Karelo-Finnish SSR, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Leningrad region.
The head of the department is Captain Kolmykov.
2nd direction - Byelorussian SSR.
The head of the department is Major Kryukov.
3rd direction - Kalinin, Smolensk and Oryol regions and the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
The head of the department is Major Rumyantsev.

Also, the department created:

Group for the application and implementation of guerrilla warfare methods and modern sabotage means,
Accounting group
Warehouse of topographic maps.
Division of sabotage tactics and technology (with

Plan
Introduction
1 Tasks of the CSBA
2 Composition of the TSSHPD
3 Structure of the digital broadband access network
4 Structures subordinate to TsShPD
Bibliography

Introduction

The central headquarters of the partisan movement at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (TSSHPD) is the central authority for controlling the partisan movement in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Created in order to unite the leadership of the partisan movement behind enemy lines and for the further development of this movement. Formed by Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. GOKO-1837ss dated May 30, 1942. In order to implement this resolution, the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR issued Order No. 00125 of June 16, 1942 “On the formation of the Central and regional headquarters of the partisan movement.”

In March 1943, the TsShPD was abolished, but a month later, on April 17, by Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 3195ss, it was again restored at the Supreme Command Headquarters. The Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement was removed from the subordination of the TsShPD.

1. Tasks of the central broadband access network

Leadership of the partisan movement, the main task of which is to disorganize the enemy’s rear, namely:

1. destruction of enemy communication lines (blowing up bridges, damaging railway tracks, causing train wrecks, attacking enemy vehicles and horse-drawn vehicles);

2. destruction of communication lines (telephone, telegraph, radio stations);

3. destruction of warehouses - ammunition, equipment, fuel and food;

4. attack on headquarters and other military institutions behind enemy lines;

5. destruction of materiel at enemy airfields;

6. informing units of the Red Army about the location, number and movements of enemy troops.

2. Composition of the CSPD

1. Ponomarenko P.K. (from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) - chief of staff,

2. Sergienko V. T. (from the NKVD)

3. Korneev T. F. (from the NPO Intelligence Department)

3. Structure of the central broadband access network

· Intelligence department of the TsShPD- was responsible for the work on establishing new military formations arriving at the front, groupings and regroupings of troops, the state and operation of the enemy’s communications, monitoring his measures to prepare defensive lines, the deployment and relocation of airfields and warehouses, the Nazis’ readiness for chemical warfare, numbers and combat effectiveness enemy field and security units, as well as the political and economic situation in the occupied territory of the USSR.

· Operations Department of the Central Shipping Center- led the combat activities of partisan formations, both through the relevant headquarters of the partisan movement and directly. The Operations Department was involved in the creation of raid partisan formations and detachments, the dispatch of organizational and sabotage groups and the reorganization of partisan formations, identified new areas of activity for them and assigned them combat missions, and also monitored the implementation of orders from the head of the Central Shpd.

Chief - Colonel I.I. Naumov.

The deputy chiefs are Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Shestakov and Major Ivolgin.

· 1st direction - Karelo-Finnish SSR, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Leningrad region.
The head of the department is Captain Kolmykov.

· 3rd direction - Kalinin, Smolensk and Orel regions and the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
The head of the department is Major Rumyantsev.

Also, the department created:

1. Group for the application and implementation of guerrilla warfare methods and modern sabotage means,

2. Accounting group

3. Warehouse of topographic maps.

The operations department developed operations - “Rail War”, “Concert”, “Winter Concert”, “Desert”, etc.

· Representative offices of the TsShPD at the Military Councils of the Fronts(since September 6, 1942). Due to the fact that the zones of action of the fronts did not coincide with the borders of the republics and regions, it was decided to have representations of the Central Shpd under the Military Councils of the fronts, the leaders of which were included in their composition.

Head - V. N. Malinin.

4. Structures subordinate to the TsShPD

1. Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement (until 1943);

2. Bryansk headquarters of the partisan movement;

3. Western headquarters of the partisan movement;

4. Kalinin headquarters of the partisan movement;

5. Leningrad headquarters of the partisan movement;

6. Karelo-Finnish headquarters of the partisan movement.

On September 28, 1942, a number of republican, regional and front-line headquarters of the partisan movement were created:

1. Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement;

2. Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement;

3. Lithuanian headquarters of the partisan movement;

4. Latvian headquarters of the partisan movement;

5. Estonian headquarters of the partisan movement;

6. Karelo-Finnish headquarters of the partisan movement;

7. Leningrad headquarters of the partisan movement;

8. Oryol headquarters of the partisan movement;

9. Smolensk headquarters of the partisan movement;

10. Stavropol headquarters of the partisan movement;

11. Crimean headquarters of the partisan movement;

12. Astrakhan headquarters of the partisan movement;

Bibliography:

2. Order of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR No. 00125 of June 16, 1942 “On the formation of the Central and regional headquarters of the partisan movement”

The leadership of the Soviet Union almost immediately after the German attack sought to use the partisan movement to fight the enemy. Already June 29, 1941 A joint directive was issued by the Council of People's Commissars of the SSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) “To the Party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions,” which spoke of the need to use guerrilla warfare to fight Germany. But from the very first days, party bodies began to create small partisan detachments, numbering no more than two to three dozen people.

