German cavalry. How the cavalry of the Third Reich fought

One of the accusations against Stalin sounds like "On horseback against tanks." This article refutes this myth.

This phrase of Alexander Glebovich Nevzorov inspired us:

“In 41, near Moscow, near the village of Muzino. The German 106th division, supported by the 107th regiment, was waiting for the order to attack, and at that moment the cavalrymen of the 44th cavalry division of the Red Army rushed at them. Gallop, checkers naked. At a distance of a thousand yards, the Germans opened fire with cannons and machine guns. According to an eyewitness, two thousand horses were killed in six minutes. About thirty, bleeding, horses reached the German positions, where they were already shot at point-blank range from rifles and machine guns. The Germans did not lose a single person in the battle near the village of Muzino. The surname of the idiot who gave the 44th division the order to attack seems to me not significant. There were such idiots in the world history of the cavalry

A task. Track the combat path of the 44th cd in the Battle of Moscow (Moscow defensive operation) in the period from 09/30/1941 to 12/5/1941.

It is noteworthy that the date is not indicated, on our own we will add that the place is indicated, apparently incorrectly, since such a settlement is not indicated on the operational map or operational reports. The numbers and designation of the units are also questioned by us, since apparently the designation of the pp (infantry regiment) was deciphered by Nevzorov as a sub-regiment, which, as far as I know, did not exist. This makes everything difficult. So, let's begin…

The 44th Mountain Cavalry Division was concentrated in Central Asia (if I'm not mistaken on the border with Iran), and arrived on the Southwestern Front no earlier than (we could not establish more precisely) November 15, 1941.

“Arrived from Central Asia, the 17th, 20th, 24th and 44th cavalry divisions (each 3 thousand people) made up the second echelon (highlighted by us). The horses turned out not to be reforged for winter, and in the Moscow region the ground was already frozen, ice appeared in the wetlands, and this made it difficult for the cavalry to move. The soldiers and division commanders did not yet have the skills to operate on rough and wooded and swampy terrain. (K.K. Rokossovsky. Soldier's duty. Part 4)

The number of mountain cavalry division is really:

a) The composition of the cavalry in peacetime by 01/01/1938. Cavalry in peacetime (by 01/01/1938) consists of: 2 cavalry divisions (including 5 mountain and 3 territorial), separate cavalry brigades, one separate and 8 reserve cavalry regiments and 7 directorates of cavalry corps. The number of peacetime cavalry on 01/01/1938 is 95,690 people.

b) Organizational measures for cavalry 1938-1942.

In 1938:

a) the number of cavalry divisions is proposed to be reduced by 7 (from 32 to 25), disbanding 7 cavalry divisions using their personnel to replenish the remaining divisions and to reinforce mechanized troops and artillery;

b) disband the two directorates of the cavalry corps;

c) disband two reserve cavalry regiments;

d) in 3 cavalry [corps] to form one anti-aircraft artillery battalion (425 people each);

e) reduce the composition of the cavalry division from 6600 to 5900 people;

e) leave the cavalry divisions of the OKDVA (2) in reinforced strength (6800 people). The number of mountain cavalry divisions to have - 2620 people "

From the report of People's Commissar of Defense K. Voroshilov to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, autumn 1937.

That is, the number of 44 cd was 2620 people, 2 "incomplete" cavalry regiments - 45 and 51. We will need this.

The first thing I rushed to was Google, and this is what I managed to find:

“15.11-5.12, troops of the right wing (30A, 16A, 1 beats A and 20A) Zap. Front (Army General G.K. Zhukov) in cooperation with Kalinin. front (gen.-p. I. S. Konev) during the Moscow defensive operation of 1941. The goal is to prevent the breakthrough of the strike group of the pr-ka (3rd and 4th tank groups) to Moscow with S. Stubborn Soviet defense troops inflicted significant damage on the enemy and frustrated his plan. This allowed the owls. command to win time to concentrate strategic reserves and go on the counteroffensive.

