Marshal in a tank ambush. Biography During the Great Patriotic War

Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Armored Forces is less known than Zhukov, Rokossovsky and Konev. However, to defeat the enemy he. Katukov’s tankers played a huge role in the battle of Moscow. They were the first to use tank ambush tactics and were able to stop German tanks on the approaches to the Russian capital. Stalin noticed the intelligent tank commander, and it was Katukov, along with our other famous tank commanders, who was the creator of military formations with a large number of armored vehicles. He created and led first the mechanized corps, and then the tank army. Left interesting memoirs "At the forefront of the main attack" .

I bring to your attention an extensive article devoted to the military work of M.E. Katukova. Source: Military literature @ Bystrov V. // Generals and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War. Issue 3 - M.: Young Guard, 1985.

Marshal of Armored Forces Mikhail Katukov

October 1941. The tank and mechanized armadas of Hitler's General Guderian were rapidly advancing towards Moscow. On October 3, one of its most combat-ready corps - the 24th motorized - immediately broke into Oryol. The troops of the Bryansk Front, which covered the distant approaches to the Soviet capital here, were dismembered by superior enemy forces. Hitler's command rejoiced. And there was a reason: the path to Moscow in early October was essentially clear.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took energetic measures to close the gap that had formed. Troops were transferred to the area of ​​the enemy breakthrough. On the spot they were supposed to be united into the 1st Guards Rifle Corps under the command of Major General D. D. Lelyushenko.

The corps included the 4th Tank Brigade, stationed near Moscow near the Kubinka station. Raised on October 2 before dawn on combat alert, she immediately began to be loaded into trains. And its commander, Colonel Katukov, was called to the telephone by the head of the main armored department of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Ya. P. Fedorenko.

“Hurry up, Comrade Katukov,” Fedorenko answered the greeting and quickly spoke. - The task is extremely important and was decided there. - Fedorenko emphasized the word “there”, making it clear that the decision to send the 4th Tank Brigade to Oryol was made at the highest levels of the military leadership. - The main thing is to close Guderian’s road to Tula.

I obey, Yakov Nikolaevich! I will do everything possible.

Few! The impossible is required there... Guderian has a colossus of tanks, and you have a cat crying. In Lelyushenko's corps, apart from your brigade, there are no tank formations yet. And you will arrive at the place first.

Katukov was familiar with Fedorenko and was even friends from their joint pre-war service. Having taken up a responsible post in the army, Fedorenko continued to treat his former fellow soldiers and comrades with friendliness and care. But his concern was special. He entrusted the most difficult tasks to his comrades, helped them, but also demanded more strictness from them than from others.

It was just beginning to get light when the brigade was already loaded into the trains. We drove quickly, without stopping. Katukov decided to rest. But I couldn't take a nap. Thoughts and memories, running into each other, dispersed the sleep. Well, maybe this is how a person is designed, maybe he needs to take stock of some stage in his life before entering another. In Katukov’s military fate, just such a line has emerged, and the need to comprehend the recent past has firmly taken possession of him.

Katukov entered the war as commander of the 20th Tank Division, which was part of the 9th Mechanized Corps of Major General K.K. Rokossovsky. The division was in the stage of reorganization and was still far from being staffed with people and equipment. The KV and T-34 tanks had not yet arrived: there were only 33 obsolete BT-2 and BT-3 tanks. The artillery regiment received only howitzers, the motorized rifle regiment received no artillery at all, and the pontoon battalion - no pontoons. The communications battalion had only training equipment.

On the first day of the war, Katukov himself was in the Kiev district military hospital, where he underwent a serious operation: the seam had not yet completely healed, the temperature reached 38°. Having with difficulty persuaded the doctors to be discharged, on June 23, in passing vehicles, he reached the division that had come out to meet the enemy troops rushing to Novograd-Volynsky. The next day, June 24, near the town of Klevan, the division attacked motorized units of the enemy’s 13th Tank Division.

The first fight is remembered forever, in every detail. But now the details were bothering Katukov. He thought again and again about the techniques that helped him then inflict quite significant damage on the enemy. First of all, tank ambushes. Using them, the BT-2 and BT-3, vulnerable in all respects, disabled many German tanks. True, in this battle the division lost all its tanks. But for each of them the enemy paid with several of his own. In subsequent battles, another trick showed itself well - “roaming” guns. Artillery batteries changed positions day and night - the enemy had the impression that he was dealing with large artillery forces.

I remembered another trick. Katukov has already forgotten who exactly proposed it. The fact is that from the first days of the war, enemy infantry began to fear T-34 tanks. But the division, like many other tank formations, did not have them. Once Katukov approached a group of commanders who were animatedly arguing about something.

And what? Make layouts. And put real guns somewhere nearby,” one of the commanders said.

The Fritz will see - immediately the drapery! - another commander sarcastically.

And what? - the first one did not give up. - The infantry will probably be scared.

Hmmm. The need for invention is cunning,” one of those gathered noted.

Seeing Katukov, the commanders stood up.

At ease! - Katukov commanded. “The need for invention is cunning,” he repeated. - But this is a saying about smart people. Thinking about layouts is worthwhile. Let's brainstorm.

And they brainstormed. They covered several disabled transport vehicles with plywood “like T-34”, attached wooden trunks to them and painted it all in a protective color. Concealed in the bushes and on the edges of the forest, but so that the enemy could detect them, these scarecrows looked like genuine thirty-fours lying in ambush. Nearby they fired at the enemy and real guns “roamed” around. Indeed, such false ambushes made a strong impression on the enemy infantry. In the areas of these ambushes, she did not go ahead. Later, when the enemy captured such “tanks,” fascist newspapers made a lot of fun at the “Russian plywood equipment.” But he laughs who laughs last: the soldiers of Katukov’s division more than once witnessed how the enemy’s infantry stopped in shock, noticing the “ambushes” of the “thirty-fours,” or how the fascist aviation frantically bombed these “ambushes.” False fortifications have also proven themselves well.

At the height of the fighting, Katukov unexpectedly received an order: to hand over the division to his deputy and leave for Moscow at the disposal of Ya. N. Fedorenko.

Yakov Nikolaevich greeted him warmly, but immediately announced in an orderly tone:

That's it, Comrade Katukov, you have been appointed commander of the 4th Tank Brigade.

Brigades? - Katukov asked in bewilderment.

Calm down, you fought well. Presented to the Order of the Red Banner. That’s why we’re giving a brigade. - Fedorenko stood up, silently walked around the office, sighed and finally explained: - Mechanized corps and tank divisions are being disbanded. There is not enough technology. Industry: half on wheels, half rebuildable. It was decided to create smaller tank formations - brigades. Let's select the best that they have: people and mostly new equipment... Your brigade is being formed near Stalingrad. Prepare it so that it is in no way inferior to the German tank division.

The brigade's command staff was selected before Katukov's arrival. Regimental Commissar M. F. Boyko was appointed Commissioner, Lieutenant Colonel P. V. Kulvinsky was appointed Chief of Staff, Senior Battalion Commissar I. G. Derevyankin was Head of the Political Department, Captain M. T. Nikitin was appointed Head of the Operations Department, and Captain P. was appointed Technical Assistant. G. Dyner. They say: the first impression is always the last. Whether this is true or not, even at the first meeting and especially subsequently, Katukov was very pleased with his assistants.

Shortly before Katukov’s arrival, a commission from Moscow arrived at the tank camp near Stalingrad to select the most experienced driver mechanics, turret gunners, commanders and political workers for the brigade. Katukov and Boyko joined the work of the commission, trying to select the best of the best. And we really had to choose from the best. The brigade was staffed by personnel from the 15th Panzer Division, which had been withdrawn from the front. The commission and the brigade command received a huge number of statements in which the tankers swore to fight for their Motherland until their last breath. Everyone who entered the office where the commission worked asked, demanded, tried to prove as convincingly as possible that he must be included in the brigade. And how difficult it was to refuse any of them! All these people were eager for a holy cause and, most importantly, they knew what awaited them: everyone had already been in battles with the fascists. But I had to refuse. There were more volunteers than were required to staff the brigade.

Oh, what people! - Katukov rejoiced when the formation of the brigade was completed. - And they know their stuff, and with combat experience! And how many communists and Komsomol members there are!

Soon the brigade began to receive equipment. The first battalion was armed with T-34 tanks. They were manufactured right there, at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant. The plan was exceeded, the workers worked at the front. But Katukov was in a hurry in order to have more time for combat training. Dyner found a way out. One day he came to Katukov with a proposal:

I believe that deputy unit commanders for technical matters, driver mechanics and the entire technical support company should work directly at the plant.

What an idea! - Katukov was delighted. - And things will go faster, and assembly is a wonderful school for studying the material part of new tanks.

The very next day, tankers allocated by Dyner, together with workers, assembled parts and assemblies of the new vehicle at the plant. Soon they, as Dyner put it, “knew its insides to the last screw.”

At the same time, combat training was launched. From the very beginning, it was so close to the conditions of the war that it differed from it only in the absence of losses. Classes lasted fourteen hours a day. Katukov was inexhaustible in developing combinations that placed soldiers and commanders in the most difficult conditions, as close as possible to a combat situation. After the battles near Klevan, he carefully considered the then proven methods of action of tank units in conditions of enemy superiority in tanks and aircraft. He selected the most typical ones and combined them into a single circuit diagram. Its main provisions were discussed at a meeting of the brigade command. And he was glad to receive practical suggestions from his assistants.

The essence of the scheme developed by Katukov is better stated in his words:

“Motorized rifles are positioned on the defensive, having previously separated real and false trenches. The mock-ups of cannons and machine guns are placed in the false ones. Some of these trenches are occupied by small groups of soldiers with real machine guns. Their lot falls to the role of “actors” inspiring the leading edge. Behind, at a short distance, there are real trenches, and further, in tank-dangerous directions, tanks are placed - sometimes a platoon, sometimes just one vehicle. For camouflage, tanks use local shelters: bushes, trees, stacks of bread, haystacks, reverse slopes. Each crew prepares for itself not one position, but two or three, which can be changed without the enemy noticing. Crews determine landmarks and distances to them in advance. Interaction with infantry, artillery, and sappers is organized in advance and communication is established either by radio, or by special signals, or by messengers. All tank crews must be within sight of each other, ready to come to the aid of their neighbor. The enemy begins ground and air reconnaissance. Ambushes do not reveal themselves. The enemy is probing the front line in battle. “Actors” come into action in false positions. The tanks are silent.

Enemy aircraft begin to bomb false trenches. The “actors” retreat imperceptibly with the passages of the message. And finally, the enemy launches tanks accompanied by infantry. The most critical moments of the battle are coming.

Riflemen, artillerymen, and mortarmen shoot at enemy infantry. The ambushes are silent. And only when the enemy vehicles come within 200–300 meters do the ambushers move into a firing position and open fire on the attackers at point-blank range, for sure. At the same time, the ambush crews do not let their neighbors out of sight and hit the sides of enemy tanks that have broken through. The result is oblique, cross, destructive fire.

The ambush commander enters the firing position only if absolutely necessary. From somewhere in a trench or from behind a bush, he watches the battlefield, marks out targets, determines the sight, and only after that gets into the tank, and the vehicle jumps out to open fire. The sight is set, the gun is approximately aimed at the target. Having fired three or four shots, the tank crawls in reverse into cover. You cannot stand in position for a long time: the crew will become a victim of targeted fire.

From cover, the commanders again conduct observation and again jump out to the position, but now to a different one. This is repeated several times."
After discussing this scheme with the brigade command, Katukov held a meeting with the unit commanders. Each of them had already had to deal with an enemy significantly superior in tanks and aircraft. Therefore, Katukov’s scheme turned out to be close and understandable to everyone. It was the basis for the brigade’s combat training.

And now Katukov recalled with satisfaction how proactively the unit commanders conducted classes according to this scheme and, like himself, were sophisticated in choosing situations that required the crews to be smart, quick to react, and have excellent training.

Katukov steadily complicated the tasks of combat training.

It is important to be able to act not only as a team as a whole. Each unit, each individual tank needs to be prepared for autonomous actions in isolation from the main forces,” Katukov instructed the commanders and immediately offered techniques, one more complex than the other, for training such autonomous actions.

Various communication and reconnaissance options were carefully worked out - Katukov attached extremely great importance to them.

I also remembered something else: “the collapse of instructions,” as Boyko joked. Once, at a meeting of command staff, there was talk (for the umpteenth time!) about the lack of tractors for pulling damaged tanks from the battlefield.

Dyner stood up and briefly reported:

They don’t give it and don’t promise it in the near future.

There's something you're not saying. - Katukov caught an intriguing note in Dyner’s voice: that’s what he always said when he found some interesting solution.

Thirty-fours and KVs can, if necessary, replace tractors... They checked, checked several times. They pull, they pull well.

This is against the instructions,” Kulvinsky spoke doubtfully.

And... - Katukov waved his hand. - Tomorrow we will conduct comprehensive tests.

Tests once again showed that thirty-fours and KVs coped well with the task of tractors.

The same instructions prohibited the landing of infantry on thirty-four and other tanks. Meanwhile, the war showed the high effectiveness of direct and simultaneous interaction between tanks and infantry.

“What if we try to land infantry like this,” Katukov suggested to Boyko, who was watching with him a tank returning from training, covered with infantrymen on top.

Let’s crush the instructions once again,” he laughed. - I also think that landings on tanks are possible.

And again the classes became more complicated, supplemented by training in tank landing operations. And there was no case when thirty-fours and KVs, even on very rough terrain, could not withstand the additional load.

On September 23, an order came: urgently load the brigade into trains and arrive in the Kubinka area. And now she's on the road again.

Katukov stood up and went to the window, looking at the monotonous landscape rushing past. The memories seemed to fade away at once, and were replaced by something else: now Katukov was mentally reviewing his strength. What does he have? Tank regiment - 49 combat vehicles, motorized rifle battalion, anti-aircraft artillery division - 16 guns, transport and repair companies, and other auxiliary units. “The fist is too small,” he sighed and then mischievously noted: “It’s small, but it’s daring!” And in fact, the equipment in the brigade was mostly new - T-34 tanks. The brigade was a close-knit fighting team, consisting of well-trained soldiers and commanders with combat experience. In the crews, everyone could replace the other if necessary. The units were trained in various types of interaction. And the morale of the personnel! The fist really turned out to be daring.

Busy to the limit with preparing the brigade for the upcoming battles, Katukov internally prepared himself for them. All this is good: new equipment, qualified personnel, and everything that combat training gives the brigade. This will, of course, bear fruit. But what should he, Katukov, do to multiply these fruits? Fedorenko’s words constantly drilled into my memory: “Prepare the brigade so that it is in no way inferior to the German tank division.” Well, perhaps this has been achieved. The 4th Tank Brigade, Katukov was sure of this, was capable of competing with the German tank division. But is this the point? Technology has brought a lot of new things into the art of war. And not all, far from all, possibilities of using technology are understood - the war, in fact, has just begun.

Now these thoughts again took possession of his consciousness. I remembered a recent conversation with Boyko and Kulvinsky. Dissatisfied with the slowness of the actions of some units in past training, Katukov meticulously examined the mistakes made at a meeting of unit commanders.

Didn't you intercept, Mikhail Efimovich? - Boyko turned to Katukov when he released the commanders. - In general, the units performed well. If they fight the Germans like this...

The Germans are not an example for us,” answered Katukov. - So far I haven’t seen what I can learn from them, at least on our tactical scale. Well, it's a rod. With such superiority, this is a simple matter. Where is the art?

Well, it’s you... Your own words: “You cannot underestimate the enemy,” objected Boyko.

And I don’t underestimate. I believe that neither we nor the Germans have yet fully understood the capabilities of the new technology, tanks in particular. So far I see one thing: the German command understood the importance of the massive use of tanks in modern warfare.

With our help,” Kulvinsky joined the conversation. - The theory of the massive use of tanks was put forward and substantiated by Soviet military theorists long before the war.

“We learned it on our own,” Katukov muttered angrily. - They just didn’t study enough. Once we have a lot of vehicles, then we’ll see what it is - the massive use of tanks!

Come back to earth! - Boyko laughed.

And I'm on the ground. That's why I look into the future. Now... Now we can successfully use tanks in defense, even though we have much fewer of them than the Germans. Tanks! Yes they can do that! What is tank warfare? This is primarily the skillful use of maneuver, speed, lightning-fast decisions and sophisticated cunning. This is the main thing both in the offensive and in the defense, with superiority in tanks, and when there are few of them - here it is even more important. The whole point is who practically masters this better - us or the enemy. That’s why today, as you said, I intercepted.

We stayed up past midnight. Katukov then, as they say, went wild - he spoke about what was tortured, carefully weighed by long thoughts, tested more than once in exercises - about continuous reconnaissance, the interaction of tanks with infantry and artillery, various methods of tank ambushes - about everything that his interlocutors had long known from himself and what the brigade was taught with him. They understood that Katukov, as happens with people who have been focused on an idea for a long time, spoke more to himself. But they, too, got carried away - Katukov’s ideas became their own during the brigade’s combat training.

It’s bad, very bad that we didn’t succeed on the scale of the entire war, but I think the formula is correct. “We must fight with little blood,” Katukov said with conviction. - And now there is no need to abandon this formula. In any case, this is how our brigade should fight,

Remembering this conversation now, Katukov felt awkward. “I got carried away then,” he was annoyed. “Maybe tomorrow you will have to answer to your conscience for all these words, to prove in practice that you are right.” But Katukov was confident that he was right and was annoyed because, as it seemed to him, he spoke somewhat pompously at the time, and he could not stand this. “He boasted while going to the army,” he mentally grumbled at himself.

Boyko entered the compartment:

Did you sleep well, Mikhail Efimovich? We are approaching Mtsensk.

“I see,” Katukov answered, nodding at the window, behind which ashes with charred pipes and craters floated on the streets of a small town. - All. From here on your own.

Having gathered in the headquarters bus, Katukov, Kulvinsky and Nikitin began to discuss the reconnaissance plan. At this time, a stocky man in a Red Army raincoat and helmet entered the bus. It was Major General Lelyushenko. A short meeting was held immediately.

Before you, a battalion of cadets from the Tula Weapons Technical School entered the city. “As of today, your brigade and this battalion are all our available forces,” Lelyushenko informed. - Other parts and connections of the body are on the way. Do you, Comrade Katukov, have any thoughts?

Intelligence, of course, is first and foremost intelligence.

On the morning of October 4, Katukov sent two groups of tanks with landing troops in a company of motorized infantry towards Orel. One of them was commanded by Captain Gusev, the other by Senior Lieutenant Burda. Katukov himself, together with Nikitin, followed the reconnaissance to study the area. Trying out different lines, they finally chose the most convenient for defense - five kilometers from Orel along the northern bank of the Optukha River, not far from the village of Ivanovskoye.

By evening, all units of the brigade arrived at the line and immediately began equipping positions. In the darkness of the night they dug deep trenches and false trenches, and early in the morning they set up tank ambushes and artillery. The brigade had no neighbors to the right or left. Therefore, Katukov organized a thorough reconnaissance and ordered tank ambushes to be deployed on the flanks. He kept up with everything and every time he was convinced that everything was done quickly, dexterously and as it should: the ambushes had two or three well-camouflaged positions, the artillery had well-thought-out routes for maneuvering. In a word, studying in the camp near Stalingrad bore fruit.

Soon information began to arrive from Captain Gusev. He ambushed tanks along the highway at the exit from Orel. At night, the clanging of tracks and the noise of engines was heard. The moon emerging from behind the clouds illuminated the highway: ten tanks were moving quickly along it. "Intelligence service!" - Gusev decided and ordered to open fire. Constantly changing positions, Gusev's crews destroyed four enemy tanks. The others quickly returned.

Katukov was dissatisfied with the actions of the scouts. Captain Gusev did not obtain specific data; there was no communication with Burda’s group at all. But something did become clear. Firstly, it was confirmed that large enemy forces were concentrated in Orel. Secondly, the enemy sent reconnaissance. This means that I don’t intend to stay in Orel.

And indeed, throughout the night of October 5, enemy reconnaissance groups tried to probe the brigade’s defenses. Around ten o'clock in the morning, when the rain stopped and the sky cleared, enemy artillery thundered and his bombers appeared in the sky. Quite a few bombs and shells fell on false positions. And in general, the correct arrangement of shelters and careful camouflage had an effect: the brigade did not suffer any significant damage from the enemy’s artillery and air preparation.

Soon, enemy tanks appeared in front of the positions of the motorized rifle battalion, followed by motorized infantry in a dense scattering. Katukov and Kulvinsky were at the forefront of motorized rifle forces at that time. Kulvinsky counted about 40 tanks alone and, perhaps, the same number, if not more, armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

Crouching down, they ran to the command post, but, obviously, the German artillerymen noticed them: the shells began to explode closer and closer. Nearby two signalmen were pulling the cable. - Get down! - Katukov shouted and rushed to the side of the road. He saw both signalmen fall, mowed down by shells that exploded nearby.

Kulvinsky!

Here I am. Alive

Quickly through the bushes to the CP!

From the command post, the battlefield was clearly visible: enemy tanks broke into the positions of the motorized rifle battalion. How the motorized rifles fought was evident from several burning German tanks. Having given the order on the radio to introduce tank ambushes into battle, Katukov clung to his binoculars and saw how almost simultaneously several thirty-fours jumped out from behind a hillock. Almost every shot hit an enemy tank. Nimble, swift, they jumped out from behind barns, bushes, haystacks, fired several shots and disappeared. Immediately they appeared again, but from different positions. The line of enemy tanks was mixed, some of them were burning in thick black fires. The chains of fascist machine gunners lay down, rose and lay down again, pressed down by machine-gun fire.

This first enemy attack lasted three hours. Several more attacks followed. The enemy made desperate efforts to crush the brigade's defenses. In the evening, when the last attack was repulsed, the brigade headquarters summed up the results: the motorized rifle battalion had suffered significant losses. The enemy's damage was significantly greater - he lost 18 tanks, 8 guns and several hundred soldiers and officers. The main thing was that the enemy was unable to break through the brigade’s defenses. And yet Katukov made a decision: to change the line of defense, quickly and secretly.

Tomorrow the enemy will look for a new place to break through. We need to deceive him,” he explained at a meeting of the brigade command.