State security agencies also began forming detachments. The 4th departments of the NKVD directorates of the republics, territories and regions, created at the end of August 1941, were responsible for the partisan movement through the NKVD, subordinate to the specially created 2nd department (from January 1942 - 4th Directorate) of the NKVD of the USSR.

On September 21, 1941, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Belarus (Bolsheviks) P.K. Ponomarenko sent a note to I.V. Stalin, in which he insisted on the need to create a single body to lead the partisan movement. In December, Ponomarenko met with Stalin, and he seemed to approve of his idea. However, then, mainly because of L.P. Beria, who sought to ensure that the partisan movement was headed by the NKVD, the project was rejected.

It seemed to the country's leadership that the efforts of the NKVD officers were sufficient for the successful development of the partisan movement. However, developments have shown that this is clearly not enough...

Before the creation of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, it was managed along several lines. Firstly, through the NKVD - through the already mentioned 4th departments . Secondly, along the party and Komsomol lines. Thirdly, through military intelligence. As a result, this led to inconsistency and unnecessary interdepartmental rivalry.

By the spring of 1942, the need to create a coordinating body that would take over the leadership of the partisan movement became obvious. On May 30, 1942, “in order to unite the leadership of the partisan movement behind enemy lines and for the further development of this movement,” the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) was created by GKO Resolution No. 1837 at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. At the last moment, Stalin removed V. T. Sergienko from the draft resolution of the State Defense Committee, who was planned to be made the head of the new body, appointing P. K. Ponomarenko as the head of the Central Staff (Sergienko eventually became his deputy). At the same time, the Ukrainian, Bryansk, Western, Kalinin, Leningrad and Karelo-Finnish headquarters of the partisan movement were created. A little later, on August 3, the Southern Headquarters was created, and on September 9, the Belarusian Headquarters. Around the same time or a little later, the Stalingrad, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Voronezh and Crimean headquarters were created.

It is worth saying that the number of partisans operating simultaneously under regional headquarters varied greatly. If many tens and sometimes more than a hundred thousand partisans operated under the republican headquarters, then under others, for example, Krymsky, there were no more than a few thousand.

After the creation of the TsShPD and regional headquarters, the 4th departments of the NKVD focused mainly on sending sabotage detachments and reconnaissance.

The leadership of partisan headquarters, as a rule, was carried out by a “triumvirate” consisting of the first secretary of the regional committee, the head of the regional department of the NKVD and the head of the intelligence department of the corresponding front. The chief of staff, as a rule, was either the secretary of the corresponding regional committee or the head of the regional department of the NKVD. At each regional headquarters of the partisan movement there was a radio center that communicated with controlled partisan detachments and the Central Broadcasting Division.

Training personnel for partisan warfare in the occupied territories was one of the main tasks of the TsShPD. Republican and large regional partisan headquarters had their own special partisan schools. Already in the summer of 1941, the Operational Training Center of the Western Front operated, and from July 1942 it became Central School No. 2 (later the Central School for the Training of Partisan Personnel). In addition to it, the Central Special Purpose School No. 105 (trained intelligence officers), Central Special School No. 3 (trained radio operators), as well as the Higher Operational School for Special Purposes (VOSHON), which trained demolitions, were subordinate to the TsShPD. The duration of training in special schools was 3 months. This relatively long training set special schools apart from the 5–10-day courses that took place at the beginning of the war. In total, from June 1942 to February 1944, 6,501 people graduated from the TsShPD partisan schools, and together with the special schools of the regional headquarters of the partisan movement - more than 15 thousand people.

The staff of the TSSHPD was relatively small. Initially it consisted of 81 people. Together with the permanent and variable composition of special schools, a central radio center and a reserve collection point, the total staff of the Central Shpd by October 1942 reached 289 people, but by the beginning of December 1942 it was reduced to 120. Along with it, the staff of partisan special schools also underwent a reduction .

Initially, the TSSHPD included an operational department, an intelligence and information department, a personnel department, a communications department, a logistics department, and a general department. However, over time, the structure of the digital broadband network has undergone significant changes.

On September 6, 1942, “in order to strengthen the leadership of the partisan movement behind enemy lines,” GKO Resolution No. 2246 established the post of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement, which was filled by K. E. Voroshilov. Now the TsShPD functioned under him, and all memos to Stalin were submitted under the signatures of Ponomarenko and Voroshilov. Researchers believe that the approval of the post of Commander-in-Chief contributed to strengthening the role of the army in the partisan movement. However, this innovation did not last long; the course towards the militarization of partisan detachments led to a conflict between Voroshilov and Ponomarenko, who had different views on the development of the partisan movement and who, moreover, with the advent of Voroshilov, had every reason to fear for his position.

On November 19, 1942, Stalin had a meeting on the development of the partisan movement, as a result of which GKO decree No. 2527 was issued. According to it, “in the interests of greater flexibility in the leadership of the partisan movement and to avoid excessive centralization,” the post of Commander-in-Chief was eliminated, and the TsShPD returned to the previous mode of operation. K. E. Voroshilov served as Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement for just over two months.