From Zhukov's order of November 1: "To carry out the defense as an active defense, combined with counterattacks. Don't wait for the enemy to strike himself. Going into counterattacks ourselves .... This is how our Stalin teaches us.

... On November 15, the 58th Panzer Division, which arrived from the Far East and did not have time to conduct reconnaissance of the terrain and enemy positions, advancing through the swamps, lost 157 tanks out of 198 and a third of its personnel. At the same time, the 17th and 44th cavalry divisions attacked the German infantry and tanks of the 4th tank group in a wide field. The 44th was killed almost completely, and the 17th lost 3/4 of its personnel. The 316th Rifle Division was about to attack Volokolamsk from the south.

The date is November 15th. Nevzorov also tells us about 2,000 corpses (more than a cavalry regiment). That is, the combat effectiveness of the division should be almost at zero - wild losses plus a moral factor. However, let us doubt this. And that's why.

“19.11 44 ​​cd was concentrated in the area of ​​BORIHINO - BOGAIKHA - PETROVSKOE.

21.11 44 ​​cd is concentrated in the SPAS-NUDOL area.

21.11 44th cd from the SPAS-NUDOL area was nominated to support units of the 18th and 78th rifle divisions in the area of ​​YADROMINO - KHOLUYANIKHA; its position is specified.

22.11 44 ​​cd: 45 checkpoint at 15.00 22.11 passed GORKI, with the task of capturing the BAKLANOVO - TRUNYAYEVKA - SITNIKOVO area; 51 CP at 7.30 joined the battle with two enemy battalions and by 15.00, having lost up to 150 people killed and wounded and 4 guns, withdrew with one squadron to the KRESTENEVO area, the rest of the forces to the Skripyashchevo area.

23.11 Remains of 44 cd, 1 guards. brigade, 23, 27 and 28 brigade are concentrated in the SAVELYEVO area.

Cavalry group Dovator, 44 cd, two battalions of the 8th Guards. sd and tank battalions 129 and 146 tank brigade at 13.00 24.11 launched a counterattack from the line CROSS - SKORODUME - OBUKHOVO - KRYVTSOVO and captured the area of ​​​​STRELINA - SHAPKINO - MARTYNOVO - SELISCHEVO.

18 sd, 1 guards. brigade, 54 cp 44 cd fought containment battles with the enemy at the same line.

27.11 2 Guards. kk (3.4 guards. cd and 44 cd) firmly held the line of defense MIKHAILOVKA - SNOPOVKA - ^ ZHUKOVO.

28.11 2 Guards. kk (3, 4 guards. cd and 44 cd) held back the enemy’s offensive at the line of BEREZKI - ROSTOVTSEVO - ALEKSEEVSKOYE - sowing. edge of the forest south of MILECHKINO.

30.11 44 ​​cd, defending the western outskirts of KRYUKOVO, held back the enemy offensive with a force of up to 30 tanks.

1.12 44 cd occupied the MTS line (north-eastern outskirts of KRYUKOVO) - KIRP (east of KRYUKOVO).

2.12 8 Guards. sd, 44 cd and 1 guards. brigade fought at the turn of ALEKSANDROVKA - KRYUKOVO - KAMENKA. After fierce fighting. ALEKSANDROVKA and KAMENKA were left by our units. 10 enemy tanks were destroyed in KRYUKOVO.

3.12 2 Guards. jus from 20th and 44th cd defended the KUTUZOVO - RUZINO - BREHOVO line, advancing with part of the forces on the Kamenka area.

4.12 44 cd after a fierce unsuccessful battle for the area KAMENKA retreated to the western edge of the forest east of the KAMENKA area, where it went on the defensive.

(Battle of Moscow. Chronicle, facts, people: In 2 books. - M .: OLMA-PRESS, 2001. - Book 1.)