On the night of October 6, the brigade retreated to the Naryshkino - Pervy Voin area, riding the Orel - Mtsensk highway. Katukov briefed the unit commanders and ordered that the positions be ready by early morning.

Having dismissed the commanders, he turned to Boyko:

People are exhausted. But who knows when Guderian will start. Let's prepare the defense - then maybe we'll have an hour or two to rest. Send the political department workers to the units... Let them explain the task. Outside the window I suddenly heard the growing noise of moving tanks and almost immediately fell silent. Senior Lieutenant Burda quickly entered the hut,

At ease, at ease,” Katukov stopped him. - Report immediately. However, no. Why didn't they respond to our requests?

The radio is out of order.

Clear. Now everything is in order"

For 36 hours, Burda's group was behind enemy lines, destroying 10 medium and light tanks, 2 tractors with anti-tank guns, 5 vehicles with infantry and about a hundred enemy soldiers and officers.

This is material for conversations in the units,” Katukov said, turning to Boyko. - Make arrangements, please.

Of particular value were the captured documents and prisoners delivered by Burda's group. It turned out that along the Orel-Mtsensk highway the enemy intended to move a huge armada of tanks, artillery and motorized infantry: the 24th Motorized Corps, consisting of two tank and one motorized divisions. In addition, another tank division was moving to the rear of the forming 1st Guards Corps. All these troops, according to the plans of the German command, were supposed to break through to Tula through Mtsensk and reach Moscow from the southern direction.

No sooner had Burda's reconnaissance results been summed up than a messenger from Lelyushenko appeared and reported that an anti-tank artillery division was being placed at Katukov's disposal. This turned out to be very useful.

Katukov and his headquarters had developed a plan for the defense of the new line in advance, and now the units were being placed in their places. The new positions were very convenient for defense: high-rise buildings from which the terrain was clearly visible, small groves, bushes, and haystacks made it possible to camouflage tank ambushes and guns. Now Katukov made adjustments to the balance of forces: he increased reconnaissance of the flanks, sent Burda’s tanks to help the motorized rifle battalion straddling the highway - they became six ambushes at motorized rifle positions, and determined positions for the arriving units of the anti-tank artillery battalion.

Early in the morning, the brigade command gathered at the brigade commander's command post. And almost immediately reports began to arrive about the movement of large enemy forces from Orel. Having climbed a large tree, the commander of the 2nd tank battalion, Captain Raftopoulo, reported on what he saw through binoculars:

About a hundred tanks, anti-tank artillery, a lot of motorized infantry, machine gunners on motorcycles...

As they approached, enemy tanks opened heavy fire on the positions of the motorized rifle battalion and anti-tank division. The return fire set some enemy vehicles on fire, but the rest stubbornly moved forward. Soon they burst into the position of the motorized riflemen and began to iron their trenches.

The mortar company found itself in a difficult situation. Thirty-four under the command of Lieutenant Kukarin jumped out of the ambush to help her. She flew almost close to the enemy tanks when a shell pierced her track. But the crew was not at a loss. The tank commander and radio operator began to fire shells, and turret gunner Lyubushkin showed his skills in full: three shots - and three enemy tanks burst into flames. Another shot - and again a direct hit. Lyubushkin shot the enemy crew who jumped out of the fourth tank with a fragmentation shell. But then an enemy shell hit the right side of the thirty-four and exploded inside it. Acrid smoke filled the car, “Shell!” - demanded Lyubushkin and knocked out another tank. In total, Lyubushkin destroyed nine enemy tanks in this battle.

Meanwhile, the position of the motorized rifle battalion became increasingly difficult. Katukov sent four tanks under the command of Senior Lieutenant Lavrinenko to help him. And again the thing that had been so carefully practiced in the exercises began. Thirty-fours jumped out of ambushes and opened fire on enemy tanks. From his command post, Katukov saw several enemy vehicles burst into flames. Others began to back away in confusion. The thirty-fours suddenly disappeared and a minute later emerged from another shelter. A series of aimed shots - and several enemy vehicles caught fire again. With such swift, sudden attacks, Lavrinenko’s tanks destroyed 15 enemy tanks. Eventually the breakthrough was closed.

The enemy tried to break through in other places of the brigade's defense with smaller, but still impressive forces. And each time tank ambushes and skillful actions of motorized riflemen and artillerymen thwarted these attempts.

The brigade did not suffer major losses. But people are extremely tired. And suddenly a report: up to 200 tanks and a large number of enemy motorized infantry were concentrated to the right of the Orel-Mtsensk highway.

Twice as much as in the morning! - Boyko exclaimed.

Yes... - Katukov thought. - Well, we’ll do some magic, and you and the political department workers urgently go to the units. And I ask: explain to political workers so that they tell people everything as it is. Nothing has such a detrimental effect on fighters as a sweet half-truth... What about people? Our people will understand.

“Conjure! - Katukov mentally mimicked himself. “What can you conjure?” And yet the headquarters began to work with all its might: some tank and artillery ambushes were rearranged, communications were checked, and reconnaissance of the flanks was intensified.

The day was drawing to a close, and the enemy artillery intensified its fire.

Will they really start at night? This is something new for the Germans,” Kulvinsky frowned, concerned that not all positions were yet ready for battle.

At this time, a tall artilleryman entered the command post.

Captain Chumak, commander of the guards mortar division,” he introduced himself. - It was ordered to plant a light on your site.

Katukov, of course, heard about the Katyushas, ​​but he never saw them. And now he looked with disappointment at the installations: ordinary trucks with rows of raised steel rails - this did not fit with the stories about the enormous destructive power of the new weapon. And then Chumak completely ruined the impression.

“I was ordered to fire one salvo,” he said. But, obviously understanding the brigade commander’s condition, he grinned and assured: “Don’t worry.” And that's enough. Once you see how the Katyusha “plays”, then you will understand what it is.

Chumak marked the enemy concentration area on his map and turned to Katukov:

We need to warn people on the front lines. The noise will be terrible. No matter how much it caused panic.

Kulvinsky sent messengers to the trenches. Chumak brought the installations into position and gave the command. Dazzling flashes of flame brightly illuminated the evening sky, a piercing whistle was heard, then a terrible roar erupted, causing the earth to tremble.

The hollow was engulfed in flames, it spread and soon turned into a huge sea of ​​​​fire. Explosions were heard from below - vehicles with ammunition were exploding. Katukov saw through binoculars that many cars that were not directly hit by the salvo were leaving in disarray. “One salvo is not enough,” he decided. “Apparently, ammunition for new weapons is still tight.”

In an hour you can see everything in place,” Chumak said, answering handshakes. - And I, Comrade Colonel, need to immediately remove the installations. So according to the instructions.

When the flames above the ravine began to die out, reconnaissance was sent there. The Katyusha salvo turned out to be accurate: dozens of smoking tanks, tractors, cars, motorcycles, many corpses - it was difficult to accurately count everything in the dark.

Late at night, the headquarters summed up the results of the day. The battle continued almost continuously for twelve hours. All enemy attacks were repulsed. He lost 43 tanks, 16 anti-tank guns, and up to 500 soldiers and officers. The brigade had six tanks damaged, four of which were soon repaired. The motorized rifle battalion was seriously damaged. He was assigned to the second echelon of the brigade.

Guderian's tank ram was clearly fragmented and weakened, but still far outnumbered the 4th Tank Brigade. And again Katukov decided that the brigade could not remain in its previous positions: the enemy now already knew the terrain, and it was impossible to repeat the previous tank ambush techniques on it - their effect would have been sharply reduced. On the night of October 7, the brigade retreated to a new line: Ilkovo - Golovlevo - Sheino.

In the morning Lelyushenko arrived at Katukov’s checkpoint. He said that he spoke on HF with Stalin and he highly appreciated the actions of the brigade. Needless to say: the praise of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief delighted Katukov. But she obliged me to a lot. And there was a moment when he thought with a chill running down his spine: “Maybe I’ve just been lucky so far?”

Lelyushenko also brought another good news: the brigade was assigned a regiment of border guards under the command of Colonel Piyashev. Reinforcements for the brigade's motorized rifle battalion were also on the way. Katukov once again thought over the plan for the disposition of his forces, strengthened many areas at the expense of border guards, and expanded reconnaissance, especially on the flanks.

Apparently, the previous three days of fighting and especially the Katyusha strike made a strong impression on the enemy: on October 7 and 8 he did not show much activity, only trying to probe the brigade’s defenses with small reconnaissance groups. Katukov ordered to provide decisive resistance to these groups, but in such a way as not to reveal the location of the units. As before, his goal was to mislead the enemy about the Soviet troops opposing him and make him nervous. “Languages” were also needed. The border guards performed admirably in this matter. At night, in small groups, they made their way to enemy positions, fired grenades or daggers, and captured prisoners.

Katukov's plan was a success. The prisoners showed that the enemy command believed that it was dealing with a large tank group of Soviet troops.

On October 9, the enemy launched a decisive offensive. Fifty dive bombers, turning on their sirens, fell on the trenches with a heartbreaking howl, literally bombarding them with bombs. This happened more than once or twice: the enemy air preparation lasted a quarter of an hour. But the fascist vultures “processed” false trenches and trenches.

Then the tanks moved in - about a hundred vehicles and motorized infantry. Katukov quickly figured out the enemy’s maneuver: to bypass the brigade’s positions from the flanks and deliver the main blow from the left through Sheino to Mtsensk. Tank and artillery ambushes held back the enemy's advance. Fierce fighting broke out everywhere. The enemy suffered huge losses. And yet his tanks broke through to Shein. Here they came across a company of BT-7 tanks under Lieutenant Samokhin. The lieutenant buried some of the tanks in the ground - their task was to conduct targeted artillery fire at enemy vehicles. The tank duel lasted an hour and a half, with enemy tanks bursting into flames one after another. However, regardless of losses, the enemy continued to attack Sheino. Katukov sent three tanks to help Samokhin. Their attack was so unexpected and swift for the enemy that the enemy tanks did not even have time to deploy their guns. Direct aimed shots immediately set fire to 11 German tanks, the rest left the battlefield and disappeared into the forest.

Enemy attacks were repulsed everywhere, with heavy losses. However, at 10 p.m. Katukov received an order from Lelyushenko to retreat to a new line, since the enemy had managed to break through in another sector of the corps’ defense and was in danger of being encircled.

The new frontier, in fact, is the outskirts of Mtsensk. On the morning of October 10, the enemy began attacks on the brigade’s front line of defense, but this time it was somehow unusual: sluggishly, without serious pressure. And this is with multiple superiority! Katukov immediately realized that these attacks were diversionary, and the main attack was being prepared somewhere else, not in the area defended by the brigade.

And indeed, pinning down the brigade along the front, the enemy broke into Mtsensk from the east. Reports were constantly coming to Katukov - one more alarming than the other. Specific answers were given for each of them. Their general meaning boiled down to one thing: to act in such a way that the enemy did not dare to assume that the Soviet troops were going to retreat.

By active actions you need to confuse the enemy so much that with the onset of darkness you can break away from him and retreat in an organized manner,” Katukov explained his plan to Boyko and Kulvinsky. - We are lucky so far; Guderian, apparently, continues to believe that he is dealing with large tank forces.

There was no clear line of defense in the city. And here the tactics of tank ambushes, the combat and psychological preparation of soldiers and commanders for conducting independent combat operations in small units, manifested themselves with particular force.

The enemy's pressure steadily increased. By mid-day, the enemy brought up large artillery forces, which began a massive shelling of the bridge over the Zusha River. It was now impossible to escape through it. The brigade and its assigned units were surrounded.

There remained a narrow railway bridge. But will cars pass through it? Dusk was already gathering when deputy political instructor Zavalishin, sent on reconnaissance, reported that he had crossed the bridge in his thirty-four. But joy immediately gave way to anxiety. Zavalishin saw the movement of troops on the opposite bank. Whose - he couldn't make out. A caterpillar fell off his tank, and he ran back to report what he had managed to reconnaissance.

In those specific conditions, the possibility of the enemy crossing to the other side of Zushi could not be ruled out. Finally it became clear that Soviet troops were taking up defensive positions on the other side.

Soon, what was later called in the brigade the crossing of the “devil’s bridge” began. Having made sure that units and subunits were being drawn up to the bridge in the prescribed manner, Katukov gathered his staff and ordered:

Regardless of ranks and positions, stand in a column of two! Prepare the grenades!

It was a relatively long distance to the bridge. And the headquarters column had to be ready to take the fight. Katukov explained that the headquarters workers are responsible for maintaining order at the crossing.

Troubles began immediately. The flooring boards could withstand guns and vehicles, but they were falling apart. Artillery bits fell into cracks, broke their legs, and fell; congestion occurred. Horses had to be shot and thrown into the river. The wheels of guns and vehicles got stuck in the cracks; soldiers and headquarters workers dragged them in their hands. And yet the crossing continued.

Suddenly the rain suddenly stopped. The clouds quickly cleared, and the full moon brightly illuminated the area. The enemy immediately discovered the crossing and opened artillery fire on the bridge. The shells were exploding ever closer. Soon machine gun fire was added to the artillery fire: enemy machine gunners took up residence in the station premises.

The decision came almost instantly. Katukov ordered the commander of a nearby tank, Sergeant Kapotov, to secretly break through to the station, knock out the machine gunners from there and set fire to several wooden buildings.

Soon the machine gun fire stopped, and then a fire broke out near the station. The situation immediately changed. Blinded by the flames, the enemy artillerymen could no longer conduct aimed fire. The crossing was in full swing. The tanks approached the bridge, continuing to fire back from the advancing enemy. Many were dragging damaged combat vehicles or trucks on trailers: Katukov ordered not to leave anything useful to the enemy.

Katukov and Boyko crossed with the first cars to the other side. Thoroughly wet and chilled, they only now felt how much nervous tension the brigade’s crossing had cost them. After the war, Katukov noted in his memoirs: “For those who managed to stay alive, crossing the railway bridge was probably remembered forever. No wonder the tank crews nicknamed this bridge “devil’s”.

The 13th Army took up defensive positions on the right bank of the Zushi. Other connections were also suitable. The front that blocked the enemy's path to Moscow began to stabilize. The 4th Tank Brigade was transferred to the second echelon of the 50th Army.

Oh, thanks! - he spoke joyfully, answering the greeting. - Do you even really know what enemy forces you were fighting with?

Apparently not all. Guderian threw his best formations against your brigade. Here one of our high-ranking officials said that you were cutting teeth as a commander... If even several tank divisions had battered Guderian’s group like that, then that would have been a great success. And here is the brigade!

Fedorenko spoke longer than usual; apparently he wanted to say something specific, but he never said it.

In the evening, the meaning of Fedorenko’s omissions became clearer. The radio broadcast the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On awarding orders and medals to the commanding and rank and file of the tank forces of the Red Army.” The announcer listed the names of 32 soldiers of the 4th Tank Brigade. Katukov and Boyko were awarded the Order of Lenin. Then a separate Decree was announced conferring the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to Sergeant Ivan Timofeevich Lyubushkin. The awardees were congratulated and rocked. The embarrassed Lyubushkin blushed and repeated in confusion:

Why am I alone, everyone was fighting...

Yes, the soldiers of the 4th Tank Brigade had every reason to rejoice. They arrived in the Oryol direction when the enemy managed to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops. Guderian's tank formations then moved 80–90 kilometers a day. The brigade slowed down this pace to 7 kilometers. But the enemy always had a multiple superiority, on some days ten or more times. Every kilometer of advance was given to the enemy at the cost of huge losses. Guderian subsequently admitted in his memoirs that, due to heavy losses, "prospects for rapid and continuous success disappeared." And this is a considerable merit of the soldiers of the 4th Tank Brigade.

The battles near Orel and Mtsensk particularly revealed Katukov’s extraordinary leadership abilities. Yes, the big boss Fedorenko spoke about was right, noting that Katukov “cut his military teeth.” Whether this expression is successful or not, its meaning is certainly correct.

On October 16, Katukov was summoned to the headquarters of the 50th Army. “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief will speak to you via HF,” they told him. After greeting, Stalin asked about the brigade’s combat capability. Katukov was, of course, ready for this question and, somehow immediately calming down, briefly reported on the main thing: the brigade was ready for new battles. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, apparently satisfied with the answer, ordered the brigade to arrive in the Kubinka area as quickly as possible.

Volokolamsk direction! How often it was mentioned in the reports of the Soviet Information Bureau during the Battle of Moscow! It was in the Volokolamsk direction that the enemy managed to drive the sharpest wedge into the defense of the Soviet troops and reach the closest approaches to Moscow. Here the 16th Army, which soon gained legendary glory, fought to its death under the command of Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky. The 4th Tank Brigade was also included in its composition.

On November 6, a passenger car accompanied by an armored car drove up to the Katukov checkpoint. Rokossovsky got out of the car.

At ease! - he stopped Katukov rushing towards him and hugged him. - Great, Katukov! Long time no see, well, let's go to you and tell you what you did there with Guderian.

Over an impromptu dinner, Katukov spoke about the brigade, how it prepared for battle and how it fought. Rokossovsky outlined the situation in the area of ​​the 16th Army.

The enemy's superiority, especially in tanks, is manifold. This is where your experience of the battles near Orel will be very useful... Try to generalize it, - Rokossovsky suggested, - in the form of a memo or instructions, or something.

I have something. I started back in Stalingrad. - Katukov took a folder out of the travel safe and handed it to Rokossovsky. “Instructions for tank crews on fighting enemy tanks, artillery and infantry,” Rokossovsky read and began to quickly glance through the brochure. - Interesting... Just that... There are tank ambushes, attacks at maximum speed... Interesting, very interesting... Very correct about reconnaissance: in mobile forms of combat it should extend for tens of kilometers...

The conversation with Rokossovsky pleasantly excited Katukov. Flipping through the instructions that Rokossovsky had just approved, Katukov felt relieved. “What kind of a theorist am I!” - he sometimes doubted while working on the instructions. At the same time, he felt the need to generalize combat experience, to extract from it the most effective and promising. Rokossovsky's assessment reinforced this need.

We were also pleased with the interest with which Rokossovsky asked about the brigade’s battles near Orel, and his, Katukov’s, high assessment of his decisions and actions in these battles. This feeling had nothing to do with a feeling of satisfied vanity. Katukov was always far from vanity and complacent satisfaction with what he had achieved. Everything was simpler: the opinion of such a talented military leader confirmed that he, Katukov, was on the right path in his quest. This made me happy.

Leaving, Rokossovsky said:

Your immediate task is to strike Skirmanovo. We have now discussed the main thing. You will receive your order later.

The immediate task was not an easy one. The bridgehead with the settlements of Skirmanovo, Kozlov, and Maryino crashed like a wedge into the defense line of the 16th Army. The 2nd German Tank Division was concentrated here, and other forces were being brought up. Intelligence established that the enemy intended to strike from this bridgehead in order to encircle and destroy the 16th Army. To cut off the resulting wedge and thereby thwart the enemy’s plan - this was the task Rokossovsky set for the 4th Tank Brigade and other formations located here.

Soon an order came, according to which units of the 16th Army were to begin fighting on the morning of November 12 to capture a more convenient line of defense, including the specified bridgehead.

On the afternoon of November 11, Katukov and Kulvinsky came to the chief of staff of the army, Major General S. M. Malinin, to coordinate issues of cooperation in the upcoming battles.

Things to do later,” Malinin said, smiling mysteriously, “I see, you don’t know anything?.. Well then, read on.” - Malinin handed Katukov “Pravda”.

That's it, you've been a general for a day now. Congratulations!

At this time, Rokossovsky appeared at the door.

Congratulations? - he asked. - But that is not all. Roth, read.

It was a document that needs to be reproduced here in full.

“To all fronts, armies, tank divisions and brigades. Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 337, Moscow

On the renaming of the 4th Tank Brigade into the 1st Guards Tank Brigade

The 4th Tank Brigade, through brave and skillful combat operations from 4.10 to 11.10, despite the significant numerical superiority of the enemy, inflicted heavy losses on him and fulfilled the tasks assigned to the brigade to cover the concentration of our troops.

Two fascist tank divisions and one motorized division were stopped and suffered huge losses from the glorious fighters and commanders of the 4th Tank Brigade.

As a result of the fierce battles of the brigade with the 3rd and 4th tank divisions and the enemy motorized division, the Nazis lost 133 tanks, 49 guns, 8 aircraft, 15 tractors with ammunition, up to an infantry regiment, 6 mortars and other weapons. The losses of the 4th Tank Brigade were counted in single units.

The excellent performance of the brigade and its success are due to the fact that:

1. The brigade conducted continuous combat reconnaissance. 2. There was full interaction between tanks and motorized infantry and artillery.

3. Tanks were deployed and used correctly, combining ambushes with the actions of the strike group.

4. The personnel acted bravely and harmoniously.

The combat actions of the 4th Tank Brigade should serve as an example for units of the Red Army in the war of liberation against the fascist invaders.

I order:

1. For brave and skillful combat actions, the 4th Tank Brigade should be called: “1st Guards Tank Brigade.”

2. The commander of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, Major General Katukov, nominate the most distinguished soldiers and commanders for government awards.

3. The Head of the GABTU and the Head of the GAU to replenish the 1st Guards Tank Brigade with the material part of combat vehicles and weapons to a full complement.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR

I. Stalin

Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union

B. Shaposhnikov.”
And again congratulations, hugs, handshakes. But in war there is little time for joy.

“In the tank forces, your brigade was the first to receive such an honor,” Rokossovsky said. - In this case, she should be given two days to rest... But alas! Tomorrow your brigade must show in practice what tank guards are.

And yet there was a holiday in the brigade. Short rallies were held in the units. “Justify the high honor!”, “Beat the enemy like a guard!” - said the soldiers and commanders who spoke at the rallies.

The next morning the brigade entered the battle. For twelve hours she stormed Skirmanovo. Since the morning of November 13, she waged a continuous 38-hour battle for Kozlov. The enemy resisted fiercely, but was forced to retreat. The brigade fought like a guard during the November “general”, “decisive” enemy offensive on Moscow. I had to retreat. With pain in their hearts, the soldiers and commanders left behind the kilometer posts with the numbers 60, 55, 53...” Moscow was nearby, completely behind.