Another significant, albeit temporary, change in the organization of the partisan movement is associated with Voroshilov’s tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement. On October 9, 1942, an order was issued by the People's Commissar of Defense on the abolition of the institution of commissars in the army. It was extended to include partisans, but P.K. Ponomarenko opposed this and, soon after Voroshilov’s resignation, wrote a note to Stalin in which he advocated the return of the commissars. Ultimately, on January 6, 1943, the institution of commissars in partisan detachments was restored.

The future of Ponomarenko and the Central Headquarters after Voroshilov’s departure was not cloudless. On February 7, 1943, GKO decree No. 3000 “On the disbandment of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement” was issued. According to it, the leadership of the partisan movement was to pass to the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, regional committees and regional headquarters of the partisan movement. The property of the TsShPD was supposed to be divided between local headquarters. The German historian B. Musyal believes that the disbandment of the TsShPD occurred due to the opposition of L. Beria, and also, probably, V. Molotov or G. Malenkov.

The Chief of the Central Staff once again managed to defend his brainchild: on April 17, 1943, GKO decree No. 3195 was issued on the restoration of the TsShPD. However, after its re-establishment, the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement left the subordination of the Central Headquarters and began to report directly to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, although it had to continue to send its reports to the Central Shpd.

The reason for the isolation of the USHPD should be sought in the personal relationships of party leaders. Ponomarenko was at odds with the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR N.S. Khrushchev and the deputy head of the USHPD I.G. Starinov. The changes also affected the states. After the re-establishment of the Central Shipping Operations Center, only 65 responsible and 40 technical employees remained.

After the re-establishment, the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement lived without any major shocks until its disbandment on January 13, 1944. According to GKO Resolution No. 4955, issued on that day, the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, as having fulfilled its function, was liquidated, and its property and personnel of the central partisan schools were distributed at other headquarters.

However, the republican headquarters of the partisan movement continued to operate. The Belarusian headquarters was disbanded on October 18, 1944. Until December 31, 1944, the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement operated, subordinate to which were detachments operating on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. In addition, the USHPD was actually one of the initiators of the deployment of the partisan movement outside the Soviet Union.

In May 1944, the USHPD transferred Polish partisan detachments operating on the territory of Ukraine to the Polish headquarters of the partisan movement. Many USHPD personnel were delegated to train the wards of the Headquarters of the Partisan Movement of Poland. USHPD participated in the creation of the Main Headquarters of the partisan movement in Slovakia, and many Ukrainian partisan detachments were soon sent to the adjacent territories of Czechoslovakia.

The partisan movement on the territory of the USSR during the Second World War became massive, covering large sections of the population of the Soviet Union. According to the personnel department of the Central Shpd, 287 thousand partisans took part in the partisan struggle (excluding Ukraine) from 1941 to February 1944.

The damage to the Germans inflicted by the partisans is difficult to reliably estimate. According to the final reports of the TsShPD, compiled before the liquidation of the headquarters, the partisans killed more than 550 thousand German soldiers and officers, 37 generals, destroyed more than 7 thousand locomotives, 87 thousand cars, 360 thousand kilometers of rails.

Although in the light of modern research these figures are considered to be greatly overestimated, the role of the partisan movement in the fight against Nazi Germany is difficult to overestimate. The partisans diverted significant enemy forces that could have been used at the front. The role of the TsShPD is great in the success of the partisan movement. Although, as can be seen from the brief history of the Central Headquarters given here, its creation and development became possible not thanks to the presence of a clearly thought-out and planned military strategy among the Soviet leadership, but was the result of constant improvisation, the TsShPD became the body on whose shoulders fell the coordination of the actions of many partisan detachments and proper training of guerrilla cadres. And the successful development of the partisan movement in 1942–1944. – in many respects it is his merit.

Creation of the Central Headquarters

In 1942, the struggle in the rear acquired enormous proportions, and the partisans inflicted significant damage on the enemy. But, unfortunately, in the first year of the war the partisans did not have a central leadership, and the key role at first was played by the NKVD, which relied on small groups. Because of this, the activities of the partisans were one-sided and did not allow the struggle to unfold more widely and to establish interaction with the active army.

Nevertheless, the partisans inflicted more and more significant blows on the enemy, and it was difficult not to notice their tenacity and heroism shown in the struggle. Centralization has simply become a burning necessity. Notable initiatives came from P. Ponomarenko (first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus in 1938-42). He advocated a broad partisan movement from the very beginning and ultimately convinced Stalin.

On May 31, 1942, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was formed, and P. Ponomarenko was appointed its head. By November 1942, the number of partisans had increased to 90 thousand people, in January 1943 it had already reached over 100 thousand people, and a year later - 200 thousand. Most of them operated in Belarus. Balashov A.I., Rudakov G.P. History of the Great Patriotic War. - St. Petersburg, publishing house "Peter", 2006, p. 409

Much attention was paid to the uninterrupted supply of partisans with weapons, ammunition, mine-explosive equipment, medicines, and the evacuation by plane of the seriously wounded and sick to the mainland. The growth of the partisan movement, multifaceted combat activities, the increase in their need for weapons, ammunition, communications, mine-explosive weapons, which made it possible to achieve effective results - all this necessitated the creation on June 20, 1942 of the logistics department of the TsShPD. If before the formation of the Central Headquarters and other headquarters of the partisan movement, the partisans were supplied with weapons through the allocation of weapons by the military councils of the fronts and armies, trophies and their collection at the sites of past battles, now a centralized and systematic supply of weapons, ammunition, mine-explosive equipment, clothing has begun , medical equipment and food.