We see that all this time the division is constantly fighting, and also counterattacking. And this, with a huge shortage of human and horse resources, most likely, they could not replenish part of up to two cavalry regiments. In addition, on the operational map published on the same site, we see that on 11/15/1941 44 cd was in the second echelon and did not take part in the battles, which is consistent with other sources. These maps agree quite well with the materials we have cited earlier. We will rely on them. So, on 11/22/1941, the division has the task of capturing the BAKLANOVO - TRUNYAEVKA - SITNIKOVO area (45 CP from the Gorka area); 51 CP (from the Kostenevo area) at 7.30 joined the battle with two enemy battalions (just the same 106th infantry division that covered the flank of the 2nd (tank division) advancing on Baklanovo-Vvedenskoye-Misirevo) and by 15.00, having lost up to 150 people killed and wounded and 4 guns, withdrew with one squadron to the Krestenevo region, with the rest of the forces to the Skripishchevo region (apparently it is possible to believe the data of the book, since large losses are reported in it (more than 40-50%)). Speaking of expediency: this blow was sent to the flank of the advancing enemy (2 TD and 106 PD) in order to disrupt the offensive. That is, the most effective of the possible options - mobile formations to the flank of the enemy's mobile formations. But the Germans covered the flanks well. Apparently this fight is meant, although we can only assume this with a high degree of probability.

The order to attack came, most likely, from the immediate superiors - the commander of the 16th Army, Lieutenant General (in the future Marshal, twice Hero of the USSR) K. Rokossovsky. It should be recalled that it is to this "idiot" (as well as to many other "idiots" from the cavalry, of whom "there were a lot", because most of them served in the cavalry under the king) we owe our lives. And they should know their names and surnames. Know and respect.

It was precisely by constant counteroffensives and offensives that it was necessary to wrest the initiative from the enemy.

“The offensive will continue to be the most decisive type of military operations. Considerations of a psychological nature require that combat training and command of troops should be based on preparation for offensive operations. An army that is not trained in an offensive spirit is like a knight without a sword. Troops well prepared for offensive operations, after appropriate training, will be able to hold out on the defensive.

“The offensive is carried out on the enemy in order to crush him. It allows you to impose your will on the enemy and forces him to conduct military operations in a direction that is beneficial to us. In the offensive, the superiority of the commander and troops (highlighted by us) is most clearly manifested.

(Eike Middeldorf. Russian company: tactics and weapons. St. Petersburg. Polygon Publishing House, 2000)

Only the offensive allowed the cavalry units to show all their qualities to the fullest. Most of the losses in the horse composition, according to the memoirs of WWII veterans, came from bombing and shelling when the horses were standing. In addition, oddly enough, but near Moscow, our units, in general, fighting defensive battles, the best thing they could do (and did) was to attack. At the first opportunity. The success of defensive operations primarily depends on the organization of counterattacks, and cavalry divisions, in the absence of tank formations larger than a brigade, were most successful. Unfortunately, the contribution that our grandfathers who fought on horseback made was unfairly forgotten. And we owe this to Comrade Nevzorov and others like him.

Another thing is that often, due to the very tense situation at the front, offensives were poorly prepared, communication with the units participating in the offensive was poorly organized. In the conditions of the haste of the defensive battle, when the German tank divisions broke through into the depths of the defense, the counterattack formations were introduced into battle in parts, as they arrived, often without proper preparation. The inexperience of soldiers and commanders at the initial stage of the war can also serve as some justification for heavy losses, however, more on that later. The victory was forged near Moscow and both cavalry and horses were invested in it separately.

In general, we consider it necessary to note that the cavalry corps were among the most combat-ready formations of the Red Army. As noted earlier, by 1939 the number of cavalry was declining.

“Cavalry formations were reorganized into mechanized ones. In particular, such a fate befell the 4th Cavalry Corps, whose command and 34th division became the basis for the 8th Mechanized Corps. The commander of the cavalry corps, Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Ryabyshev, led the mechanized corps and led it in June 1941 into battle against German tanks near Dubno.