Noting the participation of tank guards in these battles, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov wrote after the war: “The 1st Guards Tank Brigade, transferred to the 16th Army, acted with unparalleled courage. In October, this brigade (then 4th Tank) acted. fought heroically at Orlam and Mtsensk... Now, in November, defending the approaches to Moscow, the tank guards raised their glorious reputation even higher with new exploits,”

During the November battles, Katukov’s commanding talent was revealed even more deeply. In a rapidly changing situation, in conditions of constant superiority of the enemy in manpower and military equipment, he invariably found the most effective tactics, new versions of his favorite tank ambushes. And here, as a month earlier near Orel, Katukov invariably based his decisions on the principle: inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy and preserve the strength of the brigade as much as possible. And he achieved this every time.

During two weeks of the enemy offensive, the brigade destroyed 106 tanks, 16 heavy and 37 anti-tank guns, 16 mortars, 3 mortar batteries, 8 tractors, 55 cars, 51 motorcycles, up to three enemy infantry regiments, destroyed 13 bunkers and 27 machine gun nests. All this was several times greater than the number and armament of the brigade. During this time, 33 tanks in the brigade failed - three times less than the enemy lost. In fact, the brigade lost only 7 tanks, and 26 damaged vehicles, thanks to the efforts of Dyner, were repaired and returned to operational service.

Finally the long-awaited came: the Red Army drove the fascist invaders away from the walls of the Soviet capital. The 1st Guards Tank Brigade operated in infantry combat formations, cleared its path with swift attacks, outflanked the enemy from the flanks and rear, and made stunning raids on the retreating enemy from ambushes.

The high spirits in which Katukov was constantly in these days also had purely personal reasons. He had been alone for several years: his wife died before the war, there were no children. And somehow he was immediately bewitched by the foreman of the medical service, Katya - that was her name in the unit where she served. No matter how difficult the situation was, Katukov found “reasons” to visit this unit. Soon Katukov and Ekaterina Sergeevna got married. But Ekaterina Sergeevna flatly refused to leave the service or be only Katukov’s wife. So until the end of the war, she fought, although next to her husband, but as a senior medical officer. Katukov was proud of her decision, although he was worried. For distinction in battles, Ekaterina Sergeevna was awarded the Order of the Red Star and combat medals.

In mid-April 1942, Katukov received an order to transfer the brigade to Moscow for reorganization. He and Boyko were recalled to the disposal of the Main Armored Directorate.

Fedorenko greeted Katukov and Boyko warmly and treated them to tea and sandwiches.

“I have good news for you,” he said. - You, Katukov, were appointed commander of the 1st Tank Corps, you, Boyko, were appointed commissar. Do you feel, friends, what this means?.. Now we are capable of forming large tank formations! Our factories are gaining capacity.

Fedorenko said that the corps will include three tank brigades - about 250 tanks in total, a motorized rifle brigade, a rocket mortar division, a reconnaissance battalion and various rear units. Katukov and Boyko felt stunned. One could only dream of such a scale at that time.

So how? Strength? - Fedorenko asked, pleased with the effect produced. - So that’s it... And the first building is for you! Well, they deserve it. I will also please others: the 1st Guards Brigade will be part of the corps... Now let's think about personnel. We recommend Colonel Kravchenko as the chief of staff of the corps.

Katukov and Boyko proposed to appoint Derevianko as the head of the political department of the corps, Dyner as the deputy commander for technical affairs, and Nikitin as the head of the operations department.

The conversation turned out to be long. Katukov, both before and later, as an army commander, carefully studied his subordinates, did not forget to note those who distinguished themselves, and boldly promoted the worthy. In the placement of personnel, he paid great attention to what is now called psychological compatibility. And now Katukov eagerly explained why he was nominating this or that commander and why the one he recommends should be appointed as a deputy to this commander, and not another, no less worthy one.

A few days later, Katukov was summoned to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar of the Tank Industry V. A. Malyshev. He was interested in the shortcomings of tanks. “Talk everything, about every little thing,” Vyacheslav Alexandrovich asked.

There were “little things”. In practice, they sometimes turned out to be far from trifles. For example, what was it like for paratroopers to balance on a speeding tank? Or something else. Someone came up with the idea of ​​installing externally different antennas on command vehicles, and enemy artillery concentrated fire on these vehicles. Katukov subsequently noted with satisfaction how quickly his proposals were implemented: the tanks arriving at the front had the same antennas, handrails for paratroopers to hold on to, and other improvements.

The headquarters and some services of the corps were staffed in Moscow. The main work on its formation was carried out in Lipetsk, where Katukov and Boyko soon arrived.

All parts of the corps were fully equipped, and before the roads had even dried out from the spring thaw, an order was received to send it to the Bryansk Front.

The corps spent more than three months in battles - offensive, and more often defensive. Katukov was dissatisfied with neither one nor the other. What exactly has changed? There were more tanks, large tank formations appeared, but they were used in the old way - in separate units, without proper support from aviation and artillery.

No, not like that, not at all like how Katukov imagined the combat use of large tank forces. Apparently, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were also dissatisfied with the way tank troops were used on the Bryansk Front. After the war, Katukov came across a document addressed to the front command, signed by the Chief of the General Staff A. M. Vasilevsky. It said:

“Some of the tank corps ceased to be tank corps and switched to infantry fighting methods. Examples: Katukov (1st Tank Corps), instead of quickly destroying the enemy infantry, spent 24 hours encircling two regiments, and you, apparently, encourage this...” Later in his memoirs, Katukov wrote:

“This document explains much of the situation of those days. Of course, the 1st Tank Corps surrounded two infantry regiments not on its own initiative, but by order from above. But it's not only that. A more important conclusion follows from this document: tank corps were introduced into battle separately, each of them was given narrow, limited tasks. But it was possible to concentrate them into a powerful fist and, strengthening them with air and ground support, deliver a truly devastating blow to the Nazis’ flank.”
In mid-August, the corps was withdrawn to the reserve of the Supreme High Command, and soon Katukov was summoned to Moscow for a reception with Stalin.

Stalin began the conversation with specific questions, but not directly related to Katukov’s activities. Responding to them, Katukov felt awkward, seeing that Stalin did not like his critical remarks about the KV and T-70 tanks. And yet, overcoming his confusion, he stubbornly objected:

No, Joseph Vissarionovich, they showed themselves poorly in battle. Ask any tanker - everyone will prefer the thirty-four.

Katukov saw the dissatisfied look in Stalin’s eyes, but he expressed his views to the end and showed what exactly were the shortcomings of the KV and T-70 tanks. Perhaps the young general’s tenacity attracted Stalin. He turned the conversation to other topics. Katukov still could not understand why Stalin had called him, but he felt that he was gradually testing him, weighing what he was worth. And suddenly Stalin, interrupting his questions, said that mechanized corps were being created, stronger than tank ones, and he , Katukov, is appointed commander of the 3rd Mechanized Corps.

Katukov, as they say, was relieved: it means that his service was appreciated well. But it was a great pity—Katukov immediately felt it—to part with his battle friends, with the formations with which he had gone through a difficult battle path. And Katukov, as he put it in his memoirs, “begged”:

“- Comrade Stalin, it’s not so easy to prepare and train troops. It’s a big thing for fighting when people know you well and you know them. The 1st Tank Corps includes the 1st Guards Brigade, with whose fighters I am bound by the strongest bonds of friendship. How easy is it to part with her?
At the request of Katukov, Stalin ordered the inclusion of formations from the 1st Tank into the 3rd Mechanized Corps: the 1st Guards and 49th Tank Brigades, the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the transfer of Dyner to the corps as assistant commander for the technical department and the head of the operational department Nikitina.

From the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Katukov immediately went to Fedorenko. He told him in every detail about the conversation with Stalin, answered questions and, encouraged by Fedorenko’s approving remarks, as they say, poured out his soul, expressed everything that he had changed his mind while commanding the tank corps.

There are a lot more tanks. It seems that quantity should turn into quality,” Katukov fumed. - Tank corps appeared, and now mechanized corps. These are heavy fists! What do we have? Not fists, but spread fingers! There has never been a massive attack on the enemy by large tank forces! What about interaction?

Right! - Fedorenko cooled down Katukov. - You think correctly. And you're not alone.

So what's the deal?

In experience. There's a bit of growing pains here. Not everyone from the combined arms command was able to correctly understand how to use large tank forces and organize their interaction with other branches of the military. We are now preparing a draft order of the People's Commissar on this matter. You'll receive it soon.

Indeed, on October 16, 1942, a special order was issued by the People's Commissar of Defense, which revealed shortcomings in the combat use of tank forces.

The order set out in detail all the main issues of tactics and organization of actions of tank units and formations, and determined the principles and procedure for their interaction with infantry, artillery and aviation. Much attention was paid to tank and mechanized corps. They were declared as a means of army and front-line command for actions in the main direction as echelons for the development of success. The dispersal of their forces and the allocation of independent areas of defense to them was prohibited. Later Katukov wrote: “This order played a big role in the further fate of the tank forces. It essentially became the most important theoretical basis for their combat use.”

Nothing determines people's relationships so quickly and firmly as war. But she is also an inexorable homewrecker. Boyko remained in the 1st Tank Corps. And, no matter how difficult it was, Katukov understood: Boyko, as an “old-timer,” was more needed there. An experienced political worker, brigade commissar N.K. Popel was appointed commissar of the 3rd mechanized corps. He began the war as commissar of the very 15th Tank Division, from whose fighters and commanders the 4th Tank Brigade was formed. Apparently, because he again met with many of his fighting comrades, and even more because he was, as they say, now, a sociable person, Nikolai Kirillovich quickly found his rightful place in the fighting team, imbued with its needs and concerns.

Katukov, encouraged by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of October 16, 1942 and strengthened in the correctness of his views, revised a lot in those days. His, so to speak, “creative laboratory” was in full swing with intense work, and he imagined more and more clearly the true possibilities of large-scale operations of tank forces.

Your thoughts are something like a concentration of forces,” Popel once said, with whom Katukov often shared his thoughts. - The massive use of tank troops is new for us. And here you can’t do without the work of your own brain convolutions. When the time comes, you will realize a lot.

But there were also thoughts of a different kind - personal ones. I was worried about my father's health. They wrote that Efim Epifanovich was sad and worried: will he be able to see his son?

How many times have I been near him, but haven’t managed to get out to my father! - Katukov once annoyed Popel, having received another letter from his father.

Yes,” he answered thoughtfully. - We don’t see our parents very often. But life is ours...

Apparently remembering his personal sorrows, Popel unexpectedly told his biography.

My life seems to be unremarkable too. And I’m always running out of time, I always put off everything personal for later,” Katukov sighed.

The “unremarkable” life of Mikhail Efimovich was in fact quite remarkable for people of his generation and destiny. Mikhail Efimovich was born in the village of Bolshoye Uvarovo near Kolomna on September 17, 1900 in the family of a poor peasant. A piece of bad land - sand and loam - could not feed a family. My father, like many of his fellow villagers, often went to work in St. Petersburg, where he worked in various jobs. He returned tired, brought little - he barely managed to make ends meet. But he never forgot the lollipops for his son, and sparingly caressed him like a man. And it probably wasn’t easy for him to write to his wife from St. Petersburg that it was time to put 12-year-old Mikhail into action, that he had found something worthwhile for him.

Shedding tears, the mother put some underwear and some simple village food into a basket made of willow twigs. Mikhail went with her to his father in St. Petersburg to earn money. Working as a “boy” in a dairy store turned out to be a “worthwhile” job. For five years I washed bottles, scrubbed door handles, mopped tiled floors, and delivered milk to customers.

Life in the capital city taught me a lot. The difference between rich and poor here was even more striking than in their village. And the poor in the city were completely different - they did not want to put up with their deprivation.

The February Revolution made a huge impression on Mikhail. Rallies, demonstrations - he heard a lot then, and began to understand something. I saw how huge crowds of people rushed to the Finlyandsky Station to meet Lenin. And when a little later he heard that Lenin was a German spy, he came to his father in confusion. “He is for the people, for the factory workers and for us, the bast workers,” explained Efim Epifanovich. - Don’t listen to the owners, they are following their line. Take a closer look at the factory ones. They are stronger than us, the village bastards, and stand up for themselves with the whole world.”

During the days of the October Revolution, 17-year-old Mikhail, together with the Red Guards, participated in the defeat of the cadets holed up in the Sevastopol hotel. Then he returned to his native village - he grew out of the “boys” both in age and consciousness. I firmly decided to stand up for the new government, for the Soviets. How? He didn't know this yet. But life itself determined the paths of his generation. There was a civil war going on. In 1919, Mikhail volunteered to join the Red Army and fought against the White Poles, the gangs of Bulak-Bulakhovich, Savinkov and other enemies of Soviet power.

It was hard, but Katukov still fell in love with military service. To become a red commander - this dream increasingly took possession of him. Apparently, the platoon commander, with whom Mikhail had more than once shared his thoughts, reported his aspirations to his superiors. One day he announced to Katukov:

You will go to Mogilev for commander courses. It seems like you fit the bill in all respects: he’s competent at work and smart.

We studied without letting go of our rifles. Often, alerted, cadets were sent to remote areas of the Mogilev region, where gangs of bandits still roamed and terrorized the population.

On March 1, 1922, young painters graduated from the Mogilev courses. Katukov was sent as a platoon commander to the 27th Omsk Rifle Division, which was part of the Western Military District.

The commander of the district troops was M. N. Tukhachevsky. And this affected everything. Tukhachevsky persistently introduced everything new and advanced into the combat training of troops. At the House of the Red Army in Smolensk in the winter of 1923/24, he gave weekly lectures on the history of military art to command staff. Katukov was lucky: that winter the 27th Omsk Division was stationed in Smolensk, and he did not miss a single lecture by Tukhachevsky.

The lectures were fascinating and made me think about a lot - both the content and the advice. Katukov took away from these pieces of advice, as he rightly decided, the main thing: the military knowledge of the commander should be above his official position and constantly updated, however, not only military, but also general educational. Knowledge is only a tool for thinking. You need to learn to think independently, based on knowledge. Naturally endowed with an inquisitive, analytical mind, he turned self-education into a constant norm of his life.

A visit to the division camp of M.V. Frunze, his speech at a rally of Red Army soldiers and a conversation with the command and political staff left a deep imprint on the minds of the young painter. I will forever remember my meetings with S.S. Vostretsov and M.I. Fabricius. Communication with extraordinary people, even short-term, is always enriching. And Katukov, needless to say, was always lucky to have such communication. Later, his formation as a commander was greatly influenced by his service in the formations led by K.K. Rokossovsky and other, later outstanding military leaders. No, he did not strive to imitate them, but his remarkable abilities, his entire spiritual world, received from such communications unique powerful impulses for further development.

In the fall of 1926, Katukov was sent to study at the Shot course. Many commanders who became major military leaders during the Great Patriotic War studied at this famous military educational institution in the twenties and thirties.

Created in November 1918 at the direction of V.I. Lenin on the basis of the Oranienbaum officer rifle school of the old Russian army, the Shot courses played an outstanding role in the training of command personnel of the Soviet troops. Most of the teachers at the Oranienbaum School voluntarily went over to the side of the Soviet government and managed to pass on to the courses the rich experience and positive traditions of the military educational institution, which in the old army was considered the best in rifle training for officers.

The courses included extensive theoretical and design work. Under them, a statutory subcommittee and a rifle committee were created, which developed issues of the theory of shooting and the tactics of combat operations of combined arms units. Under the leadership of the first head of the course, N. M. Filatov, outstanding designers V. A. Degtyarev, V. F. Tokarev, V. G. Fedorov and others worked on the creation of new automatic small arms systems. The students of “Vystrel” were the first who, during their studies, practically became acquainted with samples of these weapons, mastered the recommendations of the statutory subcommittee and the shooting committee.

In the first decade, unique students attended the courses. Not every one of them had any thorough general education training; at best, it was limited to a four-year parochial school. They had a different “educational qualification”: they were still very young, they had already gone through a harsh labor school, had a conscious active life position, and most importantly, combat experience. No allowance was made for lack of knowledge. They strictly taught what they needed to know and be able to do. However, the word “strictly” in this case should be understood in the sense of depth and strength of knowledge. The students themselves did not need rigor: they studied with the same passionate, indomitable will with which they fought on the fronts of the civil war. At the time when Katukov arrived at the courses, they were already engaged in retraining command personnel and were called “Shooting and tactical courses for improving the command staff of the Red Army.” The training program was much more complex than before. And although the courses were located near the capital, in the city of Solnechnogorsk, Katukov managed to visit Moscow only a few times: all his time and energy went into studying.

Natural abilities and incredible work did their job: Katukov returned to the division significantly enriched with knowledge. He was immediately appointed commander of the regimental school for junior commanders and remained in this position for almost six years. For Katukov himself, these years were also a kind of school. They allowed him to understand even more deeply the role of junior commanders in the troops. Later, holding high command positions, he constantly paid attention to the work of subordinate commanders in the selection and education of non-commissioned officers, always emphasizing: “As are the foremen and sergeants, so are the soldiers.”

The 27th Division had many capable and talented commanders. The division in the artillery regiment was commanded by N. N. Voronov, the future Chief Marshal of Artillery. He was replaced by V.A. Penkovsky - later an army general. Katukov became closer friends with Valentin Antonovich, as he worked with him more than once during maneuvers and exercises. Penkovsky went into the field with his division, and Katukov with the regimental school, which in such cases played for the rifle battalion. Together they worked out issues of interaction, looked for and found ways and methods that ensured the most effective combination of fire and maneuver, close communication between infantry and artillery at all stages of the battle.

At the beginning of 1931, Katukov was appointed chief of staff of the 80th Infantry Regiment of the same division. And soon there was a decisive turn that determined the entire future fate of Mikhail Efimovich. In April 1932, the regiment was redeployed from Vitebsk to Borisov. And suddenly, out of the blue, an order came: to reorganize the regiment into the 5th separate light tank brigade. The entire command staff of the regiment was sent to a six-month armored course. But Katukov had to stay: he replaced the regiment commander. Together with business executives, junior commanders and Red Army soldiers, he was busy equipping the town for the future tank formation. Soon, technical specialists began to arrive, and then combat vehicles. With the help of specialists, Katukov, as time allowed, mastered tanks. Sometimes it was sad: his comrades were learning a new business, but he became a business executive. What's next?

In the fall, the command staff returned from the course. Katukov, as they say, felt out of place. He did not undergo special retraining, but he was irresistibly drawn to a new business. He was given a choice: accept the rifle regiment or remain at brigade headquarters as the head of the intelligence department. I agreed with the latter - still closer to a new business.

The brigade was formed for almost six months. During this time, Katukov studied BT and T-26 tanks,, with the help of specialists, completed the initial practical tank driver school and soon confidently drove combat vehicles and fired a tank gun.

In 1932, Katukov was accepted as a member of the Communist Party. Excited by this event, he spent the whole night pondering his future life. And the next day he came to the brigade commander and asked him to send him to study at the Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army.

You will go to the academy. Not now. - The brigade commander looked approvingly at Katukov. - Try yourself first in real life, command a training tank battalion. I believe you can handle it.

Commanding a training tank battalion, Katukov trained gunners, driver mechanics, and other specialists. And he prepared himself - he mastered each tankman specialty well. Then the brigade commander made him temporary chief of the brigade artillery - he helped him come to the academy, as he put it, not empty-handed, but with some experience.

In the fall of 1934, an order was received by which Katukov was appointed head of the operational department of the 134th tank brigade, stationed in Kyiv. The same order ordered him to temporarily transfer the position to a deputy, and to arrive in Moscow for the Academic Courses of Tactical and Technical Improvement at the Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army.

Katukov spent a year on the course. He studied the equipment of tanks, radio communications, and the tactics of armored and mechanized forces. Students sometimes spent days and nights at the training ground and tankodrome. The brigade had to learn on the fly again to master the responsibilities of the head of the operational department. The 134th Brigade was commanded by the energetic, widely erudite tank commander S.I. Bogdanov - later Marshal of the Armored Forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. He organized combat training in such a way that every day of study, every command and staff exercise was necessarily different from the previous ones and more difficult. Katukov himself subsequently organized combat training in exactly this way in the formations he commanded.

In 1937, Katukov was appointed chief of staff of the 45th Tank Corps. He already had almost seven years of experience in staff service behind him. So I mastered the new responsibilities quickly, but was drawn to work. I wanted to work on my own - Katukov felt that he was ripe for this. Corps commander N.D. Vedeneev, an experienced, strong-willed and at the same time sincere man, heeded Katukov’s repeated requests for a transfer to a combat position. Mikhail Efimovich was appointed commander of the 34th Tank Brigade - the same one where he served as head of the operations department after completing academic courses. During the Great Patriotic War, Katukov heard more than once about N.D. Vedeneev, who became the commander of the tank corps of the 2nd Guards Army, Hero of the Soviet Union.

In September 1939, together with the Katukov brigade, he participated in the liberation campaign of Soviet troops, which took the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus under protection. I had to meet with Wehrmacht units. True, the incident did not happen. The Nazis quickly retreated beyond the established demarcation line. "How long?" - thought Katukov. It was an anxious time, and apparently he was not the only one asking himself such questions. In 1940, Katukov was unexpectedly summoned to Moscow. He visited the People's Commissariat of Defense, then the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - there he was offered to accept the 20th Tank Division. With her he entered the Great Patriotic War...

At the beginning of 1943, Katukov received an order: to urgently report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Katukov could not find any understandable reasons for such an unexpected call and its urgency, and this set him in an alarming mood. Stories about the coolness of the Supreme Commander also came to mind.

I flew on a U-2, looking with interest at the landscapes passing by below. "Messer!" - the pilot’s voice suddenly came through the headphones. The plane immediately dived down, then the pilot began to throw the car from side to side. The Messer flashed overhead several times, apparently shooting. The skill of the pilot came to the rescue. Maneuvering at low altitude, hiding in the folds of the terrain, he broke away from the Messer and landed the plane on the outskirts of Torzhok.

The further flight to Moscow passed without incident. But there was no time to put himself in order, and Katukov came to the Kremlin as he was - in a soldier’s tunic, quilted trousers and felt boots. Poskrebyshev apparently explained to Stalin the reason for Katukov’s traveling attire. And when he entered the office of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, he only smiled slightly. In the office were A. S. Shcherbakov, N. Ya. Fedorenko, S. K. Timoshenko and several other generals.