All this invaluable cargo was delivered to the partisans by air by planes and gliders, as well as by land through gaps in the front line. Separate squadrons of Long-Range Aviation, Civil Air Fleet and front-line aviation worked for the partisans. During the war years, Soviet pilots flew 109 thousand sorties to the partisans, many of them landing at partisan airfields. Reliable radio communication was established with the detachments, which was used by the end of 1943 by 93% of the partisan formations Knyazkov A. Historical significance of the partisan movement of 1941-1945. and his role in the defeat of Nazi Germany. - Article from the newspaper “Orientir”, No. 4, 2007.

12 Knyazkov A. Historical significance of the partisan movement of 1941-1945. and his role in the defeat of Nazi Germany. - Article from the newspaper “Orientir”, No. 4, 2007.

Serious attention was paid to training specialists for the partisan movement. At the beginning of the war, they trained on short-term courses (5-10 days), which, of course, was not enough. From the end of 1941, the training process was transferred to special schools deployed both in the front-line rear and in large partisan formations, and the training time in them was increased to several months. These schools trained more than 22 thousand organizers of partisan warfare, commanders and chiefs of staff of units and formations, heads of intelligence and counterintelligence, subversive instructors, radio operators, etc. In addition, about 500 thousand military personnel took part in the movement, including more than 10 thousand officers. They passed on combat experience and military knowledge to those partisans who did not share them.

The presence of special mines and mine-explosive weapons, as well as trained mine-explosive specialists, allowed partisan formations to sharply increase the number of the most effective way to disrupt the operation of enemy railway transport - sabotage. So, if in 1941 in Ukraine as a result of sabotage there were 23 major accidents on the railways, then in 1942 there were 223. The actions of partisans on the railways in the operational rear of Army Group Center also sharply intensified with 41 sabotage incidents in April 1942 to 236 in June. The presence of special mine-explosive equipment, used at any time of the year, also made it possible to reduce seasonal differences in the combat activities of the partisans.

On September 6, 1942, the position of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement was established, to which K.E. was appointed. Voroshilov.

Centralized leadership of the partisan struggle allowed:

coordinate the actions of the partisans in accordance with the plans of the Headquarters, plan entire combat operations with the participation of the partisans

establish contact with partisan formations

supply the partisans with weapons, ammunition, medicines,

The results of these active actions to create a headquarters exceeded all expectations! Never before has there been such a close connection between the actions of partisans and the operations of regular troops as there was in the Great Patriotic War. The popular movement became a serious force opposing the German invaders. The actions of the partisans behind enemy lines merged with the attacks of the Red Army at the front into one common blow of the Soviet people against the Hitlerite military machine. “Together with the Soviet Armed Forces,” says the Theses of the CPSU Central Committee dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, “the partisans dealt crushing blows to the enemy.” Communist Party in the Second World War (June 1941 - 1945) Documents and materials. - M., publishing house "Literature", 2000, pp. 21-22..

The streets of Moscow, despite the fine day, were strikingly sparsely populated, but in the 2nd building of the NGO, in its courtyards and corridors, there were a lot of people.

Army Commissar 1st Rank Shchadenko, of average height, a stocky man, no longer young, with a puffy face, having listened to the presentation, pointed to the chair at the desk:

Sit down. How was the ride?

Thank you. Good, Comrade Army Commissar of the First Rank!

Do you know why you were invited?

The People's Commissariat is sending you to a new job - to the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, Comrade Colonel.

The work is big and important. Today, receive an order and report to Comrade Ponomarenko.

He smiled and it dawned on me:

It’s clear, Comrade Army Commissar of the First Rank! The special forces will be formed by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement!

Shchadenko’s wide eyebrows took on the shape of triangles:

What special forces?

For mining and destruction of enemy communications!

We looked at each other: me, beaming with a smile, Shchadenko, wrinkling his forehead and as if seeing me for the first time. Then the Deputy People's Commissar shrugged:

I don't understand. Ponomarenko is not forming any special forces and does not intend to form them. Someone misinformed you, Comrade Colonel. There is already enough work at the Central Headquarters. You'll see for yourself!

Apparently, the deputy people's commissar said everything he wanted, because he lowered his eyes, moved his notepad and pressed a button, calling an assistant. I continued to stand without asking permission to leave. The doors behind me opened, the assistant deputy people's commissar entered, and I still could not find the right words. What I heard did not fit in my head. The special units for which we so advocated will soon be created, our brigade will be transformed, and it turns out that I myself will be removed from the case?

Comrade Army Commissar of the First Rank “The brigade I command has just been formed and has begun to operate behind enemy lines...” I heard my own hoarse voice.

Shchadenko raised his head. I read bewilderment in his tired eyes with fading irises.