In 1923, B. M. Shaposhnikov's book "Cavalry (Cavalry Essays)" was published, which outlines the role and tasks of the cavalry in the conditions of modern warfare. No exaltation of the cavalry or reassessment of its role is visible. Many of our talented generals and marshals left the cavalry - three times hero of the USSR Budyonny, four times hero of the USSR Zhukov, twice hero of the USSR Rokossovsky, hero of the USSR Eremenko, twice hero of the USSR Lelyushenko and many more. All of them understood that although it is necessary to take into account the experience of the Civil War, military thought does not stand still and the cavalry in modern warfare should have somewhat different tasks than those that were previously assigned to it.

The field manual of the Red Army in 1939: “The most appropriate use of cavalry formations together with tank formations, motorized infantry and aviation is ahead of the front (in the absence of contact with the enemy), on the incoming flank, in the development of a breakthrough, behind enemy lines, in raids and pursuit. Cavalry formations are able to consolidate their success and hold the terrain. However, at the first opportunity, they must be released from this task in order to save them for maneuver. The actions of the cavalry unit must in all cases be reliably covered from the air. Composition:

“The regular cavalry divisions of 1941 had four cavalry regiments, a horse artillery battalion (eight 76-mm cannons and eight 122-mm howitzers), a tank regiment (64 BT tanks), an anti-aircraft division (eight 76-mm anti-aircraft guns and two batteries of anti-aircraft machine guns), a communications squadron, a sapper squadron, and other rear units and institutions. The cavalry regiment, in turn, consisted of four saber squadrons, a machine-gun squadron (16 heavy machine guns and four 82-mm mortars), regimental artillery (four 76-mm and four 45-mm guns), an anti-aircraft battery (three 37-mm guns and three quadruple maxims). The total authorized strength of the cavalry division was 8968 people and 7625 horses, the cavalry regiment, respectively, 1428 people and 1506 horses. The cavalry corps of a two-divisional composition roughly corresponded to a motorized division, having somewhat less mobility and a lower weight of an artillery volley.

(Isaev A. Antisuvorov. Ten myths of World War II. - M .: Eksmo, Yauza, 2004.)

We can see that the cavalry unit is not only horses and checkers, but also artillery, tanks, anti-aircraft guns, machine guns ... The cavalry was a formidable, quite modern force, very mobile (sometimes cavalry units were required to go up to 90-95 km, which is a difficult task for mechanized units as well) and practically independent of fuel and having the highest maneuverability, where a tank will not pass, a horse will pass. In addition, most of the cavalry units are old units with their well-established combat traditions (for example, 5th and 2nd cavalry divisions), ideologically and psychologically strong, or recruited from regions traditionally strong in cavalry - Terek, Kuban (2 Guards KK - 50 and 53 KD - Dovator case). Unlike the mechanized corps, the cavalry corps in 1941 were able to survive in all retreats and encirclements, constantly counterattacking, making raids behind enemy lines and coming to the aid of other parts of our army.

Here is an excerpt from the book of Heinz Guderian (the same Colonel-General Hapner served under his command) “Memories of a Soldier.” (Smolensk: Rusich, 1999.)

“On September 18, a critical situation developed in the Romny region. Early in the morning on the eastern flank the noise of battle was heard, which in the course of the subsequent time became more and more intensified. Fresh enemy forces - the 9th Cavalry Division and another division, together with tanks - advanced from the east to Romny in three columns, approaching the city at a distance of 800 m. From the high tower of the prison, located on the outskirts of the city, I had the opportunity to clearly observe the enemy was advancing, the 24th Panzer Corps was instructed to repel the enemy offensive. To accomplish this task, the corps had at its disposal two battalions of the 10th motorized division and several anti-aircraft batteries. Due to the superiority of enemy aircraft, our air reconnaissance was in a difficult state. Lieutenant Colonel von Barsevish, who personally flew out on reconnaissance, with difficulty eluded the Russian fighters. This was followed by an enemy air raid on Romny. In the end, we still managed to keep the city of Romny and the advanced command post in our hands ... The threatened situation of the city of Romny forced me on September 19 to transfer my command post back to Konotop. General von Geyer made this decision easier for us with his radiogram, in which he wrote: "The transfer of the command post from Romna will not be interpreted by the troops as a manifestation of cowardice on the part of the command of the tank group."