“Having said hello, the Supreme Commander unexpectedly asked: “How, Comrade Katukov, will you cope if we put you in command of a tank army?”

I was taken aback, but I wasn’t supposed to remain silent for long in his office. I thanked you for your trust and replied that I hope I can handle it.

“Here, read,” said Stalin and, taking two documents from the table, handed them to me.

The first document is the resolution of the State Defense Committee of January 4, 1943. It talked about the formation of the 1st Tank Army and that I was being appointed to command its troops. From the second I learned that I had been awarded the rank of lieutenant general of tank forces.”
It was immediately decided to appoint N.K. Popel as a member of the Military Council of the Army. When Stalin released Katukov, Fedorenko took him to his People’s Commissariat of Defense.

For that time, the creation of tank armies was a new and outstanding thing. One composition of the future army was striking in its grandeur: the 3rd mechanized corps, the 6th tank corps, four separate tank regiments and a separate tank division, six ski and rifle brigades, two airborne divisions, two howitzer regiments, two rocket artillery regiments, two mortar regiments, an aviation regiment, an artillery anti-tank destruction brigade, an engineer brigade, an army reconnaissance regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery division, two motorized engineering battalions, a communications regiment, and many different logistics units and institutions. In a word, as Katukov put it, “a considerable colossus.”

That's it, commander! Can you handle it? - asked Fedorenko, having finished listing the composition of the future 1st Tank Army.

Of course... This is how things went for us after the Battle of Stalingrad! We now have the strategic initiative... The enemy, of course, will try to take it away, but we are not the same now either. Prepare your army quickly. The time has come for the large-scale use of tank forces.

Fedorenko said that the headquarters of the 1st Tank Army would be created on the basis of the 29th Combined Arms Army. Noticing the displeasure flashing on Katukov’s face, he explained that, of course, the specifics of tank forces must also be taken into account; but other tank armies are also being created, so there may simply not be enough tank commanders of the appropriate ranks - do not take them from newly formed or being formed tank corps. Perhaps there was a reason for this, and Katukov did not argue. However, taking advantage of the ongoing conversation about personnel, he asked to appoint P. G. Dyner as his technical assistant.

Katukov spent the night almost without sleep. Thoughts evoked by the new assignment agitated my mind. Of course, the trust shown was gratifying. But Katukov clearly saw the complexity and responsibility of his new duties. After all, in fact, his commander’s activity acquired a qualitatively new content. And this is not only the most difficult work of leading many units of a huge association of tank forces. This is a new, higher level of art in the combat use of tank forces. Now he had to solve, first of all, problems of an operational scale, to clearly understand the role and place of the tank army in operations of operational-strategic and strategic importance. In operations of this kind, tank armies constituted the main striking force of the ground forces and were used primarily in the main axes to deliver powerful and deep blows to the enemy. All this, of course, Katukov knew, but, having lost hope of overcoming insomnia, he still thought about it and about the fact that he himself needed to develop as an army commander.

The next day, Katukov returned “home” by plane - to the headquarters of the 3rd Mechanized Corps. There was no time for “swinging up”. The formation of the army was ordered to be completed by February 17 in the immediate rear of the North-Western Front.

This matter turned out to be incredibly painful - it’s difficult to find other words. A blizzard was raging, the roads were covered with huge snowdrifts and turned out to be absolutely impassable for wheeled vehicles. We had to use tanks as tractors and snowplows. A representative of the armored department who arrived on the scene categorically prohibited this as being contrary to instructions. It took an order from G.K. Zhukov to lift the ban. And yet, units and formations moved extremely slowly on the snowy impassable roads.

In addition to all this, another problem emerged: in the formation area there was no fuel, no ammunition, no food. The nearest supply base was 250 kilometers away. Only country roads led to it, also covered with snowdrifts. Here, too, we had to use tanks to clear the roads.

I don’t know how we will fight, but I will remember the formation of the army all my life,” Katukov was annoyed in a conversation with Popel. - The blizzard is the only thing that helps.

Blizzard? - Popel was amazed. - She is our main tormentor.

And a savior. Imagine what the terrain would look like from above if the traces of the troops were not immediately covered up and enemy aircraft could operate.

Yes. “A living map for bombing,” Popel was alarmed.

“Everything possible is being done to speed up the movement of troops to the places of concentration and camouflage these places,” Katukov continued. - But it is necessary... impossible, or something... Focus, Nikolai Kirillovich, all party political work on this. It will take a lot of sweat, but there will be no blood. A snowstorm is an insidious thing. Suddenly it will stop, and then, lo and behold, the sky will clear up. Then wait for the bombing.

Katukov quickly became friends with Popel and highly valued his ability to work with people and his ability to find effective ways to mobilize troops to solve complex specific problems. As always, Dyner provided enormous assistance to Katukov these days. Before the war, an engineer at one of the Kyiv enterprises, Pavel Georgievich turned out to be a very outstanding military engineer-organizer. Together with Katukov, being his constant technical assistant, he always quickly mastered a new scope of activity.

Both of them - Popel and Dyner, each in his own place - did a tremendous job during the formation of the army, took upon themselves the solution of many organizational and economic issues, giving Katukov the opportunity to more thoroughly become acquainted with the command personnel and the arriving troops.

The formations included in the army and their command made a gratifying impression. Katukov was calm about the 3rd Mechanized Corps. Moreover, he knew Tank Troops Major General S.M. Krivoshein, who was appointed commander of this corps instead of him, before and often met with him on official business. Before the war, Krivoshey commanded a mechanized corps, and at the beginning of it he took part in the first battles with the fascist invaders. Since August 1941, he was the head of the combat training department for armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army.

The 6th Tank Corps was a powerful formation. He already had some combat experience: he participated in the summer-autumn battles as part of the troops of the Western Front. The corps was commanded by Major General of Tank Forces A.L. Getman. After graduating from the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army in 1937, A. L. Getman served in the tank forces and, as commander of a tank division, participated in the Battle of Moscow.

The 3rd Mechanized and 6th Tank Corps constituted the main striking force of the 1st Tank Army, and both of them were led by competent, combat-experienced, decisive, strong-willed tank generals. It was with satisfaction that Katukov became acquainted with the command and political composition of individual units arriving in the army.

True, initially not everything went well in the army’s administrative apparatus. Some of its workers were never able to adapt and understand the specifics of tank forces. And this worried Katukov more and more.

Soon an order was received according to which the 1st Tank Army was to become the main striking force in a front-line offensive operation aimed at defeating the 16th German Army and completely eliminating the blockade of Leningrad. And immediately work of incredible intensity began: the formation of the army was completed, combat training among the troops intensified, and the headquarters and all services concentrated on drawing up calculations and other documents necessary to develop a plan for a future operation. This is where the incompetence of some army staff in tank matters took its toll. Katukov urgently recalled his old combat comrade Nikitin from the 3rd Mechanized Corps to the post of chief of the operational department of the army. There are fewer inconsistencies. But drastic measures were needed. And Katukov turned to G.K. Zhukov, who had arrived to get acquainted with the progress of the preparation of the operation, with a request to replace the chief of staff of the army. He recommended for this position the chief of staff of the 22nd Army, Major General M.A. Shalin, whom he knew well and was confident that he would quickly master the specifics of tank forces.

G.K. Zhukov immediately gave instructions to make a replacement: a few hours later, Shalin, who arrived by plane, reported to Katukov that he was ready to start work. A man of action, energetic and decisive, Shalin quickly grasped the concept of the upcoming operation. All plans, orders, calculations were made quickly and correctly.

Somewhat earlier, Major General E.V. Baranovich arrived to the post of deputy commander of the army troops. He had a wealth of combat experience behind him from three wars - the Russian-Japanese, the First World War and the Civil War. A middle-aged man, Efim Vikentievich with enviable energy became interested in developing an operation plan and provided Katukov with very tangible assistance in training army troops.

Katukov was now calm about the administrative apparatus of the army: it was quickly turning into a coherent, clearly, proactively working team. The staff of the army’s political department, headed by the chief, Major General A.G. Zhuravlev, turned out to be the same. In general, the cadre of leading political workers in the army, as Popel put it, was “what we need.”

Having completed its formation, the army walked up to 90 kilometers off-road and settled in the initial area for the offensive. And suddenly, the early spring that suddenly arrived here confused all the plans of the Soviet command. The snow melted rapidly: water spilled across the fields and ravines - several tanks launched for testing plunged into it up to the very towers.

Soon a directive arrived informing that the planned operation was cancelled. Along with the directive, an order was received: the troops of the 1st Tank Army, without airborne, ski-infantry and some other formations and units, urgently embark on echelons for transfer to another location. The order did not say where.

Preparations for this failed operation were of great importance for the formation of the 1st Tank Army. In the process, shortcomings were identified and eliminated, the coherence in the work of all levels of its management was checked, the abilities of the command and political personnel, and the combat readiness of the formations were revealed. This process also gave a lot to Katukov. Now he knew the army to some extent and had himself gained some practical experience as an army commander.

Kursk Bulge. It was here, as part of the troops of the Voronezh Front, that the 1st Tank Army was transferred long before the start of the grandiose battle. Located in the second echelon in the Oboyan direction, it was supposed to firmly cover the Belgorod-Kursk road and be ready to launch counterattacks in order to defeat the breaking through enemy groups. The first echelon was occupied by the 6th Guards Army.

The army troops arrived at their locations hidden from the enemy. Careful camouflage was also observed at the line of army deployment. Tanks, guns, and vehicles were placed close to local buildings. Enemy reconnaissance aircraft could not detect them. Engineering work was immediately launched. Along the entire 60-kilometer front, trenches, communication passages, caponiers, bunkers, dugouts, and various artificial obstacles were built. In the most likely directions of enemy attack, not only real but also false trenches were dug. Later, Katukov received a trophy card. It showed false positions of the 1st Tank Army.

The enemy was not active - he was preparing for a “sudden” attack, which had long been known to the Soviet command. And Katukov tried to make full use of the pause, with maximum benefit. The issues of interaction between tank formations and infantry, artillery and aviation were carefully developed. Possible options for the troops' actions when launching counterattacks were played out with the commanders and staffs of corps and brigades through command and staff exercises and games.

Together with Shalin and Nikitin, Katukov more than once discussed different options for possible enemy actions. And they managed to foresee a lot, a lot, including the main thing: if the enemy broke through the defenses of the combined arms armies, then instead of a counterattack, the 1st Tank Army would have to act as an armored shield in the direction of the main attack of the enemy troops. Intense combat and political training was carried out among the troops. Many generals and army command officers were sent to formations and units.

It is necessary that interaction and everything else be worked out at all levels - down to the units,” Katukov admonished them. - In the units, in Suvorov’s way: “Every soldier must know his maneuver.” And this is combat training and specific political work.

Katukov himself, together with Popel, also spent a lot of time in the troops. They visited brigades, regiments and battalions and checked their main and reserve defense areas.

Katukov always found time to talk with the personnel and did it skillfully: he spoke about perseverance, military skill and then inserted an instructive parable or a sharp joke to the general laughter. He himself sat in the tank and showed the soldiers how to perform this or that maneuver, how to fire from various positions and distances.

Much attention in combat training was paid to explaining how to fight Tiger tanks. All units were provided with a memo issued by the commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army, which contained photographs of this new German tank, indicated its tactical and technical data and vulnerabilities, and described methods for destroying it on the battlefield. The memo was carefully studied, its recommendations were used in practical classes.

Special classes were conducted with young soldiers, including run-in: tanks were passed through the trenches with soldiers. The newly recruited soldiers were convinced that the tank was not so terrible if the trenches were well equipped and their defenders knew how to wield weapons.

By the end of May, the main tasks of combat training of the troops were completed. Katukov set the task: to deepen skills and knowledge, to master related specialties in order to develop complete interchangeability in tank crews, gun, mortar and machine-gun crews.

Meanwhile, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took measures to strengthen the 1st Tank Army with troops. In mid-May, an anti-aircraft artillery division, two communications air regiments, a motor transport regiment, nine hospitals and some other units and special units were included in it and soon arrived on the ground.

In the “dugout debate,” as Katukov put it, the idea arose to strengthen the army at the expense of its own capabilities: to create another tank corps on the basis of a separate tank brigade and four separate tank regiments. This brigade and regiments were intended to operate in combat formations of airborne and ski-rifle formations included in the army when it was preparing to liquidate the siege of Leningrad. Now there were no such formations in the army. The tank units intended for them turned out to be directly subordinate to the army command. In combat conditions, this would only complicate the management of their actions.

We discussed everything in detail and approached the headquarters of the Voronezh Front with a proposal, then to G.K. Zhukov. In the end, the matter came to Stalin - the creation of such large formations as the tank corps was the prerogative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Stalin approved the proposal. The next day a directive came to create the 31st Tank Corps. Unfortunately, by the beginning of hostilities the corps was not fully formed: the motorized rifle brigade and artillery did not arrive. And yet, as subsequent events showed, the new corps solved problems that were beyond the capabilities of a separate tank brigade and separate tank regiments.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the 1st Tank Army was a cohesive, trained, well-armed military formation. It relied on a powerful system of engineering structures and was capable of active defensive and offensive actions.

The Soviet command knew about the start date of the enemy offensive: July 3–6. On the night of July 5, Katukov decided to get some sleep. He advised Shalin and Nikitin to do the same. But I couldn’t sleep in anticipation of such an event. Thinking while half asleep is useless. Katukov got dressed and came to headquarters at about three o’clock. Shalin and Nikitin were there.

Are you staying up at night?

“Like you,” Nikitin laughed.

Shalin reported various information confirming that the enemy was due to launch an offensive any hour.

Basically, the direction of the enemy's main attack was known - in the defense zone of the 6th Guards Army. The front headquarters warned about this in a timely manner. And this meant that, as Katukov assumed, the 1st Tank Army was to be an armored shield in the direction of the main attack of enemy troops.

“... Army Group “South” with concentrated forces strikes from the Belgorod-Tomarovka line, breaks through the front at the Prilepa-Oboyan line, unites at Kursk and east of it with the advancing Army Group “Center”.

Thus, the enemy’s plan was largely unraveled by the Soviet command. By decision of the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin, early in the morning a powerful air and artillery strike fell on the enemy troops preparing for the offensive. He weakened the enemy's offensive capabilities. But already at seven in the morning the front headquarters reported that enemy troops were going on the offensive. The main enemy attack fell on the positions of the 67th and 52nd Guards Rifle Divisions, which were assigned artillery units and the 1st Guards Tank Brigade of the 1st Tank Army.

It is quite obvious that the enemy intends to break out onto the Oboyanskoye Highway,” Shalin stated, bending over the map. - And with a powerful tank strike.

So, the decisive moment has arrived. Katukov sat in silence for a minute, experiencing natural internal excitement in connection with the start of a major operation. Then he went to the buildings that had already been raised on combat alert. Everywhere the final preparations for battle were underway, rallies, party and Komsomol meetings were held.

On July 5, at 16:00, the commander of the front forces ordered: by 24:00, the 6th Tank and 3rd Mechanized Corps should be moved to the second defensive line of the 6th Guards Army, and the 31st Tank Corps should be positioned behind them. The army's task is to prevent the enemy from breaking through to Oboyan under any circumstances. By 23–24 hours the corps reached the indicated lines. By this time, the enemy's 4th Tank Army had significantly pushed back the 6th Guards Army in many places, captured its first and second positions, and in some places reached the second line of defense.

The July nights are short. But the line of defense was prepared in advance in engineering terms, and by the morning of July 6, the 1st Tank Army was already prepared to repel an enemy attack. At dawn, after an hour and a half of aviation and artillery preparation, the enemy's 4th Tank Army managed to break through the main defense line of the 6th Guards Army. The enemy, apparently, believed that now he would not encounter serious resistance in his attack on Kursk: his divisions were moving in pre-battle formations - in company columns, with tanks in front, followed by infantry in armored personnel carriers and vehicles. And suddenly his reconnaissance and security units ran into tank ambushes and were defeated.

The enemy was forced to once again deploy its main forces into battle formations. They included selected Wehrmacht formations. Their names alone spoke volumes: SS tank divisions “Adolf Hitler”, “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, motorized division “Gross Deutschland”. The Tigers and Ferdinands were in front, followed by the Panthers and other tanks and assault guns. A fierce battle ensued, lasting several hours. Everything was used on both sides: tanks, artillery, aviation, infantry. In some places the enemy managed to achieve superiority in forces, but even in these cases he was not successful: the stamina and skill of the Soviet soldiers seemed to be limitless.

When Katukov arrived at the command post of the commander of the 6th Tank Corps, Getman, he reported:

We fight off the fourth attack.

“It was half past three in the afternoon,” Katukov recalled. “But it seemed like there was a solar eclipse.” The sun disappeared behind clouds of dust. And ahead in the twilight bursts of shots could be seen, the earth took off and crumbled, engines roared, tracks clanged.”

The 49th Tank Brigade lost more than half of its personnel and equipment in the first battle. Shortly before this, the hero of the battles near Orel, A.F. Burda, who was appointed its commander, was inconsolable. Katukov loved him for his calculating courage and ability to achieve success in battles with little bloodshed. It turned out that enemy losses far exceeded those of the brigade. Besides, she didn't take a step back. And this was the case everywhere - not a single unit participating in the battles retreated under the onslaught of a superior enemy.

The battle died down only with the onset of darkness. The results of the first day of fighting satisfied and at the same time worried Katukov. The enemy failed to break through our defenses. But this was achieved at the cost of great losses. The fact that the enemy's losses were significantly greater was no consolation. It was clear from everything that he had great superiority. And not only numerically. Enemy "tigers" from their 88-mm cannons could fire at Soviet tanks at a distance of up to 2 kilometers, being out of the range of fire from the 76.2-mm cannons of thirty-fours. Given these enemy advantages, Katukov never tired of repeating his demands for the widespread use of tank ambushes. It was necessary for enemy vehicles to approach the ambushes at 300–400 meters. This made it possible for the more mobile thirty-fours to suddenly bring down targeted fire on the “tigers.” Measures were taken to improve interaction with aviation and the widespread use of anti-tank weapons.

At night, the army was reinforced by the reserve of the front commander with a number of anti-tank artillery regiments and anti-tank rifle battalions. Obviously, the enemy also received significant reinforcements and carefully prepared for the offensive. With dawn it became clear that this time he decided to ram the defenses of the 1st Tank Army with a powerful concentrated blow.

Something incredible, comrade commander, the enemy abandoned up to seven hundred tanks and self-propelled guns on our sector! - Krivoshey reported to Katukov.

This was the first time that the fascist command concentrated such a huge amount of military equipment on a narrow 10-kilometer section of the front. The breakthrough site he had previously planned was subjected to intensive air and artillery bombardment. And before the dust from the explosions of air bombs and artillery shells had time to settle, the enemy tanks ahead rushed to attack. Every quarter of an hour Katukov contacted Krivoshein. He reported that tankers, artillerymen, and motorized riflemen were fighting selflessly, but the enemy was increasing their attacks. It was clear from everything that he was striving at all costs to break through to Kursk in order to connect with the troops advancing from the north.

The first attack was followed by a second, then a third. And each time the enemy started all over again - carried out powerful aviation and artillery training, then threw tanks and motorized infantry into the attack. At 13:00 the fourth attack followed. This time the enemy had an even greater superiority in strength. The 3rd mechanized corps began to slowly retreat. Katukov moved a number of tank and artillery units into his defense zone. At his call, front-line aviation carried out powerful strikes on enemy troops. As a result, the plan of the fascist command was thwarted: the enemy only managed to push back the 3rd Mechanized Corps.

At night, Katukov traveled around several formations.

Twig and twig! Eight attacks were repulsed today,” reported the commander of the 3rd mechanized brigade, Lieutenant Colonel A.Kh. Babajanyan. - People fall asleep while walking.

For several days now, Katukov himself either did not sleep at all, or snatched a 2-3 hour nap, then “filled up” with sleep in a car or in an armored personnel carrier while traveling around formations. His brain was strained to the limit. It was he, the army commander, presenting a holistic picture of the many flared up and flared up battles that the army was waging, saw the general trend of their development, and had to direct it in the right direction. Therefore, only he had to decide who to give reinforcements first, how and where to use reserves, when and how to change combat tactics. Behind all this are countless specific issues that also needed to be resolved immediately and simultaneously.

In the most general terms, Katukov’s line consisted of conducting a tough defense of advantageous heights, road intersections, and populated areas. This must have changed the situation dramatically. The battles would have been fought in many places at once: the enemy would have been forced to split his forces and unclench his fist. The defense of tactically important points was also supposed to deprive the enemy of superiority in technology and manpower. It consisted, as it were, of two interconnected parts - rigid and maneuverable defense. On the approach to these points, the enemy invariably encountered “surprises”: targeted fire from skillfully camouflaged tank and artillery ambushes, and powerful tank barriers that suddenly appeared. This organization of defense made it possible to inflict huge losses on the enemy and prevented him from maneuvering reserves and aircraft.

Events, in fact, developed this way. But the enemy stepped up attacks. On July 8, the intensity of the fighting and its scale reached its climax. On this day, the enemy launched 12 large-scale attacks, supported by hundreds of aircraft. There were critical situations: individual enemy tanks broke through the second line of defense. In the center and on the left flank, the 1st Tank Army was forced to retreat 4–5 kilometers. The front of her defense bent, but did not break. And every kilometer of advance was given to the enemy at the cost of huge losses.

At night, pondering the reports and other data received from the field, Katukov smiled and, getting up from the table, stretched so that his bones crunched.

Today the enemy went all-in. This is the culmination!

Yes, it seems,” Shalin agreed after thinking.

And you, Efim Vikentievich, what do you think? - Katukov asked Baranovich.

All the signs are for that. I think we need to step up counterattacks.

Right! While we are counterattacking with companies, battalions, today we counterattacked with two brigades... Mikhail Alekseevich,” Katukov turned to Shalin, “tell the formations: tomorrow to carry out counterattacks with larger forces, taking into account, of course, specific conditions. If the enemy really went all-in, then his reserves have dried up. Counterattacks will test this...

As subsequent events showed, Katukov correctly assessed the situation: on July 8, the enemy command threw all its reserves and all aviation into the attack.