Well, let it work! - said Shchadenko. - You have a different job now. What is still not clear?

I did not surrender the brigade, Comrade Army Commissar of the first rank! Let me stay in it!

Only in very great distress can one speak in this way with a senior in position and rank. But I was in complete despair!

What does it mean to “stay”? What does “didn’t pass” mean? - Shchadenko asked clearly with pauses.

My team is special. There are a lot of Spaniards there. I was trying to achieve... - I confusedly explained the situation. Shchadenko became gloomy.

You have to work where you are assigned! - he raised his voice, - Where they put it, and not where we would like! The issue of your transfer has been resolved, we will not review it.

And looked over my shoulder at the assistant:

Prepare an order for Comrade Starinov!

The doors creaked and the assistant came out. Shchadenko shaking his head:

They trust him with a big party matter, and he is the one to “stay”! And think about your Spanish comrades: if the need arises, come in.

Half an hour later I went down to the lobby where Bolotin was waiting. Alexey Ivanovich immediately guessed: something unexpected and upsetting had happened. Having learned the news, he wilted:

What about the brigade? What about the special forces?

What can I answer, Alexey Ivanovich? Apparently, there is some urgent work at the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. I don't know anything else.

That day we said goodbye to Bolotin for a long time. Our connection was not interrupted. They wrote to each other, shared thoughts and news that could be entrusted to field mail, consulted on a variety of issues, but the joy of common work and everyday friendly communication disappeared. What can you do? Until the end of the war, our roads never converged.

I did not return to the 5th engineering brigade; I no longer had to deal with the issues of organizing special forces to disrupt the work of the enemy’s rear, but I have no right to end the story about the brigade, about its people, leaving the reader bewildered as to how events unfolded in the future, let in my absence.

Let me start with the fact that the idea of creating special units to disrupt the work of the enemy rear was partially realized: on August 17, 1942, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense in the Red Army, Separate Guards Battalions of Miners and a Separate Guards Brigade of Miners at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were created “for mining and destruction communications behind enemy lines."

On the Kalinin Front, the 10th separate guards battalion of miners was formed. From the 5th engineering brigade, a small part of the soldiers and officers ended up in the guards battalion, but the 160th and 166th battalions of the 5th brigade continued to operate behind enemy lines. They showed particular activity in the period from April to August 1943, when Colonel A.A. Vinsky was appointed chief of staff of the front engineering troops - the same Vinsky with whom our operational engineering group departed from Kharkov in the fall of forty-one. At the end of May 1943, the front commander even came to the 160th battalion to talk with the miners, drew the attention of the brigade command to the need to exert all forces to strike enemy communications, demanded that operations be clearly planned, linking them with the operations of the 10th Separate Guards Battalion of Miners . Colonel Vinsky reached an agreement with the command of the air army attached to the front, organized the training of miners in parachute jumping, and in July '43, not individual groups, but companies of miners were airlifted to the enemy's rear on the Kalinin Front. Privates, sergeants, sergeants and officers trained in the 5th Engineering Brigade acted bravely, daringly and successfully behind enemy lines. Seven of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: guard senior lieutenant N.V. Kolosov, senior sergeant V.P. Goryachev, sergeant D.M. Yablochkin, junior sergeant V.B. Efimov, privates I.K. Bazalev, F. I. Bezrukov and M. V. Myagky. Hundreds of miners were awarded military decorations and medals. Among them are my Spanish friends.

And what about the young lieutenants Goncharov and Andrianov, whom I brought from Nakhabino?

Their military fate became bright. More than once they were transferred to enemy lines, where they blew up fascist trains and vehicles of the group commanded by Mikhail Goncharov. At the end of forty-three, Goncharov became a captain and had several high military awards. He finished the war as a major, studied at the Military Engineering Academy named after V.V. Kuibyshev, and with the rank of colonel taught for many years at the academy in the department of mine demolition.

Pyotr Andrianov became famous among front line miners for his ability to boldly mine enemy railway lines in broad daylight. Distinguished by his amazing composure, foresight and resourcefulness, Andrianov with his own hands managed to lay mines literally in front of the approaching enemy train. He was also known for leading Soviet people out of enemy lines. At the end of August '43, he brought out no less than six hundred people, among them women with children. In September 1943, Andrianov’s detachment of twenty-five people intercepted and captured eighty-eight enemy saboteurs, dressed in the uniform of Red Army soldiers and armed to the teeth. At that time, Andrianov, awarded military orders, already had the rank of captain.

While performing one of his combat missions, Pyotr Andrianov caught a cold in his feet and became seriously ill. He was offered to move to staff work, but the young officer insisted on returning to his soldiers and continued to carry out military campaigns. In June 1944, Captain Andrianov’s unit and a group of partisans were surrounded by large forces of Nazi punitive forces. The battle lasted all day. In the evening, Andrianov led the people to a breakthrough, cleared the way for his comrades with grenades, and he himself fell, struck by an enemy bullet...

If the reader of these lines visits the Volga, he can see a beautiful motor ship, on the high side of which the golden letters “Peter Andrianov” shine. The homeland perpetuated the memory of the young mine officer.