As you can see, there is no neglect or underestimation of the enemy. Cavalry enemy! And only the cavalry could successfully operate in an isolated breakthrough (raid), causing damage to the materiel, smashing warehouses, destroying communications, equipment and manpower of the enemy. It is impossible to underestimate her contribution to the Victory.

In conclusion, I would like to say the following. Now I quite often hear or read about what they did wrong then, killed a lot of people ... Here I read from Nevzorov about the senselessness of using cavalry, about the terrible torment of horses in the war. It is my deep conviction that war is the greatest disaster for all living things. And not just for the horse. It is absurd and wrong to evaluate the military from a position of peacetime and peaceful views.

The military first of all carries out the order, no matter how sometimes it is incomprehensible to him, he must fulfill it. Because the command knows more, it has an idea of ​​the entire operational situation. And therefore, to consider individual attacks, even if they ended in failure, in isolation from the premises, consequences, drawing him by the ears to my calculations, I consider it fundamentally wrong from a scientific point of view and complete disrespect for those who fought then, from the general to the soldier. Apparently after so many years, being engaged in a warm stable with your horses, you can rant about the senselessness of the War and the liberation of Europe, never coming into contact with the horrors that really were. I revere the veterans and am immensely grateful to them. All this is part of the history of my country, and therefore me personally. Disrespectful to her - do not respect yourself.

And the anti-Soviet people do not understand that cavalrymen traveled on horseback. And they did not go on horseback to attack the tanks. It's like thinking that motorcycle shooters are attacking in trucks.

German cavalry

The motorization of the Wehrmacht is usually greatly exaggerated, and, worst of all, they forget about the purely cavalry units that existed in every infantry division. This is a reconnaissance detachment with a staff of 310 people. He almost completely moved on horseback - it included 216 riding horses, 2 motorcycles and only 9 cars. The divisions of the first wave also had armored cars, but in the general case, the reconnaissance of the Wehrmacht infantry division was carried out by a completely ordinary cavalry squadron, reinforced with 75-mm light infantry and 37-mm anti-tank guns.

German cavalrymen from the reconnaissance battalion of an infantry division with an MP-40.

In addition, in the Wehrmacht at the time of the outbreak of war with the USSR there was one cavalry division. In September 1939 she was still a cavalry brigade. The brigade, included in the Army Group North, participated in the battles on the Narew, the storming of Warsaw in mid-September 1939. Already in the fall of 1939, it was reorganized into a cavalry division and, as such, participated in the campaign in the West, ending it on the coast Atlantic. Before the attack on the USSR, she was included in the 2nd Panzer Group of Heinz Guderian. The division quite successfully acted together with tank formations, maintaining their pace of advance. The only problem was supplying her 17,000 horses. Therefore, it is in the winter of 1941-1942. was reorganized into the 24th Panzer Division. The revival of the cavalry in the Wehrmacht took place in the middle of 1942, when one cavalry regiment was formed as part of the army groups North, Center and South. A feature of the organization of the regiment was the presence in its composition of an armored battalion with a company of motorized infantry for 15 half-track armored personnel carriers "ganomag". In addition, by mid-1942, cavalry appeared among the troops that are usually associated with "tigers" and "panthers" - the SS. Back in 1941, the 1st SS Cavalry Brigade was formed in Poland, deployed by the summer of 1942 into the 1st SS Cavalry Division. This division participated in one of the largest battles of the Army Group Center - repulsing the Soviet offensive in the Rzhev region, carried out as part of Operation Mars in November-December 1942. The appearance of "tigers" and "panthers" did not lead to the destruction of the German cavalry . On the contrary, in 1944, separate army cavalry regiments were reorganized into the 3rd and 4th cavalry brigades. Together with the 1st Hungarian cavalry division, they made up the Von Hartenek cavalry corps, which participated in the battles on the border of East Prussia, in December 1944 it was transferred to Hungary. In February 1945 (!!! - A.I.) the brigades were reorganized into divisions, and in March of the same year they took part in the last offensive of the German troops in World War II - the counterattack of the SS Panzer Army near Lake Balaton. Two SS cavalry divisions also fought in Hungary - the 8th "Florian Geyer" and the 22nd "Maria Theresa", formed in 1944. Both of them were destroyed in the "cauldron" near Budapest. From the remnants of the divisions that jumped out of the encirclement in March 1945, the 37th SS cavalry division “Lützow” was formed.