The next day, outwardly everything happened as before: large forces of enemy tanks and infantry attacked. And hot fights continued in the sky. But...

“You know, the enemy is nervous,” Popel noted, looking through reports from the formations together with Katukov.

It seems... He is rushing about, he did not bring in fresh forces in response to our counterattacks. - It turns out that today's attacks are a gesture of despair?

It turns out, it seems... But what will this gesture cost us tomorrow? “We’re also at the limit,” Katukov replied, sighing. - I reported to the front commander. I'm waiting for help.

And help came. General Vatutin reinforced the 1st Tank Army with the 204th Rifle Division and the 10th Tank Corps. The 5th Guards Tank Corps of General A.G. Kravchenko was also subordinated to the Tank Army. By the morning of July 10, these formations occupied their assigned defense areas.

On July 10, the enemy’s “gesture” turned into major attacks. They fought back everywhere. There was something about them that allowed Katukov to say to Shalin in the evening:

You need to hold out for a day or two, and the enemy’s forces will dry up. And we are much stronger now. Vatutin strongly supported us.

Yes, the same troops are operating for the second day. Apparently, the enemy no longer has fresh forces.

After listening to the reports of his deputies, Katukov suddenly felt so tired that he began to sway. Somehow reaching the hut where he lived, he collapsed on the bed without undressing. Early in the morning his adjutant had difficulty pushing him away.

Nikitin met Katukov at the headquarters.

Today is an unusual day, Mikhail Efimovich! - After greeting, he said cheerfully. - The enemy behaves quietly, only indicating his presence.

It later turned out that the enemy command, having become convinced of the indestructible defense of the Soviet troops in the Oboyan direction, regrouped its forces in order to bypass the 1st Tank Army from the east and break through to Kursk through Prokhorovka.

At the height of the famous tank battle near Prokhorovka, the 8th and 10th tank corps attached to it on the right flank of the army, on the orders of Katukov, launched a counterattack. As a result, the enemy not only did not withdraw additional forces from the Oboyan direction, but also brought back part of the artillery and other firepower that had already been sent to Prokhorovka.

On the evening of July 14, enemy attacks on the front of the 1st Tank Army stopped altogether. Katukov reported this to Vatutin.

“It’s the same everywhere,” he answered.

This means... - Yes,” Vatutin interrupted. - This means that we survived...

Taking advantage of the respite, Katukov thought about the past battles. For the first time, the Soviet command used powerful tank formations and formations to hold strips in the depths of the defense. This was not only new, but also exceptional. After all, tank formations and formations in defensive battles are intended to carry out counterattacks, and not directly for defense. But what doesn’t happen in war! Memory pointed not only to successes, but also to failures, including his own. And he usually delved into the shortcomings more than the successes. On the whole, Katukov was pleased. He managed to carry out much of what he had thought about more than once: maneuvering large tank forces, tank barriers, ambushes, various options for interaction with other branches of the military, especially with artillery and aviation.

At the end of July, N.F. Vatutin analyzed the Battle of Kursk. He noted that the 1st Tank Army had fully completed its defensive tasks in the direction of the enemy’s main attack. Later, in a report from the command of the Voronezh Front troops to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Katukov read: “The enemy crashed in the Oboyan direction and did not break through our front.”

Katukov thought with gratitude about his closest assistants, about the commanders of the formations, admired the skill and heroism of the personnel and was very happy for the troops entrusted to him when all the army corps were renamed Guards.

On July 22, a meeting of commanders and members of the Military Councils of the armies was held at the headquarters of the Voronezh Front. Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov outlined in detail the plan for a major offensive operation of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which went down in history as the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. It was an integral part of the counteroffensive of Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk and had the goal of defeating the Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and creating conditions for the liberation of Right Bank Ukraine.

The 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies were tasked with developing the success of breaking through enemy defenses in the direction of the main attack of the Voronezh Front troops.

Here it is, “finally, the long-awaited one, which Katukov considered the main purpose of tank troops - the offensive! Having received specific instructions, he enthusiastically began preparing for the upcoming operation. First of all, it was necessary to increase the combat effectiveness of the army itself. Here Katukov could now limit himself to fundamental instructions. Everything practical Baranovich was in charge of this matter. The army received 200 new tanks and other equipment. Under the leadership of Dyner, repair work began on a wide scale. Of the 562 tanks in the army, only 20 could not be restored - there were not enough spare parts. In a short time, the army soldiers repaired 1215 vehicles.

During the operation, the front command reinforced the 1st Tank Army with a number of fighter-artillery, mortar, engineering-assault and other formations and units. The army's combat operations were to be supported by assault and fighter divisions.

Preparations for the offensive were carried out at all levels, starting with the units. And at all levels, under the leadership of Popel and Zhuravlev, active party political work was carried out. In short, the army was gaining strength.

Katukov himself, together with Shalin and Nikitin, focused on developing a plan for the upcoming operation, working out interaction with future neighbors, with the command of aviation and artillery allocated to support the army. Then they moved to a lower level - they worked out all these issues within the army itself, ensuring that the corps and individual units clearly understood their tasks and were able to closely interact with each other. The same work was carried out in formations and units. And again, as always, Katukov brought the coordination training right down to the crews, artillery and mortar crews.

“Everyone must be able to act autonomously: formations, units, subunits, and individual crews,” he persistently repeated. - This is especially important in the offensive. You will have to break away from the main forces, act behind enemy lines, and make decisions on your own.

Soon the moment came when Katukov could consider preparations for the operation completed. Everything that depended on the command of the army and its formations was done. And yet Katukov was worried. And there was a reason. The staffing of the army was far from necessary: ​​in terms of personnel - 82, tanks - 81, self-propelled artillery units - 67, guns and mortars - 85, vehicles - about 55 percent, there was a shortage of more than 3 thousand vehicles.

Katukov, Shalin and Nikitin thought this way and that, but in the end they ensured that the formations assigned the most important tasks had the necessary firepower, mobility and maneuverability.

On the night of August 2, army troops began moving to their original areas. During the day, the combat mission was communicated to all personnel. Rallies were held in all units, Katukov visited some of them and, together with everyone else, experienced that feeling of elation, special composure, which such rallies usually caused. He carefully peered into the tanned faces of the soldiers and officers, who seemed to be scorched by the battles that had just passed, as they sternly and intently said:

“We swear to you, our great people, that we will fight until our last breath, while the heart beats in the chest and the eyes see the ground...”

On August 3 at 6 o'clock the morning silence was shaken by the roar of artillery cannonade. Thousands of guns and mortars hit enemy fortifications. At 7:40 am the roar intensified - Katyusha rockets opened fire on the enemy. At the same time, hundreds of aircraft continuously bombed enemy defenses from the air.

Immediately after artillery and aviation preparation, combined arms formations went on the offensive. The enemy launched a series of furious attacks. To complete the breakthrough, forward detachments of the 1st and 5th tank armies were brought into the battle. They helped the infantrymen break through the main line of enemy defense. Then, through a narrow corridor, both tank armies - the 1st and 5th Guards - entered the operational space.

For nine days - from August 3 to 11 - the troops of the 1st Tank Army fought continuous battles. There was everything - swift, stunning blows to the enemy, and reflection of his furious counterattacks. And Katukov was right: often units and subunits had to act autonomously. The army covered 120 kilometers in nine days. Its connections cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway. The enemy managed to recapture this highway. At the direction of Headquarters, the 5th Guards Tank Army was transferred to this direction. Interacting, both armies cut the enemy troops into two parts, reached the flank of his Kharkov group and cut off its escape route to the west. The successful advance of the tankers assisted the troops of the Steppe Front in the liberation of Kharkov.

For Katukov, this operation was the first experience of leading the military operations of an army on the offensive, a new, extremely important step in the development of his art as a military leader. Even the fact that some shortcomings in the organization and actions of the troops were immediately eliminated testified to his ability to quickly navigate the situation and make the right decisions.

His closest assistants and formation commanders demonstrated high skill. In general, during the Battle of Kursk, the 1st Tank Army acquired enormous and comprehensive experience in large-scale combat operations - defensive and offensive.

In September, the army was withdrawn to the reserve of the Supreme High Command. A few days later, Katukov and Popel were summoned to a meeting with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

It turned out to be very representative: all the commanders and members of the Military Councils of the tank armies were present.

In his opening speech, Stalin said that major offensive operations were coming in the near future and therefore it was necessary to understand the organizational and staffing affairs of the tank armies.

Opinions were divided. Some army commanders believed that tank armies needed to be “lightened”, freed from “makeweights” - hospitals, sanitary-epidemiological detachments, road-bridge battalions. They proposed that medical and road-bridge services for tank crews should be entrusted to the corresponding services of the combined arms armies, in whose zone the formations of tank forces would have to operate. Katukov was in favor of keeping these special units in the tank armies. He gave convincing examples showing that these units, adapted to the characteristics and tasks of tank forces, on the contrary, contribute to the mobility and maneuverability of tank armies, especially after they are introduced into a breakthrough, when they leave the combined arms armies for three to four days. Katukov also proposed strengthening the tank armies with howitzer artillery.

Katukov's proposals were accepted. Many other issues were also discussed.

I saw how large offensive operations were coming,” Popel admired, returning with Katukov from the Kremlin. - Remember, you called our army near Kursk an armored shield? Now she will be a cutting sword.

You're speaking nice. After the war, you will probably write... Okay, Fedorenko said that Kalinin is calling us. Went.

Smiling softly, Kalinin said that he had heard a lot about both of them. It turned out that Kalinin’s friend, an old Bolshevik, who wrote to him a lot, served as a political commissar in the 1st Tank Army, and Mikhail Ivanovich decided to personally meet Katukov and Popel. And he delayed the orders for the Battle of Kursk in order to present them himself. Kalinin handed them boxes with medals.

Yours, Comrade Katukov, is a special order - a military commander's, - said Mikhail Ivanovich. - The status of the Order of Kutuzov, first degree, corresponds precisely to the actions of your army in the Battle of Kursk - the transition from active defense to a decisive counter-offensive.

Returning to the front, Katukov made a small detour - he stopped by to see his father. I found him very decrepit and sick. But Efim Epifanovich asked questions about the war with great interest and was proud of his son, even keeping Suvorov’s words for him somewhere: “The Russians always beat the Prussians.” This was Katukov's last meeting with his father. Soon Efim Epifanovich died.

At the end of November, the 1st Tank Army was transferred to the 1st Ukrainian Front and took an active part in the operations to liberate Right Bank Ukraine. In the Zhitomir-Berdichev operation, its formations and units, acting in the direction of the main attack, fought up to 300 kilometers in 17 days, liberated more than 100 settlements and, together with the 38th Army, went deep into the rear of the 8th German Army defending on the Dnieper. . In this operation, Katukov made extensive use of his carefully thought-out technique: the troops operated not only during the day, but also at night, and most large settlements were, as a rule, taken on the move at night. For that time, this was a bold and innovative undertaking - after all, the tanks did not yet have night vision devices.

An extremely important role in the liberation of Right Bank Ukraine was played by the Proskurov-Chernovtsy offensive operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front, carried out from March 4 to April 17, 1944 in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Three tank armies participated in this operation in the direction of the main attack.

The 1st Tank Army was given a difficult task - in cooperation with other troops, to cut through the enemy’s front and create conditions for the main forces of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to liberate a vast part of the territory of Right Bank Ukraine. The operation plan established a high rate of advance for the 1st Tank Army. In the first three days of the offensive alone, it was supposed to advance 120 kilometers.

Front commander G.K. Zhukov discussed in detail with Katukov the situation and conditions in which the army had to operate, calling them extremely difficult. And although he rarely spoke about general things, this time he emphasized the special significance of the operation and, smiling, concluded:

You have a chance to distinguish yourself, Katukov. Do you understand everything?.. Okay. So, in a week, be with the army here. - Zhukov pointed with a pencil at the Ternopil area on the map. - And there - “hurray”, and be healthy...

The harsh conditions took their toll almost immediately. The muddy road has begun. The tanks could move, and they did, crushing enemy strongholds, destroying his manpower and equipment. But tanks are not people. They could not “starve”. A huge amount of ammunition was also needed. The wheeled vehicles skidded hopelessly. Katukov ordered all tanks, except those operating in the forward detachments, to attach drags and carry fuel, ammunition and food onto them. To make hundreds of drags from improvised means to transport thousands of tons of cargo, immediately, in conditions of continuous fighting, is a task that can rightfully be equated to military feats.

Katukov had to simultaneously solve many complex tasks, and in such a way as to complete the main one: maintaining the established tempo of the offensive. And he was patient. In 15 days the army advanced 250 kilometers. But little can be expressed with the word “advanced” - these are brutal battles, and daring coverage of enemy groups in design and execution, sudden attacks on his flanks. This includes crossing the Dniester on the move using improvised means, night attacks and the capture of large settlements. In cooperation with the 4th Tank Army, the 1st Tank Army cut through the enemy Army Group South and cut off its main forces' escape route to the territory of Western Ukraine.

On the way, Katukov received good news - on April 4 he was awarded the rank of Colonel General of Tank Forces.

Damn, there’s no time to celebrate! - Katukov answered Popel, who congratulated him.

The day will come, he replied.

And the day came. Yes what! The operation ended, the army took positions in the second echelon. On April 25, Katukov was called to the HF machine. The General Staff reported that an order from the People's Commissar of Defense had just been signed to rename the army into the 1st Guards Tank Army.

Then Fedorenko answered the phone.

Congratulations, Mikhail Efimovich! I wish you to continue to act like a guard...

Thank you, Yakov Nikolaevich!

And for you personally, it’s also Suvorov style! - Fedorenko added. - You were awarded the Order of Suvorov, first degree. Do you know what this is? You read the status, of course. Orders of Kutuzov are awarded for counter-offensives, and of Suvorov - for military leadership in offensives... Do you understand the hint?

“I understand,” Katukov laughed.

Congratulations! So conform.

I had to “conform” soon. From July 13 to August 29, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front carried out the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, during which the western regions of Ukraine and the southeastern regions of Poland were liberated. The 1st Guards Tank Army advanced at an exceptionally fast pace in this operation: in 35 days - 400 kilometers! Katukov made extensive use of previous experience and boldly enriched it with new techniques.

Ever since the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, Katukov thought a lot about the inappropriateness of tank armies to get involved in protracted battles for large strongholds deep in enemy defenses. Later Katukov wrote about this:

“...We have accumulated sufficient experience to learn the truth - the liberation of populated areas is by no means the task of tank troops. Cutting off the enemy’s communications, causing chaos in his defense, causing panic in the rear, blocking the escape routes of his advanced units or the routes for transferring his reserves - this is the task that we set in the first place.”
During the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, Katukov directed the actions of army formations in this way: they bypassed large enemy strongholds, and this ensured a high tempo of the offensive.

Katukov himself was, as always, cheerful, fit, and energetic. On his all-terrain vehicle, he raced over potholes and ruts, managing to visit the headquarters of many formations. And few people knew that this was far from easy for him. On the eve of the attack, an acute attack of appendicitis forced him to turn to surgeons. G.K. Zhukov advised to go by plane to Moscow, but Katukov reasoned: appendicitis is not such a serious matter to fly thousands of kilometers, and went to his army hospital. The professor who was called for this operated on him, but it was unsuccessful: the skin grew together, but the abdominal muscles did not grow together. There was no time for a second operation. They ended up making a corset, which Katukov wore until the end of the war.

There were serious water obstacles on the path of the army's advance. Without waiting for the approach of the pontoon units, its formations crossed the Bug, San and Vistula using improvised means; in cooperation with other troops, the army captured and held the so-called Sandomierz bridgehead, which later became a springboard for throwing troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front across all of Poland to the Neisse River.

For skillful leadership of troops, courage and heroism in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, Katukov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

For three months, the 1st Guards Tank Army was in reserve at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. As always in such cases, this time was filled with combat and political training of troops, acceptance of new and repair of existing equipment, and training of reinforcements. There have been changes in the command staff, including at the highest levels of the army. For health reasons, E.V. Baranovich was forced to leave the army. Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Andrei Lavrentievich Getman, who demonstrated extraordinary abilities as a military leader, became the deputy commander of the army troops. In his place, Colonel A.Kh. was appointed commander of the 11th Guards Tank Corps. Babajanyan.

Katukov always used the breaks between operations to detour troops. Now there was a long pause. Together with Popel, Katukov visited all hospitals and medical battalions, which both of them generally considered a rule for themselves. Even earlier, they decided to send only seriously wounded soldiers to the rear. The rest of the wounded were treated in hospitals belonging to the army itself, and the veterans returned to their units. Katukov used to check himself: were the wounded, as well as orderlies, nurses and doctors, not given awards? He often went to the troops, as he said, just like that: not for inspections and meetings, but to communicate with soldiers, sergeants and officers. He always did it simply and naturally. His authority among the troops was extremely high. The warriors proudly called themselves Katukovites. The soldiers sang a song composed by someone in the army:

But time will fly by, we will defeat the fascists,
The homeland will bloom victoriously again.
A brave tanker, a Katukov guy.
She will meet and caress you who is waiting somewhere.
At the end of November, the 1st Guards Tank Army was transferred to the 1st Belorussian Front and was soon concentrated in the forests near Lublin.

“I know the army from previous battles,” the commander of the front troops, G. K. Zhukov, met Katukov and Popel. - That’s why I asked you from the Supreme. Prepare well - big things are coming.

There were really big things ahead. A major strategic operation was planned, which went down in history as the Vistula-Oder operation. Troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian, and part of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian and 4th Ukrainian fronts were involved in its implementation. Four tank armies were to operate in the directions of the main attacks, including the 1st Guards Tank Army. During the operation, Soviet troops were supposed to liberate Poland and enter German territory.

Soon the front command organized a war game on cards, to which commanders, chiefs of staff and members of the Military Councils of the armies were invited. The scale of operations and its security were amazing. Soviet troops were now superior to the enemy in everything - numerically and in types of weapons. But the enemy had powerful fortifications, reinforced by natural obstacles - large rivers. The depth of the enemy defense, which consisted of seven defensive lines, extended up to 500 kilometers. The tank armies were given the task of quickly capturing enemy defense lines before enemy troops were brought in, cutting off their communications and the routes of approach for reserves.

With the same thoroughness, Katukov organized war games on maps and in the army: with commanders and chiefs of staff of corps, then in corps with brigade commands. A separate game was held with the command and political composition of the rear services of the army, corps and brigades. These games largely contributed to the development of unity of views on the nature and methods of action in the upcoming operation of all levels of army leadership.

On January 2, Katukov received a directive defining the specific tasks of the 1st Guards Tank Army in the Vistula-Oder operation.

The pace is unprecedented! - exclaimed the usually imperturbable Shalin. - Is this a conceivable thing! Near Lvov and Sandomierz we advanced 25 kilometers per day, and this seemed like a record. And here...

The conceivable, of course, the conceivable, dear Mikhail Alekseevich! - Katukov felt in Shalin’s excitement the high spirits that everyone who knew the goals and scale of the grandiose operation experienced then. “And first of all, you, as the chief of staff of the army, will have to think about this.

We’ll have to, of course,” Shalin laughed.

The 1st Guards Tank Army was introduced into the breakthrough the day after the start of the Vistula-Oder operation. In 18 days, she fought over 600 kilometers, overcame seven defensive lines, and crossed the rivers Pilica, Warta, and Oder (Odra) on the move. The average daily rate of advance of army formations was 33, and the maximum was 75 kilometers! The situation changed quickly, unforeseen situations arose, difficulties with communications and supplies. But the careful preparation of the army for the operation, the skill of the formation commanders, and the uncontrollable offensive impulse of the tank soldiers also had an effect. The army formations withstood the high tempo of the offensive. Sometimes they broke away from the main forces at a distance of up to 100 kilometers, immediately broke through the intermediate lines of enemy defenses, performed skillful maneuvers, quickly pursued enemy troops, cut them apart, and did not give them the opportunity to gain a foothold in previously prepared positions.

Tank radios of that time had a range of no more than 30–35 kilometers. Therefore, in order to directly supervise the actions of the troops, Katukov formed an operational group of the army headquarters. It included: himself, a member of the Military Council, an artillery commander and the head of the operations department. The group moved after the troops, often at their own pace - it was necessary to have time to be where immediate decisions of the army command were primarily required. The front headquarters, headed by Shalin, remained in the rear. He moved to a new location only after he had summarized all the data on the army’s actions and reported them to front headquarters.

Rapidly advancing, the army troops left behind them the enemy’s undefeated units and their strongholds. In this regard, critical situations arose in a number of cases. The task force was in one of them. One day it was located on the outskirts of Nowe Miasto, on the eastern bank of the Pilica. The troops moved to Lodz, leaving only the sapper unit at the crossing. Suddenly it became clear that battered enemy units from the defeated Warsaw group were retreating on both banks of the Pilica. One such wandering “cauldron” - up to a thousand infantrymen with artillery and tanks - made its way straight to Nowe Miasto. Attempts to contact the crews by radio yielded nothing. There were such interruptions - connections went beyond the reach of the walkie-talkies.

The enemy is attacking Nowe Miasto! - Nikitin, out of breath, ran up to Katukov. - He is being held back by a company of the motorcycle battalion of Senior Lieutenant Baikov. He has six tanks, the enemy has seventeen!

Having ordered security tanks to be sent to help Baikov, Katukov commanded:

All over me! Chain!

The security platoon, signalmen, and drivers rushed after Katukov. The battle broke out. Seizing the moment, Katukov ordered the radio operator to contact I. N. Boyko’s brigade, which was somewhere nearby. Finally this was possible, and Katukov quickly explained the situation to the brigade commander.

Eat! I'll be there soon!

The Nazis continued to press, shells were exploding very close. The line of CP defenders was thinning. But Boyko made it in time, the wandering “cauldron” was eliminated.

The army carried out active offensive operations until the very end of the operation and fully completed the tasks assigned to it. For his skillful leadership of the army troops, personal courage and heroism shown in the Vistula-Oder operation, Katukov was awarded the second Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Vistula-Oder operation crushed the entire strategic front of the enemy defense from the Vistula to the Oder. Soviet troops stopped 60 kilometers from Berlin. At this time, the enemy concentrated the Vistula Army Group in Eastern Pomerania to strike the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, which had rushed forward. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command made a decision: with the forces of the 2nd and part of the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front, defeat the enemy’s East Pomeranian group and then resume the offensive on Berlin. The 1st Guards Tank Army was also involved in the East Pomeranian operation.