Chapter 20.

In a new position

It was a stone's throw from the People's Commissariat of Defense to the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD), but I changed my mind a lot along the way. The significance of the Central Headquarters is clear: centralization of the leadership of the partisan movement is extremely necessary, and the creation of the Central Shpd is an event of extreme importance! It’s not clear why it was necessary to recall me from the front and send me to the Central Broadcasting Division? True, I wrote several times to P.K. Ponomarenko, who was appointed head of the TsShPD, proposing the creation of brigades to disrupt the work of the enemy rear. Maybe these letters?..

The central headquarters of the partisan movement worked in a spacious old building with a mezzanine and false columns in the courtyard of the mansion, where the Museum of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels is now located. The yard was densely furnished with former stables and woodsheds, adapted for a garage and a guard room.

Having presented my documents to the duty officer, I climbed the carpeted stairs to the second floor. Everything sparkled: polished parquet flooring, well-polished copper door handles, fresh paint on baseboards and walls. Adjutant Ponomarenko, reporting on me, stayed in the chief of staff’s office for about five minutes. Finally he appeared and invited me in.

Ponomarenko was sitting at a large polished table in a brand new, brand new tunic that tightly fitted his heavy figure. He rose to meet him, listened to the presentation with a smile, offered to sit down, pulled a folder lying on the table towards him, tapped the papers with his index finger:

You see, I’m looking through your personal file and just can’t decide who to appoint you to!

How did you react to these words? When recalling me from the front, they should, of course, have determined in advance the type of my activity, but maybe they changed their mind at the last moment or there are several vacancies at headquarters?

I thought I could help Ponomarenko:

Panteleimon Kondratievich, as far as I know, there are no partisan headquarters behind enemy lines yet.

So, perhaps, create such a headquarters behind enemy lines in the Western direction, in one of the partisan regions? At first, you can throw the task force of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement behind the Nazis' lines.

No. Operational engineering groups at the front are one thing, and leadership of a guerrilla war behind enemy lines is another. The movement there is led by party bodies, and we should not replace them.

I didn’t mean the political leadership, Panteleimon Kondratievich! The operational group of the headquarters would be engaged in training specialists in sabotage work, planning and coordinating the actions of partisan brigades and detachments.

No, Comrade Starinov, we do not need any operational groups or additional headquarters behind enemy lines! - Ponomarenko said firmly. - Absolutely unnecessary!

Then you can form a sabotage brigade. I can prepare her and fly with her behind enemy lines in two to three weeks!

Ponomarenko shook his head again:

Not that. Do you really think that I sought your transfer to Central Headquarters in order to immediately send you behind the front line? I think we need to organize something like a partisan academy. Let's put it more modestly - a higher partisan school. In addition, the headquarters needs a head of the technical department. So I’m wondering which place is best for you. And one more thing: shouldn’t we combine these two positions - head of the technical department and head of higher education, and shouldn’t we appoint you to such a position?

It’s not for me to decide, Panteleimon Kondratievich.

You will be able to organize the production of various mines, you have a lot of experience in training saboteurs...

Ponomarenko called the head of the personnel department of the headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Timoshenko:

Get busy with the registration of Comrade Starinov. He will head our technical department and the partisan school at headquarters. Think over the structure of the school together, and Comrade Starinov will select the personnel for it himself. He knows people and knows where to turn.

Leaning his palms on the table, Ponomarenko stood up and straightened up:

That's all for today, Comrade Starinov. Get down to business.

By the time I appeared at the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, work was already underway to identify and register all partisan detachments, to establish radio contact with them, efforts were being made to supply the partisans with explosives, weapons and medicine, to organize treatment and evacuate the seriously wounded and sick to the Soviet rear.

The general management of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) was carried out by K. E. Voroshilov from the State Defense Committee. By the way, when discussing the name of the headquarters in the State Defense Committee, Voroshilov proposed calling it, as it was under Lenin, the Main Headquarters of Partisan Detachments or Partisan Forces. However, a different point of view prevailed.

An old acquaintance, a comrade in the battles in Spain, Hadji Dzhiorovich Mamsurov, told me about this. I met him, still slender, dark, handsome, in the corridor of the headquarters. It turned out that Colonel Mamsurov heads the local intelligence department.

I believe that Klementy Efremovich’s proposal was more correct! - Mamsurov remarked categorically. - The headquarters is the body for planning and developing operations conceived by the commander. Can there really be a commander of a “movement”? Can not. Here is the Commander-in-Chief of the partisan forces - he can! Okay, more on that later. There will still be time!

Mamsurov had a huge responsibility for the correctness of information about the enemy coming from the TsShPD. Information from the partisans - albeit fragmentary and irregular - was received, but any intelligence information requires double-checking and confirmation, and timely ones. It was extremely difficult to obtain verified, confirmed data in the then state of communication. It was no easier for other staff members than for Mamsurov. For example, it was possible to supply partisans with explosives, mine equipment, weapons and ammunition only if there was stable radio communication inaccessible to the enemy. But what could the head of the communications department of the headquarters, Colonel Ivan Nikolaevich Artemyev, do, even though he was a major specialist in radio engineering, if only a sixth of the partisan detachments and formations registered by the headquarters had reliably working radios?!