Steward of the 8th SS Cavalry Division "Florian Geyer". Horses were the transport of World War II cavalry, and during battle they were usually bored under the supervision of horsemen.

The final. Soviet cavalrymen water their horses in the Oder. 1945

As we can see, the Germans were by no means disdainful of such a type of troops as cavalry. Moreover, they ended the war with several times the number of cavalry units available than at its beginning.

Stories about stupid, backward cavalrymen throwing themselves at tanks with sabers are, at best, a delusion of people who are poorly versed in tactical and operational issues. As a rule, these misconceptions are the result of dishonesty of historians and memoirists. The cavalry was quite an adequate means of conducting maneuverable combat operations in 1939-1945. The Red Army demonstrated this most clearly. The cavalry of the Red Army in the prewar years has undergone a sharp reduction. It was believed that she could not seriously compete with tank and motorized formations on the battlefield. Of the 32 cavalry divisions and 7 corps directorates available by 1938, 4 corps and 13 cavalry divisions remained by the beginning of the war. However, the experience of the war showed that with the reduction of the cavalry hastened. The creation of only motorized units and formations was, firstly, unbearable for domestic industry, and secondly, the nature of the terrain in the European part of the USSR in many cases did not favor the use of vehicles. All this led to the revival of large cavalry formations. Even at the end of the war, when the nature of hostilities had changed significantly compared to 1941-1942, 7 cavalry corps successfully operated in the Red Army, 6 of them bore the honorary title of guards. In fact, during its decline, the cavalry returned to the standard of 1938 - 7 departments of cavalry corps. The Wehrmacht cavalry experienced a similar evolution - from one brigade in 1939 to several cavalry divisions in 1945.

In 1941–1942 The cavalry played a crucial role in defensive and offensive operations, becoming the indispensable "quasi-motorized infantry" of the Red Army. In fact, before the appearance in the Red Army of large independent mechanized formations and formations, cavalry was the only maneuverable means of the operational level. In 1943-1945, when the mechanisms of tank armies were finally fine-tuned, the cavalry became a subtle tool for solving especially important tasks in offensive operations. Tellingly, the number of cavalry corps was approximately equal to the number of tank armies. There were six tank armies in 1945, and seven cavalry corps. Most of both of them bore the rank of Guards by the end of the war. If the tank armies were the sword of the Red Army, then the cavalry was a sharp and long sword. Typical task of cavalrymen in 1943-1945. there was the formation of an outer front of encirclement, a breakthrough far into the depths of the enemy defenses at a time when the old front was crumbling and a new one had not yet been created. On a good highway, the cavalry certainly lagged behind the motorized infantry. But on dirt roads and in wooded and swampy areas, it could advance at a pace quite comparable to that of motorized infantry. In addition, unlike motorized infantry, the cavalry did not require a constant delivery of many tons of fuel. This allowed the cavalry corps to advance deeper than most of the mechanized formations and ensure a high rate of advance for the armies and fronts as a whole. Cavalry breakthroughs to great depths made it possible to save the forces of infantrymen and tankmen.

Only a person who does not have the slightest idea about the tactics of the cavalry and has a vague idea of ​​​​its operational use can assert that the cavalry is a backward branch of the army, only due to the thoughtlessness of the leadership remaining in the Red Army.