Having familiarized himself with the tasks and conditions of the army’s operations, Shalin gasped:

Full of rivers, streams, swamps!

However, this time the matter was extremely difficult. G.K. Zhukov was also worried. On February 28, he summoned Katukov. In his memoirs, Katukov reproduced this conversation with G.K. Zhukov as follows:

“From his conversation, I understood that he was worried about whether the tank troops would be able to carry out the orders of Headquarters on time. - Slush, there are almost no roads to the north. The only one with a hard surface... How will such a mass of troops pass through it? Meanwhile, four days are allowed for the entire operation. The Baltic Sea is one hundred kilometers away. This means that you must walk twenty-five kilometers a day. Can you handle it?

Don’t worry, Comrade Marshal, the army will complete its task on time.

Zhukov looked at me gloomily.

Won't you let me down? - No way. During the Vistula-Oder period, such distances were not covered.

Well look. Keep me updated. If you need help, call.

It seemed to me that the front commander became somewhat cheerful.”
Katukov and Shalin carefully thought through all possible options for the army’s actions in the upcoming operation and discussed them in detail with the commanders of the formations. And when the operation began, nothing could help the enemy - neither fortifications, nor terrain conditions difficult for tanks to operate, nor fierce resistance. Katukov ordered offensives to be carried out around the clock. Night attacks especially stunned the enemy. But they were also difficult for Soviet tank crews. The nature of the fighting changed quickly. Army formations crushed enemy troops and bypassed resistance centers. Often, due to terrain conditions, this was impossible to do, and then the tankers operated in infantry combat formations, storming cities and other populated areas. The established pace of advance was maintained.

From Colonel Smirnov,” he reported and handed the army commander a bottle of cloudy liquid.

What is this?

Water, comrade commander. Baltic. Like a combat report. The colonel himself scooped it up and ordered it to be delivered to you.

Katukov did not need a better report that the 40th Tank Brigade had reached the Baltic Sea. By March 5, other army formations reached the Baltic Sea coast. The task set by G.K. Zhukov was completed.

The completion of the East Pomeranian operation was entrusted to the 2nd Belorussian Front. The 1st Guards Tank Army was also temporarily transferred to its composition. In cooperation with other troops, it occupied Gdynia on March 28, and Danzig (Gdansk) on March 30. This completed the East Pomeranian operation.

And finally, the battle for Berlin! The 1st Guards Tank Army was again included in the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and again acted in the direction of the main attack.

The fiercest battle unfolded on the Seelow Heights. The troops of the 8th Guards Army of V.I. Chuikov stubbornly made their way through the enemy defenses, but many of its attempts to break through were unsuccessful: both the terrain itself and the huge mass of fortifications all favored the enemy. And then came the order from G.K. Zhukov: without waiting for a complete breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, bring the 1st Guards Tank Army into battle. In practice, this meant throwing tanks at unsuppressed enemy firing points. But the front commander apparently had no other choice.

It was hard, very hard for the infantry soldiers and tank crews, who were now together uprooting the enemy from the Seelow Heights. Chuikov's guardsmen managed to break through the first line of enemy defense. But the second one turned out to be even more powerful. It was literally stuffed with Tigers, Panthers, Ferdinands, anti-tank artillery, anti-aircraft artillery regiments and motorized infantry units transferred here from the Berlin air defense zone. The heights were surrounded by trenches, pillboxes, bunkers, and minefields. The steepness of the eastern slopes of the heights was such that when climbing, the tanks were forced to bypass steep slopes and cliffs, and therefore expose their sides to enemy artillery fire.

The command of the front troops, subjecting the Seelow Heights to powerful massive artillery and air strikes, helped the guardsmen of Chuikov and Katukov to accelerate their advance. And so they finally mastered these, as Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov later put it, “devilish heights.”

Guards tankmen and infantrymen, still acting shoulder to shoulder, broke out to the Spree River, the main forces crossed it and came close to Berlin. Zhukov especially noted the actions of Katukov’s tankers in those battles, unprecedented in intensity and ferocity.

“It should be emphasized,” he wrote in his memoirs, “the significant role of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, which, having reached the south-eastern outskirts of Berlin, cut off the retreat routes of the 9th Army to Berlin. This made it easier to continue the struggle in the city itself.”
The Katukovites were among the first to begin fighting in Berlin itself. Every building here was turned into a fortress. Tanks, accompanying the infantry, together with artillery, uprooted the enemy from these fortresses. They spread out across many streets and slowly but uncontrollably moved forward. The army's actions sometimes broke up into a mass of local battles. However, Army Commander Katukov did not let go of their leadership for a second. He maneuvered reserves, organized the interaction of troops, and concentrated artillery forces to clear passages for tanks. The army made its way to the very center of Berlin, when the long-awaited came - the enemy capitulated.

Open the hatches!

This was already a symbolic team. Victory has come.

Katukov toured formations and units of the army. Military orders shone on their banners, almost all of them had names: Berdichev, Chernivtsi, Peremyshlensk, Vistula, Sandomierz, Lodz, Brandenburg, Berlin and others. He stayed for a long time in his native 1st Guards Tank Brigade. Now her battle banner was decorated with six orders: two Orders of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky. At its head, Katukov took part in the battle of Moscow; among the best formations of the 1st Guards Tank Army, the brigade went through a glorious battle path right up to the final battles in the capital of the Nazi Reich.

* * *
After the end of the Great Patriotic War, Katukov commanded the army, armored and mechanized forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. In 1951, he graduated from the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff.

Learn! - Katukov called on his fellow soldiers, hung with medal strips. - All your experience needs to be filtered through military theory. Then only it will be useful for the future.

All further activities of Mikhail Efimovich were dedicated to the future of the Soviet Armed Forces. Since 1955, he was inspector general of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, then deputy head of the Main Directorate of the Ground Forces. In 1959, he was awarded the rank of Marshal of the Armored Forces.

For the last ten years of his life, Mikhail Efimovich was a military inspector-adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. During these years, he worked a lot on generalizing and theoretically understanding the experience of combat operations of tank forces during the Great Patriotic War. His articles in military magazines, and even memoirs, contain valuable provisions for military art, many of which are still of great theoretical and practical importance for the Soviet Armed Forces.

On June 8, 1976, Mikhail Efimovich Katukov passed away. In the room where he died, there is a moire pillow attached to the wall. She wears orders and medals. A lot of them. Among them are two Stars of the Hero of the Soviet Union, four Orders of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Order of Kutuzov 1st degree, Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree. And behind each of these awards are remarkable military achievements in the name of the triumph of the ideas of October, in defense of socialism. In Moscow and other cities there are streets and schools named after M.E. Katukov. And along the battle route of the 1st Guards Tank Army, in many places there are monuments to tank soldiers - the famous thirty-fours - on pedestals.

The name of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov is among those whom the people will always honor and surround with grateful memory

TO Atukov Mikhail Efimovich - commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Colonel General of tank forces.

Born on September 4 (17), 1900 in the village of Bolshoye Uvarovo, Kolomensky district, Moscow province, now Ozersky district, Moscow region. Russian. From a poor peasant family with 5 children. From early childhood he worked on the dairy farm of a local landowner. He graduated from a rural primary school. In 1912 he was sent “to the public” to St. Petersburg, worked as a messenger boy in a dairy store, then in the factories of the city.

Participant of the October armed uprising in Petrograd in 1917. Then, due to the death of his mother, he returned to his native village to help his family.

He was drafted into the Red Army by the Kolomna military registration and enlistment office in March 1919. Sent as a Red Army soldier to the 484th Infantry Regiment of the 54th Infantry Division. Participated in the Civil War - the suppression of the Don Cossack uprising in 1919. Then he suffered from typhus for a long time, and was re-enlisted in the active army only in November 1919. He was a Red Army soldier of the 9th Rifle Regiment, and in June 1920 - the 1st Reserve Regiment, from July 1920 - the 507th Rifle Regiment as part of the 57th Rifle Division, fought on the Western Front against Polish troops. Since November 1920 - Red Army soldier of the 33rd Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division. Since December 1920 he has been studying.

In 1922 he graduated from the 23rd Mogilev Infantry Course. Since 1922, he served in the 235th and 81st rifle regiments of the 27th Omsk Red Banner Rifle Division: from March 1922 - platoon commander, from August 1923 - assistant company commander, from December 1923 - company commander, from August 1924 - assistant head of the regimental school, from July 1926 - assistant battalion commander. In 1927, he graduated from the rifle-tactical advanced training courses for the command staff of the Red Army "Vystrel", after which he continued to serve in the 27th division, from August 1928 - company commander, from October 1927 - head of the regimental school, from December 1931 - chief of staff of the 80th th Leningrad Red Banner Rifle Regiment.

Since May 1932 - in the armored forces. The first position in them was the chief of staff of the 5th separate mechanized brigade of the Belarusian Military District (Borisov), from December 1932 - the chief of reconnaissance of this brigade, from September 1933 - the commander of a training battalion and from May 1934 - the acting chief of artillery of this brigades. Since October 1934 - head of the operational department of the 134th mechanized brigade of the 45th mechanized corps in the Kiev Military District.

In 1935 he graduated from the Advanced Courses for Command Staff at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army named after I.V. Stalin. Since September 1937 - chief of staff of the 135th rifle and machine-gun brigade of the 45th mechanized corps, since April 1938 - acting chief of staff of the 45th mechanized corps. From October 1938 - commander of the 5th light tank brigade of the 25th tank corps, at its head he participated in the Red Army campaign in Western Ukraine in September 1939. From July 1940 - commander of the 38th light tank brigade. From November 1940 - commander of the 20th Tank Division of the 9th Mechanized Corps of the Kyiv Special Military District (Shepetovka).

A participant in the Great Patriotic War from June 24, 1941, as commander of the 20th Tank Division, he participated in the Border Tank Battle in the Dubno area, then fought out of encirclement. From September 1941 - commander of the 4th Tank Brigade, which became famous during the defense of Moscow, first in the Mtsensk direction, then on the Volokolamsk Highway. For outstanding successes in battles and significant losses inflicted by the troops of the German 2nd Tank Army of General G. Guderian, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on November 11, 1941, the brigade was the first in the Red Army to receive the Guards banner and became known as the 1st Guards Tank Brigade. During the counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow in December 1941 - January 1942, he commanded a mobile group in the 16th and 20th armies of the Western Front, consisting of two tank brigades, one motorized rifle brigade and one tank battalion. This group successfully operated during the liberation of Volokolamsk and the breakthrough of German defenses along the lines of the Lama and Ruza rivers.

From April 1942 - commander of the 1st Tank Corps, which distinguished itself in the defensive battles of the 1942 summer campaign on the Bryansk Front. From September 1942 - commander of the 3rd mechanized corps of the Kalinin Front.

From January 1943 until the Victory, he commanded the 1st Tank Army (from April 1944 - the 1st Guards), which participated in the Battle of Kursk, Belgorod-Kharkov, Zhitomir-Berdichev, Proskurov-Chernovtsy, Lvov-Sandomierz operations and in the battles for holding Sandomierz bridgehead on the Vistula.

Z and the successful leadership of military formations and the personal courage and heroism displayed by the Colonel General of the tank forces Katukov Mikhail Efimovich On September 23, 1944, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

Subsequently, army units distinguished themselves in the Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian and Berlin operations.

Z and the successful leadership of military formations and the personal courage and heroism demonstrated by the Colonel General of the Tank Forces on April 6, 1945, was awarded the second Gold Star medal.

After the war, for another 3 years he commanded the 1st Guards Tank Army as part of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, and at the same time was the head of the Soviet Military Administration of Saxony. From April 1948 to June 1950 - commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, then left for study.

In 1951 he graduated from the Higher Academic Courses at the Higher Military Academy named after K.E. Voroshilov. Since September 1951 - commander of the 5th Guards Mechanized Army of the Belarusian Military District (Bobruisk). Since June 1955 - Inspector General of the Inspectorate of Tank Forces of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since April 1957 - Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ground Forces. Since 1963 - military inspector-adviser of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Lived in the hero city of Moscow. Died June 8, 1976. He was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery in Moscow.

Military ranks:
Major (1936),
Colonel (02/17/1938);
Major General of Tank Forces (11/10/1941);
Lieutenant General of Tank Forces (01/18/1943);
Colonel General of Tank Forces (04/10/1944);
Marshal of Armored Forces (10/5/1959).

Awarded 4 Orders of Lenin (11/10/1941, 09/23/1944, ...), 3 Orders of the Red Banner (05/3/1944, 11/3/1944, ...), 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree (05/29/1944, 05/19. 1945), orders of Kutuzov 1st (08/27/1943) and 2nd (02/8/1943) degrees, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree (01/10/1944), Red Star, "For service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3- 1st degree (1970), medals "For the Defense of Moscow", "For the Liberation of Warsaw", "For the Capture of Berlin", anniversary medals, foreign awards, including the Order for Distinguished Service (Great Britain, 1944), two degrees of the Order " Cross of Grunwald" (Poland), Order of Military Valor (Virtuti Militari, Poland), Order of the Red Banner of Battle (Mongolia, 1944), Order of Merit for the Fatherland in gold (GDR), medals of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

A bronze bust was installed in the city of Ozyory. In Moscow, a memorial plaque was installed on the house in which M.E. Katukov lived, and an apartment museum was opened. Busts were erected in the cities of Ozery, Moscow Region, and Mtsensk, Oryol Region. Streets are named after him in the cities of Bogodukhov, Kharkov region, Moscow, Lipetsk, Mtsensk, Oryol region, and Snezhnoye, Donetsk region, where memorial plaques are also installed.

Essays:
Tank battles. M., 1942;
At the forefront of the main blow. M., 1985, etc.

Mikhail Efimovich

Battles and victories

Soviet military leader, Marshal of Armored Forces (1959), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944, 1945).

The Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation, the Kursk Bulge, the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive operation, a raid unheard of in military history in depth and pace during the Vistula-Oder operation, the assault on Berlin... They said about the commander of the 1st Tank Army: if it was necessary to stop the enemy, to make a breakthrough on some section of the front, Stalin sent Katukov there.

Mikhail Efimovich Katukov was born in a “village” - that’s how he affectionately called the village of Bolshoye Uvarovo, Kolomna province, Moscow region. Now this is the Ozersky district. Mother - Maria Semenovna, father - Efim Epifanovich. The most legendary person in the family is grandfather Epifan Yegorovich, who served as a soldier with Skobelev, on Shipka, and participated in the battles for Plevna and the Green Mountains. The old warrior told his grandchildren how he sat “in secret,” showed how to capture Turks, wield a bayonet, and often repeated: “A soldier is a statesman. A servant to everyone, he does not serve himself,” “The main thing is the brick in the cornice, not in the foundation,” “What you raise in childhood is what you will rely on in old age.” All this left an indelible mark on the boy’s soul and formed the basis of his fate. In addition to his grandfather, his grandmother, a wise woman, a skilled storyteller, also had a great influence on the future marshal, filling her grandson’s life with legends, epics, and various instructive stories.

Until the age of 12, Mikhail Efimovich lived in the village and studied at the local school. He graduated with a certificate of merit, was the first student, loved to read, and had an extraordinary, amazing memory. He never forgot anything, remembered and knew a lot. As a child, he was fond of Jules Verne, Stevenson, Mine Reid, and Fenimore Cooper. In his youth, he loved Lermontov’s Borodino, the songs and poems of Nikitin, Koltsov, he knew Pushkin’s Poltava by heart, and often later read all this from memory to soldiers at the front.

After the revolution of 1917, Mikhail Katukov linked his fate with the army. Before this, there was a difficult period of “training” in St. Petersburg while serving as a “boy” in Sumakov’s dairy company. Five years of hard labor strengthened my character and opened my eyes to many things. Mikhail Efimovich volunteered to join the Red Army, participated as a private in the Civil War as part of the 54th Infantry Division, and in 1919 fell ill with typhus. After recovery, he was sent to the 57th Infantry Division on the Polish Front and fought with the White Poles until peace was concluded. At the end of 1920, at his own request, he entered the paint courses and on March 1, 1922 he graduated from the 23rd Mogilev infantry courses. He received a command rank and was sent to the 235th Nevelsk Rifle Regiment of the 27th Omsk Red Banner Division (first company) as a platoon commander. Mikhail Efimovich served in this division until April 1932, holding the positions of assistant company commander, assistant chief and, finally, head of the school. During this time, he became an excellent sniper, smart, calculating, and focused.

In 1927 he graduated from the advanced training course “Vystrel”. And in April 1932, when the rifle regiment was deployed to the tank 5th separate brigade in the city of Borisov on Berezina, M. E. Katukov was temporarily appointed chief of staff of the brigade. Then - head of the intelligence department, head of artillery, commander of a separate training battalion, where he trained 1,500 tank crews for units of the tank forces of the Red Army, mainly for the Far East. But first he himself had to learn tank business and technology through self-training. And already in 1933, Mikhail Katukov took first place in the district rifle competitions in tank shooting, but he received professional tank education only in 1935, having successfully completed advanced training courses at VAMI. Stalin in Moscow.

Brigade commander Katukov
and Commissioner Boyko

In 1940 M.E. Katukov was assigned to form the 20th Tank Division, which was part of the 9th Mechanized Corps, commanded by General K.K. Rokossovsky. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the division was at the stage of formation: it had one third of the personnel, and instead of the 375 tanks required by the state, there were none. The T-34 tanks had not yet been sent, they were supposed to arrive in July-August 1941. Thus, Katukov began the war as commander of the 20th Tank Division... without tanks. They fought the enemy on foot, deceiving the enemy by placing tanks made of plywood with camouflage in ambushes.

The front-line officer wrote down what Katukov recalled about these days: “The main forces of my division were already fighting the Germans. Remember the laconic messages of the Sovinformburo: “A tank battle unfolded in the Lutsk direction during the day, in which up to 4,000 tanks are participating on both sides. The tank battle continues."

Well, my 20th division with thirty training tanks also took part in this battle. But our people fought desperately: each of our tanks, even training ones, defeated from three to nine German ones. And then... Then they fought like infantrymen: they shot from rifles, whoever had them, fought with shovels, wrenches, crowbars.”

Katukov quickly realized: the small number of tanks that are available are being used incorrectly, to conduct a tank battle you need a powerful armored “fist”, and while there are few tanks (only “BT”) this is impossible. And already at that time, Katukov had the idea of ​​​​using tank ambushes. This tactic helped to inflict sensitive blows on the enemy with small forces.

You need to hold on steadfastly, courageously and at all costs destroy the uninvited enemy.

M.E. Katukov

It is important to be able to act not only as a team as a whole. Each unit, each individual tank must be prepared for autonomous operations in isolation from the main forces.

M.E. Katukov

In November 1941, the 1st Guards Tank Brigade was created, and M.E. was sent to command it. Katukov. This brigade defended Moscow in the Mozhaisk and then in the Volokolamsk directions, then launched a counteroffensive, liberating cities and towns near Moscow. She became the founder of the tank guard, and the commander who led her into battle was called the first tank guard.

“The 4th Tank Brigade, through brave and skillful combat operations from 4.10 to 11.10, despite the significant numerical superiority of the enemy, inflicted heavy losses on him and fulfilled the tasks assigned to the brigade to cover the concentration of our troops.

Two fascist tank divisions and one motorized division were stopped and suffered huge losses from the glorious fighters and commanders of the 4th Tank Brigade.

As a result of the fierce battles of the brigade with the 3rd and 4th tank divisions and the enemy motorized division, the Nazis lost: 133 tanks, 49 guns, 8 aircraft, 15 tractors with ammunition, up to an infantry regiment, 6 mortars and other weapons. The losses of the 4th Tank Brigade were counted in single units.

I order:

1. For brave and skillful combat actions, the 4th Tank Brigade will be called: “1st Guards Tank Brigade.”
2. The commander of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, Major General Katukov, should present the most distinguished soldiers and commanders for government awards.

PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION SSR
I. STALIN"

In April 1942, General Katukov M.E. appointed commander of the 1st Tank Corps. In mid-August 1942, an order came: the 1st Tank Corps should enter the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and concentrate south of Tula. Here is Major General Katukov M.E. received an order to appoint him commander of the 3rd mechanized corps, which, according to the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, was intended for combat operations in the Kalinin region. Very little time was allocated for the formation of the corps. Katukov's corps was to participate in the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts, and the personnel of the newly formed corps successfully completed the task.

From Katukov’s memoirs about being summoned to the Kremlin in September 1942: “Stalin, pacing around the office, asks me another question:

Do you think our tanks are good or not? Speak directly, without beating around the bush.

I answer that the T-34 tanks fully justified themselves in battle and that we have high hopes for them. But the troops don’t like heavy KB tanks and T-60 and T-70 combat vehicles.

Stalin stopped for a minute, arching his eyebrow questioningly:

- For what reason?

– KB, Comrade Stalin, are very heavy, clumsy, and therefore unmaneuverable. They overcome obstacles with difficulty. But the thirty-four don’t care. In addition, KBs break bridges and generally cause a lot of unnecessary trouble. And the KB is armed with the same seventy-six-millimeter cannon as the thirty-four. So, the question arises, what combat advantages does a heavy tank give us? Now, if the KB had a stronger gun, with a larger caliber, then it would be a different matter. One could, perhaps, put up with its heaviness and other design flaws.

I also criticized the T-60 light tank. It is armed with an automatic, but only a 20-mm cannon. This vehicle cannot conduct a serious fight against enemy armored forces. In addition, it has low ground clearance, making marches on it or attacking in the snow and mud is a dead task. In the battles near Moscow we had to tow these tanks.

The T-70 light tank has more solid armor protection, is armed with a 45-mm cannon, and has two automobile engines. But it has just begun to enter service and has not yet shown itself to be anything special.

“There’s nothing wrong with them, Comrade Stalin,” I concluded.

The Supreme Commander listened attentively and did not interrupt. But when I expressed my point of view about all the tanks that were in our service, he, after a long pause, suddenly began to prove to me that I was in vain to attack the KB, T-60 and T-70 so harshly, that they were not bad cars and , perhaps we tankers simply underestimate them.