Unhurried, restrained, Ivan Nikolaevich listened to the claims of Mamsurov and the head of the operational department, Colonel Vasily Fedorovich Sokolov, without showing his feelings, only turning pink. And then he quietly advised his interlocutors to contact the State Defense Committee, or even better - directly to the Commander-in-Chief, so that they would be given a sufficient number of walkie-talkies, and at the same time - aircraft for flights behind enemy lines...

At that time, much had not yet been finally decided: the departments of the headquarters were just being staffed, the job responsibilities of some employees were still being clarified, the forms of contacts with the General Staff and with the headquarters of various branches of the military were just beginning to be established. However, the TsShPD was created only two months ago, and there was not even a consensus on the capabilities of partisans, on the methods of leading partisan detachments and formations, on the most effective methods of waging guerrilla warfare.

By order of August 1, 1942, I was appointed head of the new school at the Central School of Shipping. The creation of a new school, called the Higher Operational School for Special Purposes (VOSHON), began by requesting former OTC employees and Spanish comrades from the 5th brigade. The head of the engineering troops of the Kalinin Front, Colonel Kosarev, was angry at first, but then he understood my situation and satisfied the demand. True, the veterans of the partisan struggle did not express joy at being recalled to Moscow. Then I sent a letter to the commander of the airborne troops, General Glazunov, and asked to send thirty paratroopers to the school. Soon they arrived: young, tall, physically strong. The Higher Military-Political Institute also responded to our request and sent graduates. Also young, in brand new tunics with creaky sword belts, they looked at the gold stars sewn on the sleeves and at the scarlet cubes pinned to their buttonholes. Many of these political workers had experience in party and Soviet work, good military training, but they had only read about partisan warfare behind enemy lines from Fadeev.

I will mention their names more than once on the pages of this book. A special category of school personnel included mine demolition instructors familiar to the reader, who once worked at the Educational Training Center, then in Kharkov, Rostov and on the Kalinin Front: Maria Stepanovna Belova, Captain Semyon Petrovich Mineev, captain Vladimir Pavlovich Chepiga and several other comrades. Teaching mine demolition at VOSHON. they themselves studied, mastering the tactics of action behind enemy lines. And, of course, veteran saboteurs Campillo, Lorente, Conizares, Sanchez Coronado, Viesque, Fusimanya, Francisco Gullon, Angel Alberca, Benito Ustarres, Joaquin Gomez improved their knowledge and shared their experience with newcomers.

I ordered that the administrative and economic staff of the school be involved in the training: at least let them know who they should provide with what and for what purposes. The head of the financial department of VOSHON, Captain A.S. Egorov, was forced to give such an order, a wonderful man, an excellent worker, but precisely for this reason he did not allow the school management to deviate one iota from the countless paragraphs of countless instructions regulating financing. Secretly, I hoped that Egorov would become interested in mine demolition and become softer. Alas, this “sabotage” of mine was not a success: the chief of finance studied mine demolition and tactics behind enemy lines thoroughly, just a year later he became deputy for sabotage under the Hero of the Soviet Union A.F. Fedorov, but he made concessions to me and my assistants while he remained the head of the school's finances, he never did.

There were other comrades among the school staff who became enthusiasts of mine demolition and bravely fought behind enemy lines. Among them is the head of the school’s medical unit, B. N. Kazakov.

The issue of a translator for classes with Spanish cadets was simply resolved: I called my wife and children from the evacuation, and Anna, who was known to the Spaniards from her forays near Jaen and Grenada, who herself had a good knowledge of mine demolition and was fluent in Spanish, again became my faithful assistant .

Chapter 21.

Changes

In the editorial “Partisans, strike harder at the enemy!”, published on August 13, Pravda calls for the destruction of enemy manpower and equipment primarily during railway transportation: “Glorious partisans and partisans! Beat the enemy, destroy his weapons and equipment on the way, on his communications, on the approach to the front, in the deep enemy rear! "

Tests, exercises...

Just on August 13, we begin testing various methods of sabotage on the railways. We detonate conventional charges and the so-called “cumulative” ones - cone-shaped, directional. We carry out wrecks using a variety of mines, check the effectiveness of incendiary devices, firing at locomotives and tanks with rifles, machine guns and anti-tank rifles, we are looking for the most rational ways of placing anti-train mines, allowing us to achieve results with the least amount of explosives: after all, for the partisans, every gun was worth its weight in gold !

After listening to the report on the test results, Ponomarenko asks if it is possible to organize a demonstration of mine-explosive equipment to a group of partisans who arrived at the headquarters for a short time. I answer that I will agree with the head of military communications of the Red Army, I.V. Kovalev, and ask that we be allocated a railway test ring. We are allowed to use the test ring and a date is set - August 18th.