Listening to Stalin, I, of course, was worried... Just by the fact that Stalin tortured me with particular passion about why our tanks were good and bad in terms of their tactical and technical properties, I understood that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief wanted to thoroughly, down to the very, as they say, depth, to understand the strengths and weaknesses of our armored vehicles of the forty-second year.”

In January 1943, a tank formation was formed - the 1st Tank Army, whose commander was Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, who was awarded the rank of lieutenant general of tank forces. Like Suvorov, he understood: in battle there is no more important soldier. And therefore, before battles in all regiments and brigades, he himself conducted conversations with the personnel. He taught how to fight, how to use equipment, weapons, how to interact in battle with other branches of the military, within units and crews. Explained the task. The soldiers knew and understood what the commander wanted. Katukov delved into all the needs of soldiers and officers, took care of awards and never forgot his promise to help or figure something out. He was especially concerned about the wounded. Everyone knew their commander by sight and, for his warmth and cordiality, paid him with loyalty, appreciated his composure, calmness, restraint, were proud of him, were glad that they were fighting well under his command, and called themselves “Katukovites,” and Mikhail Efimovich knew many names and faces...

During the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943, the 1st Panzer was in the direction of the main attack of the Germans and fought with eleven tank divisions and numerous infantry. Katukov recalled the beginning of the Battle of Kursk: “Burda crossed the threshold of the hut, barely able to stand on his feet. His unshaven face was black with soot and fatigue. The gymnast is stained with sweat. Boots covered in dust. We have never seen him like this before. He raised his hand to his helmet. But I stepped towards him, hugged him and sat him down on the bench:

- Well, tell me in order.

- Comrade commander, losses...

- No losses in the war...

- No, there weren’t any...

It was strange to hear all this from such a commander as Burda.

- Tell me, Alexander Fedorovich.

And Burda began to tell. In their sector, the enemy attacked continuously. Fifty to a hundred tanks were moving. “Tigers” and “Panthers” are ahead.

“But it’s difficult with them, Comrade Commander.” You hit them, and the shells ricochet off.

– Well, what are the results of the battle?

– Losses... Terrible losses, comrade commander... Sixty percent of the brigade.

One could understand Burda's condition. Shortly before the start of the fighting, he took over the brigade. This was his first battle as a brigade commander. And suddenly such an unusual outcome: after all, he usually knew how to fight with little blood, as they said then. Defeated the enemy by cunning...

I asked Shalin (chief of staff) to give a report containing the combat account of the 49th Tank Brigade. German losses significantly exceeded the losses of Burda's brigade.

I stood up and shook the brigade commander's hand.

- Consider that you have completed the task. The main thing is that you persevered and did not retreat. Now go to the repairmen and hurry them up. Let the cars be restored as soon as possible. I am sure that you will still fight on them like a guard.”

It was in the defense sector of the 1st Panzer that 200 Panthers, the first new German tanks thrown into battle, failed. The significance of this battle in the history of the Great Patriotic War is enormous. First of all, it was as a result of this that the Wehrmacht finally lost its strategic initiative: the German army could no longer launch offensives with strategic goals. But the Red Army received freedom of choice: where, when and with what forces to strike and gradually move further to the west.

The leadership talent of Army Commander Katukov was clearly manifested in the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive operation carried out by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in July - August 1944. Tankers of the 1st, already Guards, Tank Army quickly reached the Vistula, crossed it and, together with the infantrymen and artillerymen, with the support of aviation, captured the Sandomierz bridgehead, which was later used as the starting area for subsequent offensive actions of Soviet troops to the borders of Nazi Germany.

From Katukov’s memoirs: “It must be said that the 1st Guards Army suffered serious losses and had difficulty repelling the attacks of the Nazis on the outer ring of encirclement... Probably the enemy guessed about our condition. In any case, the Nazis even tried to make jokes. German radio gave us the answer to the ultimatum: “We are in the ring, and you are in the ring - let’s see what happens in the end”...

On August 18, 1944, enemy resistance in the city was broken, the last Nazi machine gunners were knocked out of their nests. When I entered Sandomierz, I was surprised that most of its buildings were intact: probably, occupied by a stubborn defense, the Nazis did not have time to blow them up.

The ancient city has retained many medieval features: narrow streets, pointed arches and sharp spiers of churches. Gray walls and tiled roofs of castles, cobblestone pavements - all of this smelled of deep antiquity. The ruins, torn rows of barbed wire, smoking tanks and broken cars were returned to today.

And soon the Sovinformburo transmitted the latest report on the fighting in this area:

“On August 20, north of the city of Sandomierz, our troops completed the liquidation of the encircled group... due to the refusal to surrender, most of the encircled enemy troops were destroyed...”

Over 35 days of fighting, the 1st Guards Tank Army, in cooperation with other armies, destroyed and captured over 34 thousand Nazis, knocked out and captured 461 tanks and assault guns, 187 armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, 887 guns and mortars, 683 vehicles, 864 machine guns, 88 aircraft "

For this operation, in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated September 23, 1944, Guard Colonel General of Tank Forces Katukov Mikhail Efimovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

On January 14, 1945, from the western bank of the Vistula, south of Warsaw, Katukov’s tank army begins a raid unheard of in military history in depth and pace during the Vistula-Oder operation (offensive depth 600 kilometers). On some days, the pace of movement reached 100 kilometers or more, and all this was through enemy territory. Actions unfold quickly. After the liberation of the cities of Lodz and Gniezen, the 1st Guards Tank Army blocks the city of Poznan with part of its forces, and with its main forces it goes to the Oder and immediately seizes a bridgehead on the western bank. In addition, Katukov’s army crosses the rivers: Pilica, which bends several times along the army’s route, Warta, Obra. The western bank of the Obra was fortified with powerful steel armor of multi-story pillboxes. There are dragon teeth, and gouges, and traps, and minefields - and all this is overcome by Soviet tank crews, punching a hole in the defense before the infantry approaches. Then Katukov's tanks rushed towards the Oder, leading the infantry. On March 1, 1945, the 1st Guards Tank in a swift raid, cutting Pomerania into two parts, reached the Baltic coast, cutting off and encircling the enemy troops. Then, like a tornado, the “Katukovites” swept through Eastern Pomerania, occupied the Baltic coast and began preparing for the assault on Berlin.

Military friend of Army Commander E.S. Katukova recalled those days: “We are on German soil! Out of habit, this country makes a depressing impression. All in gray stone of some prison color, with a greenish tint. The houses have pointed roofs, stand closely together, and look alike.

We passed many villages to Berlin, and they were all one. The houses have standard furniture, everything is the same, there is no individuality. Everything here is somehow not our way, and nothing pleases the eye. Our Russian space is gone. Even the forest, and that one is different. Pine trees are stuck in rows like matchsticks, all the undergrowth has been cut down. The soil is bad - just sand.

We entered cities and villages, from which the Germans, not having time to close the doors of apartments and shops, fled. Coffee pots were still boiling on the stoves... In all the yards there were cattle without water. The cows, which had not been milked for several days, mooed as if they were being burned with fire. The Germans' economy is not poor, in every house there are electric milkers, cabinets are filled to the brim with goods. And the roads are all strewn with down from feather beds and pillows, like snow...”

The enemy was waiting for the offensive of Soviet troops in the Berlin direction, although he did not know its exact date. With the beginning of the battle for the German capital, Katukov’s army gnawed through the German defense in depth on the Seelow Heights. Here the area was wooded with countless rivers, swamps, and canals. Maneuvering tank forces during combat was extremely difficult. After fierce battles, a narrow gap was formed at the heights - the railway to the city of Seelow. At that moment, Katukov came up with the idea of ​​launching tanks with their headlights on along the railway track at night. The enemy decided that it was his own troops leaving the encirclement and did not open fire for some time. Katukov, taking advantage of the surprise, threw all his forces into the breakthrough, leaving only cover in other areas. “In 1941, Katukov had only 45 tanks, and now this mass: tank to tank, gun to gun - occupied a space of 150 kilometers. And Katukov’s entire army entered this narrow neck,” wrote E.S. Katukova.

Thus, in fierce battles, destroying the enemy and repelling his desperate counterattacks on the left flank of Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front, Katukov’s tank army broke into the eastern and southeastern parts of Berlin. She was the first to cross the Spree River and, interacting with the troops of the 8th Army of V.I. Chuikova, took possession of the Zoo and part of the Tiergarten park near the Reichstag. Here the “Katukovites” came into contact with the troops of the tank army of General S.I. Bogdanov, advancing from the north and northeast. On May 2, 1945, Berlin fell.

From the end of the war until 1948, Mikhail Efimovich Katukov held the post of head of the Soviet military administration of the Land of Saxony and at the same time commanded the tank army. From 1948 to 1950 he was the commander of armored and mechanized forces in Germany, from 1951 to 1955. serves in Bobruisk in Belarus. In 1953 - member of the Bobruisk Regional Council of Workers' Deputies, in February 1955 - deputy of the Supreme Council of Belarus. In June 1955, he was appointed to the Ministry of Defense in the Main Inspectorate - inspector general of tank forces. In April 1957, M.E. Katukov was deputy head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of Ground Forces of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In 1959 he was awarded the rank of Marshal of the Armored Forces.

During his service in the Soviet Army, Mikhail Efimovich Katukov was twice awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, received four Orders of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov, 1st degree, Order of Kutuzov, 1st and 2nd degrees, Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, and other awards. However, his greatest reward, like every real commander, was the love of those he commanded, for whom he endlessly improved himself, sparing no effort. After his death, returning from the marshal’s funeral, a simple Soviet soldier A. Erofeev, took up his pen and wrote poetry in memory of his commander:

He was a legend, an example of courage,
He was worse than death for his enemies.
With your mind and victorious action
He gained the love of the people of Katukov.
No, you can’t make up for the bitterness of loss,
His affairs will survive the years.
Bow your heads, soldiers,
Such people live forever.

These words say almost more than all the awards... The memory of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov is alive. A military unit, streets in Moscow and other cities, and schools are named after him. He is an honorary citizen of the cities of Mtsensk, Ozera, and Berlin. Monument to twice Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal M.E. Katukov in the city of Ozyory, Moscow Region - this is also recognition of his services to the Fatherland.

SURGHIK D.V., IVI RAS

Literature

Heroes of the Soviet Union: A Brief Biographical Dictionary. Prev. ed. collegium I.N. Shkadov. M., 1987

The Great Patriotic War. Commanders. M., 2005

Internet

Nakhimov Pavel Stepanovich

Successes in the Crimean War of 1853-56, victory in the Battle of Sinop in 1853, defense of Sevastopol 1854-55.

Sheremetev Boris Petrovich

Stessel Anatoly Mikhailovich

Commandant of Port Arthur during his heroic defense. The unprecedented ratio of losses of Russian and Japanese troops before the surrender of the fortress is 1:10.

Ushakov Fedor Fedorovich

The great Russian naval commander who won victories at Fedonisi, Kaliakria, at Cape Tendra and during the liberation of the islands of Malta (Ianian Islands) and Corfu. He discovered and introduced a new tactic of naval combat, with the abandonment of the linear formation of ships and showed the tactics of a “scattered formation” with an attack on the flagship of the enemy fleet. One of the founders of the Black Sea Fleet and its commander in 1790-1792.

Rokossovsky Konstantin Konstantinovich

Kazarsky Alexander Ivanovich

Captain-lieutenant. Participant in the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-29. He distinguished himself during the capture of Anapa, then Varna, commanding the transport "Rival". After this, he was promoted to lieutenant commander and appointed captain of the brig Mercury. On May 14, 1829, the 18-gun brig Mercury was overtaken by two Turkish battleships Selimiye and Real Bey. Having accepted an unequal battle, the brig was able to immobilize both Turkish flagships, one of which contained the commander of the Ottoman fleet. Subsequently, an officer from the Real Bay wrote: “During the continuation of the battle, the commander of the Russian frigate (the notorious Raphael, which surrendered without a fight a few days earlier) told me that the captain of this brig would not surrender, and if he lost hope, then he would blow up the brig If in the great deeds of ancient and modern times there are feats of courage, then this act should overshadow all of them, and the name of this hero is worthy of being inscribed in gold letters on the Temple of Glory: he is called captain-lieutenant Kazarsky, and the brig is “Mercury”

Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich

The greatest Commander and Diplomat!!! Who utterly defeated the troops of the “first European Union”!!!

Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich

Chairman of the State Defense Committee, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War.
What other questions might there be?

Suvorov Alexander Vasilievich

The greatest Russian commander! He has more than 60 victories and not a single defeat. Thanks to his talent for victory, the whole world learned the power of Russian weapons

Yulaev Salavat

Commander of the Pugachev era (1773-1775). Together with Pugachev, he organized an uprising and tried to change the position of the peasants in society. He won several victories over the troops of Catherine II.

Gagen Nikolai Alexandrovich

On June 22, trains with units of the 153rd Infantry Division arrived in Vitebsk. Covering the city from the west, Hagen's division (together with the heavy artillery regiment attached to the division) occupied a 40 km long defense line; it was opposed by the 39th German Motorized Corps.

After 7 days of fierce fighting, the division's battle formations were not broken through. The Germans no longer contacted the division, bypassed it and continued the offensive. The division appeared in a German radio message as destroyed. Meanwhile, the 153rd Rifle Division, without ammunition and fuel, began to fight its way out of the ring. Hagen led the division out of encirclement with heavy weapons.

For the demonstrated steadfastness and heroism during the Elninsky operation on September 18, 1941, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 308, the division received the honorary name “Guards”.
From 01/31/1942 to 09/12/1942 and from 10/21/1942 to 04/25/1943 - commander of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps,
from May 1943 to October 1944 - commander of the 57th Army,
from January 1945 - the 26th Army.

Troops under the leadership of N.A. Gagen took part in the Sinyavinsk operation (and the general managed to break out of encirclement for the second time with weapons in hand), the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, battles in the Left Bank and Right Bank Ukraine, in the liberation of Bulgaria, in the Iasi-Kishinev, Belgrade, Budapest, Balaton and Vienna operations. Participant of the Victory Parade.

Minikh Christopher Antonovich

Due to the ambiguous attitude towards the period of Anna Ioannovna’s reign, she is a largely underrated commander, who was the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops throughout her reign.

Commander of Russian troops during the War of the Polish Succession and architect of the victory of Russian weapons in the Russian-Turkish War of 1735-1739.

Kornilov Vladimir Alekseevich

During the outbreak of the war with England and France, he actually commanded the Black Sea Fleet, and until his heroic death he was the immediate superior of P.S. Nakhimov and V.I. Istomina. After the landing of the Anglo-French troops in Evpatoria and the defeat of the Russian troops on Alma, Kornilov received an order from the commander-in-chief in the Crimea, Prince Menshikov, to sink the ships of the fleet in the roadstead in order to use sailors for the defense of Sevastopol from land.

Kolchak Alexander Vasilievich

A prominent military figure, scientist, traveler and discoverer. Admiral of the Russian Fleet, whose talent was highly appreciated by Emperor Nicholas II. The Supreme Ruler of Russia during the Civil War, a true Patriot of his Fatherland, a man of a tragic, interesting fate. One of those military men who tried to save Russia during the years of turmoil, in the most difficult conditions, being in very difficult international diplomatic conditions.

Suvorov Alexander Vasilievich

For the highest art of military leadership and immeasurable love for the Russian soldier

Zhukov Georgy Konstantinovich

He made the greatest contribution as a strategist to the victory in the Great Patriotic War (aka World War II).

Field Marshal General Gudovich Ivan Vasilievich

The assault on the Turkish fortress of Anapa on June 22, 1791. In terms of complexity and importance, it is only inferior to the assault on Izmail by A.V. Suvorov.
A 7,000-strong Russian detachment stormed Anapa, which was defended by a 25,000-strong Turkish garrison. At the same time, soon after the start of the assault, the Russian detachment was attacked from the mountains by 8,000 mounted highlanders and Turks, who attacked the Russian camp, but were unable to break into it, were repulsed in a fierce battle and pursued by the Russian cavalry.
The fierce battle for the fortress lasted over 5 hours. About 8,000 people from the Anapa garrison died, 13,532 defenders led by the commandant and Sheikh Mansur were taken prisoner. A small part (about 150 people) escaped on ships. Almost all the artillery was captured or destroyed (83 cannons and 12 mortars), 130 banners were taken. Gudovich sent a separate detachment from Anapa to the nearby Sudzhuk-Kale fortress (on the site of modern Novorossiysk), but upon his approach the garrison burned the fortress and fled to the mountains, abandoning 25 guns.
The losses of the Russian detachment were very high - 23 officers and 1,215 privates were killed, 71 officers and 2,401 privates were wounded (Sytin's Military Encyclopedia gives slightly lower data - 940 killed and 1,995 wounded). Gudovich was awarded the Order of St. George, 2nd degree, all the officers of his detachment were awarded, and a special medal was established for the lower ranks.

Barclay de Tolly Mikhail Bogdanovich

Participated in the Russian-Turkish War of 1787-91 and the Russian-Swedish War of 1788-90. He distinguished himself during the war with France in 1806-07 at Preussisch-Eylau, and from 1807 he commanded a division. During the Russian-Swedish war of 1808-09 he commanded a corps; led the successful crossing of the Kvarken Strait in the winter of 1809. In 1809-10, Governor-General of Finland. From January 1810 to September 1812, the Minister of War did a lot of work to strengthen the Russian army, and separated the intelligence and counterintelligence service into a separate production. In the Patriotic War of 1812 he commanded the 1st Western Army, and, as Minister of War, the 2nd Western Army was subordinate to him. In conditions of significant superiority of the enemy, he showed his talent as a commander and successfully carried out the withdrawal and unification of the two armies, which earned M.I. Kutuzov such words as THANK YOU DEAR FATHER!!! SAVED THE ARMY!!! SAVED RUSSIA!!!. However, the retreat caused discontent in noble circles and the army, and on August 17 Barclay surrendered command of the armies to M.I. Kutuzov. In the Battle of Borodino he commanded the right wing of the Russian army, showing steadfastness and skill in defense. He recognized the position chosen by L. L. Bennigsen near Moscow as unsuccessful and supported M. I. Kutuzov’s proposal to leave Moscow at the military council in Fili. In September 1812, due to illness, he left the army. In February 1813 he was appointed commander of the 3rd and then the Russian-Prussian army, which he successfully commanded during the foreign campaigns of the Russian army of 1813-14 (Kulm, Leipzig, Paris). Buried in the Beklor estate in Livonia (now Jõgeveste Estonia)

Chuikov Vasily Ivanovich

Commander of the 62nd Army in Stalingrad.

Vorotynsky Mikhail Ivanovich

“Drafter of the statutes of the watchdog and border service” is, of course, good. For some reason, we have forgotten the Battle of YOUTH from July 29 to August 2, 1572. But it was precisely with this victory that Moscow’s right to many things was recognized. They recaptured a lot of things for the Ottomans, the thousands of destroyed Janissaries sobered them up, and unfortunately they also helped Europe. The Battle of YOUTH is very difficult to overestimate

Paskevich Ivan Fedorovich

Hero of Borodin, Leipzig, Paris (division commander)
As commander-in-chief, he won 4 companies (Russian-Persian 1826-1828, Russian-Turkish 1828-1829, Polish 1830-1831, Hungarian 1849).
Knight of the Order of St. George, 1st degree - for the capture of Warsaw (the order, according to the statute, was awarded either for the salvation of the fatherland, or for the capture of the enemy capital).
Field Marshal.

I beg the military historical society to correct the extreme historical injustice and include in the list of the 100 best commanders, the leader of the northern militia who did not lose a single battle, who played an outstanding role in the liberation of Russia from the Polish yoke and unrest. And apparently poisoned for his talent and skill.

Pozharsky Dmitry Mikhailovich

In 1612, during the most difficult time for Russia, he led the Russian militia and liberated the capital from the hands of the conquerors.
Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Pozharsky (November 1, 1578 - April 30, 1642) - Russian national hero, military and political figure, head of the Second People's Militia, which liberated Moscow from the Polish-Lithuanian occupiers. His name and the name of Kuzma Minin are closely associated with the country’s exit from the Time of Troubles, which is currently celebrated in Russia on November 4th.
After the election of Mikhail Fedorovich to the Russian throne, D. M. Pozharsky plays a leading role at the royal court as a talented military leader and statesman. Despite the victory of the people's militia and the election of the Tsar, the war in Russia still continued. In 1615-1616. Pozharsky, on the instructions of the tsar, was sent at the head of a large army to fight the detachments of the Polish colonel Lisovsky, who besieged the city of Bryansk and took Karachev. After the fight with Lisovsky, the tsar instructs Pozharsky in the spring of 1616 to collect the fifth money from merchants into the treasury, since the wars did not stop and the treasury was depleted. In 1617, the tsar instructed Pozharsky to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the English ambassador John Merik, appointing Pozharsky as governor of Kolomensky. In the same year, the Polish prince Vladislav came to the Moscow state. Residents of Kaluga and its neighboring cities turned to the tsar with a request to send them D. M. Pozharsky to protect them from the Poles. The Tsar fulfilled the request of the Kaluga residents and gave an order to Pozharsky on October 18, 1617 to protect Kaluga and surrounding cities by all available measures. Prince Pozharsky fulfilled the tsar's order with honor. Having successfully defended Kaluga, Pozharsky received an order from the tsar to go to the aid of Mozhaisk, namely to the city of Borovsk, and began to harass the troops of Prince Vladislav with flying detachments, causing them significant damage. However, at the same time, Pozharsky became very ill and, at the behest of the tsar, returned to Moscow. Pozharsky, having barely recovered from his illness, took an active part in defending the capital from Vladislav’s troops, for which Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich awarded him new fiefs and estates.
Skopin-Shuisky Mikhail Vasilievich

A talented commander who distinguished himself during the Time of Troubles at the beginning of the 17th century. In 1608, Skopin-Shuisky was sent by Tsar Vasily Shuisky to negotiate with the Swedes in Novgorod the Great. He managed to negotiate Swedish assistance to Russia in the fight against False Dmitry II. The Swedes recognized Skopin-Shuisky as their undisputed leader. In 1609, he and the Russian-Swedish army came to the rescue of the capital, which was under siege by False Dmitry II. He defeated detachments of adherents of the impostor in the battles of Torzhok, Tver and Dmitrov, and liberated the Volga region from them. He lifted the blockade from Moscow and entered it in March 1610.

Bennigsen Leonty Leontievich

Surprisingly, a Russian general who did not speak Russian, became the glory of Russian weapons of the early 19th century.

He made a significant contribution to the suppression of the Polish uprising.

Commander-in-Chief in the Battle of Tarutino.

He made a significant contribution to the campaign of 1813 (Dresden and Leipzig).

Denikin Anton Ivanovich

Russian military leader, political and public figure, writer, memoirist, publicist and military documentarian.
Participant in the Russo-Japanese War. One of the most effective generals of the Russian Imperial Army during the First World War. Commander of the 4th Infantry "Iron" Brigade (1914-1916, from 1915 - deployed under his command to a division), 8th Army Corps (1916-1917). Lieutenant General of the General Staff (1916), commander of the Western and Southwestern Fronts (1917). An active participant in the military congresses of 1917, an opponent of the democratization of the army. He expressed support for the Kornilov speech, for which he was arrested by the Provisional Government, a participant in the Berdichev and Bykhov sittings of generals (1917).
One of the main leaders of the White movement during the Civil War, its leader in the South of Russia (1918-1920). He achieved the greatest military and political results among all the leaders of the White movement. Pioneer, one of the main organizers, and then commander of the Volunteer Army (1918-1919). Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia (1919-1920), Deputy Supreme Ruler and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army Admiral Kolchak (1919-1920).
Since April 1920 - an emigrant, one of the main political figures of the Russian emigration. Author of the memoirs “Essays on the Russian Time of Troubles” (1921-1926) - a fundamental historical and biographical work about the Civil War in Russia, the memoirs “The Old Army” (1929-1931), the autobiographical story “The Path of the Russian Officer” (published in 1953) and a number of other works.

Kappel Vladimir Oskarovich

Perhaps he is the most talented commander of the entire Civil War, even if compared with the commanders of all its sides. A man of powerful military talent, fighting spirit and Christian noble qualities is a true White Knight. Kappel's talent and personal qualities were noticed and respected even by his opponents. Author of many military operations and exploits - including the capture of Kazan, the Great Siberian Ice Campaign, etc. Many of his calculations, not assessed on time and missed through no fault of his own, later turned out to be the most correct, as the course of the Civil War showed.

Denikin Anton Ivanovich

The commander, under whose command the white army, with smaller forces, won victories over the red army for 1.5 years and captured the North Caucasus, Crimea, Novorossia, Donbass, Ukraine, Don, part of the Volga region and the central black earth provinces of Russia. He retained the dignity of his Russian name during the Second World War, refusing to cooperate with the Nazis, despite his irreconcilably anti-Soviet position

Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky Pyotr Alexandrovich

Senyavin Dmitry Nikolaevich

Dmitry Nikolaevich Senyavin (6 (17) August 1763 - 5 (17) April 1831) - Russian naval commander, admiral.
for courage and outstanding diplomatic work shown during the blockade of the Russian fleet in Lisbon

Barclay de Tolly Mikhail Bogdanovich

Finnish War.
Strategic retreat in the first half of 1812
European expedition of 1812

Baklanov Yakov Petrovich

An outstanding strategist and a mighty warrior, he achieved respect and fear of his name among the uncovered mountaineers, who had forgotten the iron grip of the “Thunderstorm of the Caucasus”. At the moment - Yakov Petrovich, an example of the spiritual strength of a Russian soldier in front of the proud Caucasus. His talent crushed the enemy and minimized the time frame of the Caucasian War, for which he received the nickname “Boklu”, akin to the devil for his fearlessness.

Makarov Stepan Osipovich

Russian oceanographer, polar explorer, shipbuilder, vice admiral. Developed the Russian semaphore alphabet. A worthy person, on the list of worthy ones!

Bennigsen Leonty

An unjustly forgotten commander. Having won several battles against Napoleon and his marshals, he drew two battles with Napoleon and lost one battle. Participated in the Battle of Borodino. One of the contenders for the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army during the Patriotic War of 1812!

Ermak Timofeevich

Russian. Cossack. Ataman. Defeated Kuchum and his satellites. Approved Siberia as part of the Russian state. He dedicated his entire life to military work.

Chuikov Vasily Ivanovich

“There is a city in vast Russia to which my heart is given, it went down in history as STALINGRAD...” V.I. Chuikov

Karyagin Pavel Mikhailovich

Colonel Karyagin's campaign against the Persians in 1805 does not resemble real military history. It looks like a prequel to "300 Spartans" (20,000 Persians, 500 Russians, gorges, bayonet attacks, "This is madness! - No, this is the 17th Jaeger Regiment!"). A golden, platinum page of Russian history, combining the carnage of madness with the highest tactical skill, amazing cunning and stunning Russian arrogance

Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich

He was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War! Under his leadership, the USSR won the Great Victory during the Great Patriotic War!

The de facto commander-in-chief of the allied armies that liberated Europe in 1813-1814. "He took Paris, he founded the Lyceum." The Great Leader who crushed Napoleon himself. (The shame of Austerlitz is not comparable to the tragedy of 1941)

Stalin (Dzhugashvili) Joseph Vissarionovich

Comrade Stalin, in addition to the atomic and missile projects, together with Army General Alexei Innokentievich Antonov, participated in the development and implementation of almost all significant operations of the Soviet troops in the Second World War, and brilliantly organized the work of the rear, even in the first difficult years of the war.

Kotlyarevsky Petr Stepanovich

Hero of the Russian-Persian War of 1804-1813.
"Meteor General" and "Caucasian Suvorov".
He fought not with numbers, but with skill - first, 450 Russian soldiers attacked 1,200 Persian Sardars in the Migri fortress and took it, then 500 of our soldiers and Cossacks attacked 5,000 askers at the crossing of the Araks. They destroyed more than 700 enemies; only 2,500 Persian soldiers managed to escape from ours.
In both cases, our losses were less than 50 killed and up to 100 wounded.
Further, in the war against the Turks, with a swift attack, 1,000 Russian soldiers defeated the 2,000-strong garrison of the Akhalkalaki fortress.
Then again, in the Persian direction, he cleared Karabakh of the enemy, and then, with 2,200 soldiers, he defeated Abbas Mirza with a 30,000-strong army at Aslanduz, a village near the Araks River. In two battles, he destroyed more than 10,000 enemies, including English advisers and artillerymen.
As usual, Russian losses amounted to 30 killed and 100 wounded.
Kotlyarevsky won most of his victories in night assaults on fortresses and enemy camps, not allowing the enemies to come to their senses.
The last campaign - 2000 Russians against 7000 Persians to the Lenkoran fortress, where Kotlyarevsky almost died during the assault, lost consciousness at times from loss of blood and pain from wounds, but still commanded the troops until the final victory, as soon as he regained consciousness, and then was forced take a long time to heal and retire from military affairs.
His exploits for the glory of Russia are much greater than the “300 Spartans” - for our commanders and warriors more than once defeated an enemy 10 times superior, and suffered minimal losses, saving Russian lives.

Gavrilov Pyotr Mikhailovich

From the first days of the Great Patriotic War - in the active army. Major Gavrilov P.M. from June 22 to July 23, 1941 he led the defense of the Eastern Fort of the Brest Fortress. He managed to rally around himself all the surviving soldiers and commanders of various units and divisions, closing the most vulnerable places for the enemy to break through. On July 23, he was seriously wounded by a shell explosion in the casemate and was captured in an unconscious state. He spent the war years in the Nazi concentration camps of Hammelburg and Revensburg, experiencing all the horrors of captivity. Liberated by Soviet troops in May 1945. http://warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=484

Spiridov Grigory Andreevich

He became a sailor under Peter I, participated as an officer in the Russian-Turkish War (1735-1739), and ended the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) as a rear admiral. His naval and diplomatic talent reached its peak during the Russian-Turkish War of 1768-1774. In 1769 he led the first passage of the Russian fleet from the Baltic to the Mediterranean Sea. Despite the difficulties of the transition (the admiral's son was among those who died from illness - his grave was recently found on the island of Menorca), he quickly established control over the Greek archipelago. The Battle of Chesme in June 1770 remained unsurpassed in terms of loss ratio: 11 Russians - 11 thousand Turks! On the island of Paros, the naval base of Auza was equipped with coastal batteries and its own Admiralty.
The Russian fleet left the Mediterranean Sea after the conclusion of the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace in July 1774. The Greek islands and lands of the Levant, including Beirut, were returned to Turkey in exchange for territories in the Black Sea region. However, the activities of the Russian fleet in the Archipelago were not in vain and played a significant role in world naval history. Russia, having made a strategic maneuver with its fleet from one theater to another and achieved a number of high-profile victories over the enemy, for the first time made people talk about itself as a strong maritime power and an important player in European politics.

Uborevich Ieronim Petrovich

Soviet military leader, commander of the 1st rank (1935). Member of the Communist Party since March 1917. Born in the village of Aptandrius (now Utena region of the Lithuanian SSR) in the family of a Lithuanian peasant. Graduated from the Konstantinovsky Artillery School (1916). Participant of the 1st World War 1914-18, second lieutenant. After the October Revolution of 1917, he was one of the organizers of the Red Guard in Bessarabia. In January - February 1918 he commanded a revolutionary detachment in battles against Romanian and Austro-German interventionists, was wounded and captured, from where he escaped in August 1918. He was an artillery instructor, commander of the Dvina brigade on the Northern Front, and from December 1918 head of the 18th Infantry divisions of the 6th Army. From October 1919 to February 1920, he was the commander of the 14th Army during the defeat of the troops of General Denikin, in March - April 1920 he commanded the 9th Army in the North Caucasus. In May - July and November - December 1920, commander of the 14th Army in battles against the troops of bourgeois Poland and the Petliurites, in July - November 1920 - 13th Army in battles against the Wrangelites. In 1921, assistant commander of the troops of Ukraine and Crimea, deputy commander of the troops of the Tambov province, commander of the troops of the Minsk province, led the military operations during the defeat of the gangs of Makhno, Antonov and Bulak-Balakhovich. From August 1921 commander of the 5th Army and the East Siberian Military District. In August - December 1922, Minister of War of the Far Eastern Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army during the liberation of the Far East. He was commander of the troops of the North Caucasus (since 1925), Moscow (since 1928) and Belarusian (since 1931) military districts. Since 1926, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, in 1930-31, deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and chief of armaments of the Red Army. Since 1934 member of the Military Council of NGOs. He made a great contribution to strengthening the defense capability of the USSR, educating and training command staff and troops. Candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1930-37. Member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee since December 1922. Awarded 3 Orders of the Red Banner and Honorary Revolutionary Weapon.

Also G.K. Zhukov demonstrated remarkable knowledge of the properties of the military equipment in service with the Red Army - knowledge that was very necessary for the commander of industrial wars.

Fedor Fedorovich Ushakov

A great naval commander who did not suffer a single defeat and did not lose a single ship during his combat activities. The talent of this military leader manifested itself during the Russian-Turkish wars, where thanks to his victories (usually over the superior naval forces of the Ottoman Empire), Russia realized itself as a naval power in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

Govorov Leonid Alexandrovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union. From June 1942 he commanded the troops of the Leningrad Front, and in February-March 1945 he simultaneously coordinated the actions of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts. He played a big role in the defense of Leningrad and breaking its blockade. Awarded the Order of Victory. A generally recognized master of the combat use of artillery.

In the Soviet Army - since 1919. He graduated from the Mogilev Infantry Courses (1922), the Shot courses (1927), the Academic Advanced Courses for Command Staff at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army (1935) and the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff (1951). Participant of the October armed uprising of 1917 in Petrograd.

During the Civil War, he fought as an ordinary soldier against the White Guards on the Southern Front. Since 1922, he commanded a platoon, a company, was the head of a regimental school, chief of staff of a regiment, brigade, and commander of a training battalion of a tank brigade. Since November 1940 - commander of the 20th Panzer Division.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he took part in defensive operations in the area of ​​the cities of Lutsk, Dubno, Korosten, showing himself to be a skillful, proactive organizer of a tank battle with superior enemy forces. These qualities were clearly demonstrated in the Battle of Moscow, when he commanded the 4th Tank Brigade. In the first half of October 1941, near Mtsensk, on a number of defensive lines, the brigade steadfastly held back the advance of enemy tanks and infantry and inflicted great damage on them. Having completed a 360-km march to the Istra direction, the M.E. brigade. Katukova, as part of the 16th Army of the Western Front, heroically fought in the Volokolamsk direction and participated in the counter-offensive near Moscow. On November 11, 1941, for its brave and skillful military actions, the brigade was the first in the tank forces to receive the rank of guards.

The experience of the brigade’s skillful actions was summarized in a book written under the leadership of M.E. Katukov and the “Instructions for combating enemy tanks, artillery and infantry” recommended for use by troops.

In 1942 M.E. Katukov commanded the 1st Tank Corps, which repelled the onslaught of enemy troops in the Kursk-Voronezh direction, from September 1942 - the 3rd Mechanized Corps. In January 1943, he was appointed commander of the 1st Tank Army, which was part of the Voronezh, and later the 1st The Ukrainian Front distinguished itself in the Battle of Kursk and during the liberation of Ukraine. In April 1944, the army was transformed into the 1st Guards Tank Army, which, under the command of M.E. Katukova participated in the Lviv-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian and Berlin operations, crossed the Vistula and Oder rivers.

For skillful leadership of troops and demonstrated courage and heroism in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation M.E. Katukov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. He was awarded the second Gold Star medal for the successful military operations of the 1st Guards Tank Army in the East Pomeranian operation. In the Berlin operation, the army under the command of M.E. Katukova, advancing in the direction of the main attack of the 1st Belorussian Front, took part in breaking through the powerful enemy defenses on the Seelow Heights and storming Berlin.

In the post-war period, M.E. Katukov commanded the army, armored and mechanized forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Since 1955 - Inspector General of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, since 1957 - Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ground Forces. In 1963–1976 - in the group of inspectors general of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded four Orders of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov, 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov, 1st degree, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, 1st degree, Kutuzov, 2nd degree, Red Star, “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

Biography

Mikhail Efimovich Katukov was born in the village of Bolshoye Uvarovo, then Kolomensky, and now Ozersky district, Moscow region, into a large peasant family (his father had seven children from two marriages). Russian. As a child, he worked on the dairy farm of a local landowner-baron. He graduated from a rural primary school. Due to the poverty of the family, in 1912 he was sent to relatives in St. Petersburg, first worked as a “boy”-messenger, then worked in the factories of the city.

During the Civil War

In 1917, he took an active part in the October armed uprising in Petrograd. Then he returned home to support his family during the difficult times that followed the death of his mother. He was drafted into the Red Army by the Kolomna military registration and enlistment office in 1919. Participant in the Civil War. As a member of the 54th Rifle Division, a Red Army soldier took part in the fighting on the Don against the rebel Cossacks. After long treatment in hospital for typhus, in 1920 he enlisted in the 57th Infantry Division, in which he fought on the Western Front against Polish troops.

During the interwar period

He graduated from the Mogilev infantry courses in 1922. From 1922, he served for almost 10 years in the 27th Omsk Red Banner Rifle Division, commanding a platoon, company, and battalion. In 1927 he graduated from the rifle-tactical advanced training course for the command staff of the Red Army named after the III Comintern “Vystrel”. Since November 1931 - chief of staff of a rifle regiment in the same 27th division. Member of the CPSU(b) since 1932.

In June 1932, M.E. Katukov's military service changed for the rest of his life: he was transferred to mechanized troops and appointed commander of the 5th separate mechanized brigade in the Belarusian Military District. From December of the same year he was the head of reconnaissance of this brigade, and from September 1933 he was the commander of the training battalion. Since October 1934 - head of the operational department of a motorized rifle brigade in the Kiev Military District. He graduated from the advanced training courses for command personnel at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army in 1935. Since September 1937 - Chief of Staff of the 135th Rifle and Machine-Gun Brigade of the 45th Mechanized Corps in the Kiev Military District. Since April 1938 - acting chief of staff of the 45th mechanized corps. From October 1938 - commander of the 5th light tank brigade, from July 1940 - commander of the 38th light tank brigade. Since the end of 1940 - commander of the 20th Panzer Division.

During the Great Patriotic War

Participant of the Great Patriotic War since June 1941. Commanded the 20th Tank Division in the battle of Lutsk-Dubno-Brody. In August 1941, he led the remnants of the division out of encirclement and was appointed commander of the 4th (later 1st Guards) Tank Brigade, which fought near Mtsensk and in the Volokolamsk direction. The tankmen of Colonel M.E. Katukov had the honor of being the first to inflict a serious defeat on one of the best enemy tankmen, General H. Guderian, in October 1941, and then they distinguished themselves in the defensive stage of the Battle of Moscow.

On November 11, 1941, order N337 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR appeared, which, in particular, said: “The 4th Tank Brigade, with brave and skillful combat actions from 4.X to 11.X, despite the significant numerical superiority of the enemy, inflicted heavy losses on him and fulfilled the tasks assigned to the brigade to cover the concentration of our troops... As a result of fierce battles of the brigade with the 3rd and 4th tank divisions and the enemy motorized division, the Nazis lost 133 tanks, 49 guns, 8 aircraft, 15 tractors with ammunition, up to an infantry regiment , 6 mortars and other weapons. The losses of the 4th Tank Brigade are counted in single units."

For these exploits, Katukov's brigade was the first in the Red Army to receive the Guards banner and became known as the 1st Guards Tank Brigade. Major General of Tank Forces (11/10/1941). During the offensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow, he commanded a combined mobile group consisting of his brigade, another tank and one motorized rifle brigade.

From April 1942 - commander of the 1st Tank Corps, which fought near Voronezh, from September 1942 - commander of the 3rd Mechanized Corps on the Kalinin Front. Lieutenant General of Tank Forces (01/18/1943). From January 1943 until the end of the war, he commanded the 1st Tank Army (from April 1944 renamed the 1st Guards Tank Army), which participated in the Battle of Kursk, the liberation of Ukraine, Poland, and Germany. Colonel General of Tank Forces (04/10/1944).

For skillful leadership of the 1st Guards Tank Army in the Lviv-Sandomierz operation, courage and heroism, on September 23, 1944, Colonel General Katukov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. During this operation, tankers of the 1st Guards Tank Army quickly reached the Vistula, crossed it and, together with infantry, with the support of aviation, captured the Sandomierz bridgehead, which was later used as the initial area of ​​attack during the Vistula-Oder operation.

During the Vistula-Oder operation, the 1st Guards Tank Army was brought into battle at 14.00 on January 15 (the second day of the operation) at a depth of 13–15 km and, together with the 8th Guards Army of General V.I. Chuikov, completed the breakthrough of the second zone defense, advanced by the end of the day to a depth of 25 km. In the second half of January 17, Katukov’s army crossed the Pilica River. On the night of January 18, the advance detachment of the 8th Guards Mechanized Army Corps entered Lodz. It was possible to liberate and preserve almost intact the ancient residence of the Polish kings from the Piast dynasty, the city of Gniezen (Gniezno).

The second Gold Star medal was awarded on April 6, 1945 for skillful leadership of the combat operations of the 1st Guards Tank Army in the East Pomeranian operation.

Participated in the Berlin operation. In its first period, it displeased the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal Zhukov. On April 17, 1945, Zhukov noted in the order: “1. The worst performers of the offensive Berlin operation are the 69th Army under the command of Colonel General Kolpakchi, 1 TA under the command of Colonel General Katukov and 2 TA under the command of Colonel General Bogdanov. These armies , having colossal forces and means, the second [day] they act ineptly and indecisively, trampling in front of a weak enemy. Army commander Katukov and his corps commanders Yushchuk, Dremov, Babajanyan do not observe the battlefield and the actions of their troops, sitting far in the rear (10 - 12 km). These generals do not know the situation and are trailing behind the events..." Due to strong enemy resistance on the Seelow Heights, "On April 17 and 18, the tankers advanced no more than 4 kilometers per day," admits in his memoirs "At the forefront of the main attack "M.E. himself Katukov. Nevertheless, overcoming the stubborn defense of the German troops and repelling fierce counterattacks, the tankers of the 1st Guards Tank Army by the end of April 19 broke through the third defensive line and were able to develop an attack on Berlin, the outskirts of which the tanks of the 1st Guards Army reached on April 22. Katukov's army took part in the assault on the German capital. On the night of April 24, all units of the 1st Guards Tank, together with units of the 8th Guards Army, crossed the Spree River. The axis of advance of the 1st Guards Tank Army passed along Wilhelmstrasse, which abutted the Tiergarten.

In the post-war period

After the war, until 1950, he continued to command the 1st Guards Tank Army as part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Since 1950 - commander of armored and mechanized forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. In 1951 he graduated from the Higher Academic Courses at the Higher Military Academy named after K. E. Voroshilov. Since 1951 - commander of the 5th Guards Mechanized Army. Since 1955 - inspector general of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, then deputy head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ground Forces. The military rank of Marshal of Armored Forces was awarded on October 5, 1959.

Since 1963 - in the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Author of the book of memoirs “At the Edge of the Main Strike.”

Lived in Moscow on Leningradsky Prospekt in the General's House No. 75. Died June 8, 1976. He was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery.

Awards

• medal "Gold Star" of the Hero of the Soviet Union No. 4585 (09.23.1944)
• medal "Gold Star" of the Hero of the Soviet Union No. 5239 (04/06/1945)
• 4 Orders of Lenin
• 3 Orders of the Red Banner
• 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st class
• Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree
• Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, 1st degree
• Order of Kutuzov, 2nd degree
• Order of the Red Star
• Order "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd degree,

As well as medals and foreign orders.

Memory

He was buried in Moscow, at the Novodevichy cemetery, with a monument erected at his grave. A memorial plaque was installed on the house where he lived (Moscow, Leningradsky Prospekt, 75), and an apartment museum was opened. A bronze bust was erected in the city of Ozyory. Streets in the cities are named in honor of M.E. Katukov: Ozyory, Moscow, Volokolamsk, Lipetsk, Mtsensk, Snezhnoye, Borshchev, Chernivtsi, Orel, Kazatin. A monument was erected to him in Kazyatyn for the liberation of this city.

Secondary school No. 37 in the city of Orel is named after M. E. Katukov.