“Sabotage groups” arrived at the scene close to midnight. There is darkness as far as you can see! The cautious steps of “patrols” guarding the railway tracks can be heard. The “patrols” include partisans, who will be shown the equipment. These are attentive, cautious people, but the “saboteurs” are no strangers. Morning. “Patrols” and “saboteurs” gathered together. Ponomarenko and the headquarters workers arrive. We invite them and the partisans to inspect the routes. The examiners incredulously look around the railway track, ballast stones stained with fuel oil, sleepers, straight threads of rails, and carefully take their first steps. Three partisans, before taking a step, test the ballast with probes: they understand that they could have a surprise in store for them. Alas, soon there is a bang and smoke appears: the first “mine”, designed to destroy the “tentacle,” exploded. And here is the second, and the third...

No one was able to find at least one mine and neutralize it. Then “they sent a train around the ring. And so it began! Flash, smoke, flash, smoke, flash, smoke! The train went in the opposite direction - again “explosions”! This is the response of “mines” of delayed action and “mine” of rapid action,

Thus, we were able to convince the partisan leaders of the advantages of certain mines, completely invisible to train drivers and requiring only 10–20 seconds to install, as well as the advantages of delayed action mines, which fire reliably even when installed in ballast, without contact with the rails and sleepers of the railway track . Then they showed how to assemble mines from parts that the partisans could mine or make themselves. The “dessert” was the non-removable mines shown by S.V. Gridnev. Unfortunately, we could not promise that these mines would soon reach the partisan detachments...

Problems, problems...

Every evening, after finishing classes at school or testing at the training ground, I returned to the Central Shipping Center, where I stayed until late at night. Work was underway on various documents, and among them the most important one - the draft order of the People's Commissar of Defense “On the tasks of the partisan movement.”

The need to issue such an order was dictated, in particular, by the lack of consensus on the capabilities of the partisans, on the tactics of the partisan armed forces, on the methods of fighting the enemy in his rear, on the need for operational leadership of the partisans and their material support from the Soviet rear.

Some military leaders, for example, Mehlis, found that the partisans did not and could not have any special strategy and tactics; attack the enemy at the right moment and immediately hide, and the proposal to supply the partisans with weapons and explosives was called harmful chatter: they say, this will give rise to dependent sentiments among them, and will allow them to avoid combat contact with the enemy!

The partisans have already stayed too long in the forests and swamps! - said the defenders of this point of view. - Let them come out, let them attack the Nazis, arm themselves and be supplied at their expense, and not beg at the party and Soviet threshold!

However, life itself convinced us: partisan detachments grow faster and act more actively precisely where they receive constant assistance from the Soviet rear. In Belarus, for example, the Vitebsk partisans received such assistance. From March to September forty-two, more than eleven thousand rifles, six thousand machine guns, a thousand machine guns, five hundred anti-tank rifles, a large amount of ammunition, grenades and explosives were transported to them. And what? The number of Vitebsk partisans by the beginning of forty-three was almost half the number of all Belarusian partisans, although the Vitebsk region occupies only a tenth of the territory of the USSR!

Voroshilov sharply opposed the views of Mehlis and others who had little knowledge of the issues of the partisan movement. Therefore, the draft order, in particular, clearly defined the main strategic task of the partisans - the destruction of enemy manpower and equipment on the way to the front along the railways.

At the end of August - beginning of September, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, on behalf of the Party Central Committee, held a meeting of representatives of underground party bodies and commissars of large partisan formations in Ukraine, Belarus, Smolensk and Oryol regions. The meeting was attended by senior staff of the CSPD.

Giving a report, the head of the Central Shpd Panteleimon Kondratyevich Ponomarenko urged the partisans not to wait until they are armed with any theory of guerrilla warfare, but to beat the Germans there, and with what they have, to more actively carry out crashes of enemy trains.

The commanders and commissars of the partisan detachments, one and all, pointed out the need for effective leadership of the armed forces of the partisans, suggested that the headquarters develop large-scale operations against the enemy, and urgently raised the issue of supplying the partisans with weapons, explosives and walkie-talkies.

The partisans wondered why, while dropping thousands of tons of explosives enclosed in aerial bombs on enemy railway junctions, the partisans were dropped only tens of kilograms of the same explosives? The commanders of partisan units argued that the effect of blowing up enemy railway trains was always greater than that of bombing. Hero of the Soviet Union M. I. Duka after the war recalled that dozens, hundreds of aerial bombs dropped on the Bryansk station caused only a four-hour break in the movement of fascist echelons, and said that with the same amount of explosives, if it got to the partisans, it could have paralyzed all traffic on the Bryansk railway junction section, putting hundreds of locomotives, thousands of cars, platforms and tanks out of action!

The commander of the raiding Ukrainian partisan unit, S.A. Kovpak, making a request to improve the supply of partisans, urged that his unit be given explosives first of all, and not cartridges: having explosives, the unit will be able to send dozens of sabotage groups to enemy communications in different directions, inflict the Nazis will suffer great damage, sow panic in the enemy camp, disorient the Nazis, and it doesn’t matter if the partisans go on a raid a few days later.

The head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, P.K. Ponomarenko, promised to take into account the partisan wishes and requests.

On the night of September 1, the meeting participants were received in the Kremlin by the leaders of the party and government. Four days later, on September 5, J.V. Stalin signed the order “On the tasks of the partisan movement.” And the next day, September 6, the position of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement was introduced in the Red Army. K.E. Voroshilov was appointed to this position.

Related information.